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RECHARGING THE JURY:
THE CRIMINAL JURY'S CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE
IN AN ERA OF MANDATORY SENTENCING
RACHEL E. BARKOW'
[L]et it be again remembered, that delays, and little inconveniences in
the forms ofjustice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their
liberty in more substantial matters; that these inroads upon this sacred
bulwark of the nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our
constitution; and that, though begun in trifles, the precedent may
gradually increase and spread to the utter disuse of juries in questions of
the utmost concern.
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INTRODUCTION
More than 200 years ago, William Blackstone warned that we must
protect the criminal jury not from "open attacks," but from "secret
machinations" that on their face seem convenient and benign. He
argued that the delays and "inconveniences" of the criminal jury were
a fair price for free nations to "pay for their liberty."
3
Even though the Framers of the Constitution disagreed about a
great many things in Philadelphia, they concurred with Blackstone's
estimation of the criminaljury. From the outset, the criminal jury was
designed to be part of our elaborate system of checks and balances,
placing a check on the legislature and executive to ensure that no one
received criminal punishment unless a group of ordinary citizens
agreed. Thus, even before the Sixth Amendment guaranteed "the
right to. . . an impartial jury,, 4 the criminal jury was enshrined in the
Constitution as a check on the government. Article Ill-the frame-
work for the judiciary-provides that the "the Trial of all Crimes...
shall be by Jury.
" 5
Today, however, the jury's role as a check on the government's
power has become far more limited. The criminal process in the
United States has become largely an administrative one, with the po-
lice, prosecutors, and judges overseeing the criminal laws with little
intervention by the people. The rise of plea bargaining is, of course,
part of the reason for the administrative regime we now have. But it is
merely the most obvious cause; it is not the only one.
In fact, a much more subtle development-a "secret machina-
tion"-has eroded the jury's and, consequently, the judiciary's power
to check the government. Over the past few decades, the federal gov-
ernment and many states have embraced mandatory minimum sen-
tences and binding sentencing guidelines. There has been a barrage
of criticism of mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines for
limiting the discretion ofjudges and increasing the power of prosecu-
tors.6 But what has been all but ignored is the effect of these
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
6 See, e.g., KATE STITH & jose A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 78-103 (1998) (arguing that limiting judges' sen-
tencing discretion dilutes the moral validity of criminal laws and leads to an unprinci-
pled sentencing jurisprudence); Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines:
A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 926 (1991) (noting that sentencing
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sentencing laws on the jury's ability to check the legislature and the
executive. Yet it is only by considering the effect these laws have had
on the judiciary writ large-judges andjuries-that it is possible to see
the full impact these laws have on the constitutional order.
The focus has been on judges alone because the most obvious ef-
fect of these laws (and the intent in passing them) is to limit the dis-
cretion of judges. Moreover, it is neither intuitive nor immediately
apparent why or how mandatory sentencing laws intrude on the jury's
function to a greater extent than the sentencing regime that existed
before such guidelines. After all, even before the advent of sentenc-
ing guidelines, judges were making critical factual determinations that
were used to increase defendants' sentences. Commentators have
pointed to this fact to argue that the jury's factfinding powers in
criminal cases were compromised long before the age of sentencing
guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences.7 Consequently, de-
terminate sentencing laws seem to have done little to affect the jury's
existing role.
But this analysis holds only if the jury performs solely the role of
factfinder in a criminal proceeding. In fact, the jury does much more
reform creates a "prosecutor's paradise" wherein prosecutors wield wide discretion);
Bradford C. Mank, Rewarding Defendant Cooperation Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines: Judges vs. Prosecutors, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 399, 402-04 (1990) (listing problems aris-
ing from increasing prosecutorial discretion); Michael Tonry, Mandatory Minimum Pen-
alties and the U.S. Sentencing Commission's "Mandatory Guidelines," 4 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 129, 132 & 133 n.12 (1991) (citing REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMiTTEE 23, 37-38 (1990)) (discussing a survey of district court judges that found a
common complaint with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be the elimination of
judicial discretion).
7 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World
of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1126-27, 1134 (2001) (finding that, at common law
and in the Nation's early history, judges had broad discretion in sentencing); Nancy J.
King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1467, 1506-13 (2001) (de-
scribing the decline of mandatory penalties and the increase of judicial discretion to
set penalties in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and arguing that
this history shows that juries have played a "low-level gatekeeping" role for years (quot-
ingJones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 244 (1999))); see also Apprendi v. NewJersey,
530 U.S. 466, 544 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that, in light of the
Court's acceptance of discretionary sentencing, "it is difficult to understand how the
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments could possibly require" a limit on determi-
nate sentencing schemes). But see Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO.
L.J. 387, 454 (2002) (drawing a distinction between determinate sentencing and dis-
cretionary sentencing based on the fact that positive laws imposing punishment are "by
definition a matter of fault" and arguing that the jury must make these fault determi-
nations).
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than that." Unlike their civil counterparts, criminal juries have the
constitutional power not merely to find facts, but also to apply the law
to those facts." Criminal juries have the power to issue a general ver-
dict of "guilty" or "not guilty" under the law, based on whatever facts
they find. And when the verdict is "not guilty," the jury's decision is
unreviewable. This power translates into the power to nullify the law. If
the criminal jury believes that a law should not apply in a particular
case because its application would be unjust, the jury has the power to
ignore that law, regardless of the law's language. In other words, ju-
rors have the kind of ameliorative power Aristotle deemed critical for
producing equitable results.'
This power to mitigate or nullify the law in an individual case is no
accident. It is part of the constitutional design-and has remained
part of that design since the Nation's founding. In an age in which we
have grown accustomed to bureaucratic rationality and the adminis-
trative state, this power seems strangely out of place. But it serves a
valuable function. Roscoe Pound praised the jury's power to mitigate
or temper the letter of the law in the name ofjustice as "the great cor-
rective of law in its actual administration."" Judge Learned Hand
similarly observed that:
The institution of trial by jury-especially in criminal cases-has its hold
upon public favor chiefly for two reasons. The individual can forfeit his
liberty-to say nothing of his life-only at the hands of those who, unlike
any official, are in no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what
they do, and who at once separate and melt anonymously in the commu-
nity from which they came. Moreover, since if they acquit their verdict is
final, no one is likely to suffer of whose conduct they do not morally dis-
approve; and this introduces a slack into the enforcement of law, temper-
ing its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions. A
trial by anyjury, however small, preserves both these fundamental elements
8 See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995) (rejecting the argument
that the jury is a "mere factfinder").
9 Id. at 513 (acknowledging "the historical and constitutionally guaranteed right of
criminal defendants to demand that the jury decide guilt or innocence on every issue,
which includes application of the law to the facts").
10 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. 5, ch. 10, pt. 1137b, 11. 17-24, at 144-45
(Terence Irwin trans., 1985) (n.d.).
11 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 18 (1910); see
also 4 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE § 116, at 20, 25 (1959) ("The chief reliance of
the common law for individualizing the application of law has been the power ofjuries
to render general verdicts.").
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and a trial by ajudge preserves neither, at least to anything like the same
degree.
2
This power to issue an unreviewable general verdict despite the letter
of the law introduces a critical check on the government before it can
impose criminal punishment and provides a mechanism for correct-
ing overinclusive general criminal laws.
This powerful safety valve can operate, however, only if the jury re-
tains control over laws that dictate criminal punishment. For almost
200 years, this went unquestioned-that is, until the advent of manda-
tory sentencing schemes like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentencing laws. These laws dictate criminal
punishment upon the finding of particular facts, yet these general
laws are being applied by judges, not by juries. As a result, prosecu-
tors can seek review of trial judges' decisions, thereby preventing
judges from individualizing punishment and tempering the law in
particular cases if doing so violates the letter of the law itself. This is
something prosecutors could not do ifjuries applied these laws.
Remarkably, this enormous intrusion on the jury's power has gone
virtually unnoticed. Courts and commentators have been lulled into
acceptance of this regime, insofar as it relates to the jury, because
their view of the jury as a factfinder has prevented them from seeing
how these sentencing laws differ from the previous discretionary sen-
tencing regime. Legislators, too, seemed to enact these mandatory
sentencing laws believing that their only effect was on judges, not ju-
ries. But to describe the effect of mandatory sentencing laws on
judges tells only half the story.
This Article tells the other half. It is the effect of these laws on
judges and juries in tandem-the judiciary-that makes them so trou-
bling. The operation of these laws prevents the judiciary from ensur-
ing in each case that a criminal law properly applies. To the extent
that the correction of overinclusive laws is a key component of our
constitutional order-and the jury's unreviewable power to acquit de-
spite the letter of the law suggests that it is, at least in criminal cases-
criminal proceedings come up short when these laws are applied by
judges instead of the jury. Because of the mandatory nature of these
laws and prosecutors' ability to seek review when judges depart from
them, trial judges lack the necessary discretion and flexibility to
ensure that these laws make sense in individual cases. This story has
12 United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
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been told many times by commentators. What has been ignored,
however, is the fact that the Constitution provides a ready-made safety
valve for precisely this problem. Juries by design, with their unreview-
able power to acquit, can act as a check on overinclusive or overrigid
criminal laws. To be sure, this is an imperfect check, especially given
the limited information the jury now receives at trial. 3 But even with
its limitations, the jury retains the power to individualize laws to some
extent and to ensure an equitable result, regardless of the legislature's
language or its view ex ante about what should apply as a general mat-
ter.
This Article considers whether and when the legislature should
have the power to close this safety valve by placing the authority to ap-
ply laws that trigger criminal punishments with judges instead of ju-
ries. This question is especially timely. During the past few years and
culminating in a pair of cases decided at the end of the 2002 Term,
the Supreme Court has addressed the question of how much freedom
legislatures should have in identifying so-called sentencing factors that
trigger punishment and in having those laws applied byjudges instead
of juries. And the Court will consider the issue again this Term in
Blakely v. Washington.14 Thus far, however, a majority of the Court has
been unwilling to use these cases to reinvigorate the jury's-and thus
the judiciary's-structural constitutional role.
Initially, it looked as if the Court was on a path that would
strengthen the jury. In 2000, the Court decided the landmark case of
Apprendi v. New Jersey,15 in which the Court held that any fact (other
than recidivism) 16 that has the legal effect of increasing a penalty
13 The jury is typically not told the sentencing consequences of its guilty verdict,
nor is it told that it has the power to acquit against the evidence. See infra text accom-
panying notes 155-60, 206; see also PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE,
LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 213 (1995) (noting
that jury nullification can bring community standards to bear on criminal codes, but
that this safety valve is an imperfect one in part because some juries might be unaware
of their nullification power).
14 47 P.3d 149 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 20,
2003) (No. 02-1632).
15 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
1 In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226 (1998), the Court held, in
a 54 decision, that the legislature could make recidivism a sentencing factor even if
that factor increased the defendant's sentence above the maximum permitted for the
charged offense. The Court in Apprendi distinguished Almendarez-Torres based on the
fact that "there is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment
of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury
trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof." 530
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above a statutory maximum punishment is an offense element that
must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of
whether the legislature has labeled that fact a sentencing factor. 17 Ap-
prendi was seen by some as a "watershed" opinion'8 because the Court
indicated for the first time a willingness to place a substantive limit on
the legislature's freedom to allocate facts between sentencing and
trial. '
U.S. at 496. For a defense of treating recidivism differently based on an estoppel the-
ory, see Note, Awaiting the Mikado: Limiting Legislative Discretion to Define Criminal Ele-
ments and Sentencing Factors, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1349, 1362-66 (1999).
17 In Apprendi, the Court considered a NewJersey statutory scheme that permitted
a judge to enhance a defendant's sentence for an underlying offense based on the
judge's finding that the defendant committed the crime with "a purpose to intimidate
an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, relig-
ion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity." 530 U.S. at 469 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:44-3(e) (West 1995) (repealed 2001)). Under this "hate-crime" statute, ajudge
could increase a sentence even above the statutory maximum for the underlying con-
viction. Id. at 491.
is Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Douglas A. Berman,
Appraising and Appreciating Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 303, 303 (2000) ("Ap-
prendi is indisputably a significant decision for modern sentencing reforms."); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Supreme Court Review: A Dramatic Change in Sentencing Practices, TRIAL,
Nov. 2000, at 102 (calling Apprendi "one of the most important U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in years"); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apr~s Apprendi, 12 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 331, 331 (2000) ("This due process rule is properly labeled 'water-
shed,' as it is bound to change the course of criminal litigation significantly .. "
(footnote omitted));J. Stephen Welceh, Apprendi v. NewJersey: Watershed Ruling for the
New Millennium?, S.C. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 37, 37 (noting that Apprendi "may truly
be such a 'watershed' ruling").
Although the Court at one time indicated a willingness to place substantive lim-
its on the legislature's ability to define offense elements for burden-of-proof purposes,
the Court quickly backed away from that position. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975) (rejecting a Maine law that distinguished between murder and
manslaughter for sentencing purposes but placed the burden of proving heat of pas-
sion on the defendant), with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07, 210 (1977)
(allowing the legislature broad freedom to distinguish between offense elements and
affirmative defenses). Until 1999, the Supreme Court seemed on a path to grant legis-
latures similar freedom in allocating facts between trial and sentencing. See Almendarez-
Torres, 523 U.S. at 243-47 (1998) (holding that a legislature could make recidivism a
sentencing factor even if the recidivism factor increased the defendant's sentence
above the maximum permitted for the charged offense); McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (upholding a mandatory minimum sentencing provision and,
relying on Patterson, concluding that, "in determining what facts must be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt[,] the state legislature's definition of the elements of the of-
fense is usually dispositive"). In 1999, the Court began expressing constitutional
doubts about whether a legislature could constitutionally treat a fact (other than re-
cidivism) as a sentencing factor if it increased a statutory maximum. See Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 232-39 (1999) (construing the federal caijacking statute to
avoid constitutional questions and finding that the factor at issue was an element of
the crime rather than a sentencing factor). But it was not until Apprendi that the
2003]
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But the content of that substantive limit-and therefore the pro-
tection for the jury-remained in doubt. In particular, it was unclear
whether the Court would extend its logic to mandatory sentencing
guideline schemes like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines or manda-• • 20
tory minimums. As the dissent in Apprendi pointed out, there was lit-
tle to distinguish the statutory scheme at issue in that case from a sen-
tencing guideline regime that also effectively increases the maximum
sentence allowed." At the same time, however, the Court's stated test
was limited to facts that increased a penalty above a statutory maximum,
not to facts that increased a Guidelines maximum or that dictated a
22
mandatory minimum sentence. After Apprendi, then, the Court was
at a true crossroads in terms of the jury's future.
During the 2002 Term, the Court seemed to put to rest a reading
of Apprendi that would give broader protection to the jury's structural
role. At first glance, it may have appeared that the Court's commit-
ment to the jury was actually growing stronger. In Ring v. Arizona,
23
the Court relied on Apprendi to strike down Arizona's death penalty
24scheme. Under Arizona law, the jury's verdict finding Ring guilty of
first-degree felony murder authorized a maximum punishment of life
imprisonment. A death sentence could not be imposed under state
law until "at least one aggravating factor [was] found to exist beyond a
Court's holding placed a constitutional limit on the legislature's freedom to allocate
facts between trial and sentencing. 530 U.S. at 49t-97.
20 In his concurrence in Apprendi, Justice Thomas indicated that he would take
Apprendi further. Specifically, Justice Thomas stated his view that "authority establishes
that a 'crime' includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing pun-
ishment (in contrast with a fact that mitigates punishment)." 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas,
J., concurring). He noted that he is "aware of no historical basis for treating as a
nonelement a fact that by law sets or increases punishment." Id. at 521. Although Jus-
tice Thomas reserved the question, it would appear that his proposed standard would
call into question the Sentencing Guidelines because they permit a judge to increase a
sentence based on her particular factual findings. Id. at 522-23, 523 n.1 1.
21 Id. at 531 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
22 Because a rule based on a statutory maximum could be easily evaded, Justice
O'Connor's dissent "suspect[ed] that the constitutional principle underlying [the
Court's] decision is more far reaching." Id. at 543. In particular, she worried that
"[t]he actual principle underlying the Court's decision may be that any fact (other
than a prior conviction) that has the effect, in real terns, of increasing the maximum
punishment beyond an otherwise applicable range must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 543-44. Justice O'Connor therefore read
the Court's opinion as calling into question "all determinate-sentencing schemes in
which the length of a defendant's sentence within the statutory range turns on specific
factual determinations," including the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 544.
23 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
24 Id. at 589.
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reasonable doubt.'2 5 The Court held that, pursuant to the constitu-
tionaIjury guarantee, that fact had to be found by ajury, not ajudge.
With this holding, the Court made clear that Apprendi applies in capi-
tal prosecutions no less than in other prosecutions. Indeed, to reach
the result it did in Ring, the Court overruled its decision in Walton v.
Arizona2 7 and effectively declared at least five states' capital schemes
unconstitutional.
Standing alone, Ring perhaps could have been read to lend fur-
ther support to the predictions that Apprendi would usher in an age of
greater jury power. But in an opinion released the same day as Ring,
the Court established limits beyond which Apprendi would not go. In
Harris v. United States,2" the Court held that the Constitution does not
require juries to find facts that trigger mandatory minimum punish-
ments.' The Court reasoned that judges alone can make those de-
terminations because "the jury's verdict has authorized the judge to
impose the minimum with or without the finding."3' Four justices-
the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy-could
not distinguish mandatory minimum sentencing from the previous
discretionary regime in which judges selected a penalty within a statu-
tory range. "If the facts judges consider when exercising their discre-
tion within the statutory range are not elements," the plurality rea-
soned, "they do not become as much merely because legislatures
require the judge to impose a minimum sentence when those facts are
found-a sentence thejudge could have imposed absent the finding.3 2
Because that minimum sentence could be imposed "with or without
25 State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1152 (Ariz. 2001).
26 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
27 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
28 In addition to Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska "commit both
capital sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to judges."
Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 n.6. The capital scheme in four additional states (Alabama,
Delaware, Florida, and Indiana) may also be unconstitutional in light of Ring because
the jury renders only an advisory verdict and the judge possesses the ultimate capital
sentencing authority. Id.
29 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
Id. at 568-69.
31 Id. at 557. The Court decided a third case last Term involving the jury's struc-
tural role. In United States v. Cotton, the Court held that the prosecution's failure to
include in the indictment a fact that increases a statutory maximum did not "affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation" of the proceeding. 535 U.S. 625, 633-34
(2002) (citingJohnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 (1997)). As this Article ex-
plains, the Court underestimates the importance of the jury in reaching such a conclu-
sion.
32 Haris, 536 U.S. at 560.
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the factual finding[,] the finding is by definition not 'essential' to the•,,3 3
defendant's punishment. Thus, because the plurality could not en-
vision how a mandatory minimum regime intruded on the jury's
power to a greater extent than the previous sentencing regime, it up-
held the mandatory minimum law. And its logic would seem to con-
done the Sentencing Guidelines, for the Court noted that "[w]ithin
the range authorized by the jury's verdict.., the political system may
channel judicial discretion-and rely upon judicial expertise-by re-
quiring defendants to serve minimum terms afterjudges make certain
factual findings. ' :4 Justice Breyer provided the fifth vote, and he, too,
made clear that in his view the legislature has broad power to channel
judicial discretion through mandatory minimums and sentencing
guidelines.
Taken together, Ring and Harris establish that the Court will find
the constitutional jury guarantee satisfied as long as the defendant's
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum sentence authorized
by the jury's verdict. In Ring, the maximum sentence authorized by
the jury's verdict under Arizona state law was life imprisonment. "3 6 To
receive a death sentence, additional factfindings were required, and'
therefore, the Court held that those findings had to be made by the
jury.37 Consistent with this view, Harris found that a mandatory mini-
mum sentence falling within the maximum sentence authorized by
the jury's verdict satisfied the Constitution.8 According to the Court,
then, the jury guarantee is essentially defined by the legislature's
choice of maximum punishment.
This Term the Court will consider what happens when a legisla-
ture has established two sentencing ceilings: the maximum originally
attached to the substantive offense and the ceiling established by
later-enacted, legally binding sentencing guidelines. In Blakely, the
" Id. at 561. For a similar argument, see Frank R. Herrmann, 30=20: "Understand-
ing"Maximum Sentence Enhancements, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 175, 190-97 (1998) (describing-
and embracing-this type of positivist argument in support of defining facts as ele-
ments if they increase a statutory maximum). See also Susan N. Herman, The Tail that
Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Lim-
its of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 308-09 (1992) (defining the positivist argument
but criticizing its procedural consequences). The Court has also used this positivist
line of logic in its decisions concluding that states can determine what parole proce-
dures they will use. See id. at 330.
34 Harris, 536 U.S. at 567.
.15 Id. at 569-70 (BreyerJ., concurring).
36 Ring, 536 U.S. at 597.
37 Id. at 609.
.1 Harris, 536 U.S. at 568-69.
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petitioner entered a plea of guilty to one count of second degree kid-
napping with a deadly weapon and one count of second degree as-
sault. 9 These are "class B" felonies under Washington state law, and
such felonies carry a maximum punishment of ten years. 40 But the
Washington state legislature passed another statute that governs these
offenses, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981,4' which establishes a grid
of presumptive sentences based on the seriousness of the offense and
the criminal history of the offender. Under this binding, duly enacted
law, the standard sentencing range for Blakely's kidnapping offense
was forty-nine to fifty-three months, and the range for the assault
count was twelve to fourteen months. 2 The Washington Sentencing
Reform Act dictates that a court "shall impose '' 3 a sentence within
these standard ranges unless it finds "substantial and compelling rea-
sonsjustifying an exceptional sentence. 44 The Act then sets forth fac-
tors that may justify a "substantial and compelling" reason to give a
sentence above the standard range. The trial court found (by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence) such statutorily enumerated factors in
Blakely's case and imposed a sentence of ninety months.4" Blakely ar-
gued in his petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court that this in-
crease violated the Court's statutory maximum rule as described in
Apprendi and Ring because the facts to which he pleaded guilty did
not authorize a sentence of ninety months under the state's guideline
regime.46 The Court in Blakely will therefore need to explain whether
there is a constitutional difference between the statutory maximum at
issue in Apprendi and the statutory ceilings created by mandatory sen-
tencing guidelines. A decision from the Court could therefore have
enormous implications for all legally binding sentencing guidelines.47
39 Petition for Certiorari, Blakely v. Washington, No. 02-1632, 2003 WL 22427993, at
*3-4.
4 Respondent's Brief in Opposition, Blakely v. Washington, No. 02-1632, 2003 WL
22427994, at *7.
41 WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.310 (recodified as amended at § 9.94A.510 (2001)).
42 Petition for Certiorari, Blakely v. Washington, supra note 39, at *4.
43 WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.120(1) (recodified as amended at § 9.94A.505(1)-(2)
(2001)).
44 Id. § 9.94A.120(2) (recodified as amended at § 9.94A.505(2) (b) (2001)).
45 Petition for Certiorari, Blakely v. Washington, supra note 39, at *4-5.
46 Id. at *11.
47 Although the petitioner in Blakely has attempted to argue that a ruling in his
favor would not call into question the Federal Sentencing Guidelines-because, ac-
cording to Blakely, those guidelines are promulgated by ajudicial commission instead
of Congress and are therefore not "statutory" maximum sentences, id. at *16-17-the
Court may well find this distinction unpersuasive. See infra note 342 (explaining why
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The Court's bright-line, statutory maximum test offers little guid-
ance, however, to the questions posed by mandatory guideline re-
gimes (such as the one at issue in Blakely) because the Court's test
lacks a theory of the jury's role to support it. What, exactly, is the con-
stitutional difference between a law that authorizes a mandatory
minimum sentence upon the finding of a particular fact and a law that
authorizes a maximum sentence upon the finding of a particular fact?
Why is thejury's involvement critical in the latter situation but not the
former? Similarly, why should it matter that the maximum sentence is
contained in a statute as opposed to a legally binding sentencing
guideline? One looks in vain for answers to these questions in the
Court's opinions, for the Court has thus far failed to wrestle with the
antecedent question of what, precisely, is the jury's constitutional
function. Instead, the Court's answer has been a formal one: as long
as the sentence received by the defendant falls within the range author-
ized by statute for the facts found by the jury, it is permissible.
And although there is already a burgeoning literature analyzing
the meaning of Apprendi,4" none of it approaches the problem as a
the Sentencing Guidelines might pose an even greater constitutional concern than
sentencing laws enacted by a legislature).
48 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi and the Dynamics of Guilty Pleas, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 311 (2001) (responding to criticism of Nancy King and Susan Klein and reiterat-
ing argument that defendants are disadvantaged under Apprendi); Bibas, supra note 7,
at 1115-23 (arguing that Apprendi makes defendants worse off because of its operation
under the system of Federal Sentencing Guidelines and plea bargaining and endorsing
a test that gives legislatures freedom to allocate facts between sentencing and trial);
Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: You Say You
Want a Revolution?, 87 IowA L. REv. 615 (2002) (advocating a presumption that juries
decide all facts that increase punishment absent a compelling reason why they should
not make such a determination); Huigens, supra note 7 (arguing that the proper line
between offense elements that must go to the jury and sentencing factors that must go
to the judge should be determined based on whether the facts pertain to moral ques-
tions of fault, and if they do, those facts are offense elements that should go to the
jury); NancyJ. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L. REv.
295 (2001) (disagreeing with Stephanos Bibas's argument that defendants are worse
off under Apprendi when they plea bargain); King & Klein, supra note 7 (advocating a
multi-factor test for identifying the few instances when legislatures should not be al-
lowed to draft around Apprendi's rule); Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries
of "Apprendi-Land": Statutory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 377, 400-54 (2002) (arguing that there is no logical basis under Apprendi for
not treating Guidelines factors or factors imposing a mandatory minimum as offense
elements); Alan C. Michaels, Truth in Convicting: Understanding and Evaluating Ap-
prendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 320 (2000) (describing Apprendi's holding as narrow
and discussing its effect on federal drug prosecutions); Jacqueline E. Ross, Unantici-
pated Consequences of Turning Sentencing Factors into Offense Elements: The Apprendi De-
bate, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 197 (2000) (arguing that Apprendiwill have unintended,
negative consequences on defendants because defendants will have to produce
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question of separated powers and the jury's role within that struc-
ture .49 But only by considering the problem from this angle can a
evidence on an increasing range of issues that might be prejudicial before a jury and
because the decision will limit judges' ability to go beyond plea agreements); Stephen
A. Saltzburg, Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. NewJersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243,
248-53 (2001) (disagreeing with an approach that would read Apprendi to require ei-
ther a return to the prior discretionary regime or ajury determination on all Sentenc-
ing Guidelines questions and instead arguing that further due process protections
should apply whenever judges sentence defendants, including the right to confront
witnesses, a proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard for the prosecutor, and an op-
portunity for the defendant to appeal the judge's decision);Jeffrey Standen, The End of
the Era of Sentencing Guidelines: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 779-84,
802-05 (2002) (arguing that Apprendi hurts defendants because it enhances prosecuto-
rial power and advocating code reform as an alternative approach); B. Patrick Costello,
Jr., Comment, Apprendi v. NewJersey: "Who Decides What Constitutes a Crime?" An Analy-
sis of Whether a Legislature is Constitutionally Free to "Allocate" an Element of an Offense to an
Affirmative Defense or a Sentencing Factor Without Judicial Review, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1205 (2002) (arguing that Apprendi should be reconsidered and that the Court should
allow judges to increase sentences beyond statutory maxima); Jason Ferguson, Case-
note, Apprendi v. NewJersey: Should Any Factual Determination Authorizing an Increase in
a Criminal Defendant's Sentence Be Proven to aJuly Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 52 MERCER
L. REV. 1531 (2001) (describing possible readings of Apprendi without taking a position
on the appropriate standard for identifying offense elements); AndrewJ. Fuchs, Note,
The Effect ofApprendi v. New Jersey on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Blurring the Dis-
tinction Between Sentencing Factors and Elements of a Crime, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399,
1419-38 (2001) (arguing that Apprendi should be read narrowly and not be read to in-
validate the Sentencing Guidelines); Robert S. Lewis, Note, Preventing the Tail from
Wagging the Dog: Why Apprendi 's Bark is Worse than Its Bite, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599,
601-07, 612-26 (2001) (arguing that Apprendi follows from the Supreme Court's prior
cases, which barred judges from sentencing above a statutory maximum based on fac-
tors determined by a preponderance of the evidence); Elizabeth A. Olson, Comment,
Rethinking Mandatory Minimums after Apprendi, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 811, 82542 (2002)
(arguing that the analysis in Apprendi should apply to mandatory minimums); Freya
Russell, Casenote, Limiting the Use of Acquitted and Uncharged Conduct at Sentencing: Ap-
prendi v. NewJersey and Its Effect on the Relevant Conduct Provision of the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1199 (2001) (arguing that the reasoning of Apprendi
dictates that courts cannot use the relevant conduct provision of the Sentencing
Guidelines to increase the Guidelines range for an offense); Stephanie B. Stewart,
Note, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Criminals at Sentenc-
ing, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1193, 1201-17 (2001) (praising the bright-line test adopted in
Apprendi but observing the uncertainty of how it will affect upward departures under
the Sentencing Guidelines); Analisa Swan, Note, Apprendi v. NewJersey, The Scaling
Back of the Sentencing Factor Revolution and the Resurrection of Criminal Defendant Rights,
How Far is Too Far?, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 729, 746-85 (2002) (arguing that Apprendi should
be narrowly construed because of the potential for a broad reading to disrupt a multi-
tude of state and federal sentences).
49 Although Stephanos Bibas has written a brief essay on his view of how Apprendi
affects "institutional allocations of power," he ignores the jury's structural role in that
analysis because he believes it is "anachronistic" to focus on the jury. Stephanos Bibas,
How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA L. REV. 465, 474 (2002).
In his view, "the real institutional competition" is "among legislatures, sentencing
commissions,judges, and prosecutors." Id.
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coherent picture of the jury and its relationship to sentencing laws
emerge.
Part I of this Article sets the stage for this analysis by describing
the critical check on state power that the criminal jury is designed to
provide under our constitutional structure and, more importantly,
explaining how the jury is designed to fulfill that purpose. In particu-
lar, it shows that the constitutional architecture allows the jury to
check the operation of general laws in individual cases when justice so
requires. This vision of the jury's function is consistent with the view
of the jury both at the Nation's founding and throughout subsequent
history. While the courts have chipped away at the margins of the
jury's power to check general laws and individualize their application,
the jury's core power to acquit against the evidence without facing re-
view has remained intact.
Part II explains the threat mandatory sentencing guidelines pose
for the jury's role. Specifically, this Part describes how the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines not only impede the jury's role at trial, but also
undercut the indirect effect the jury has on plea negotiations.
Part III offers an alternative proposal to the Supreme Court's test
for determining when a fact must be found by a jury and cannot be
labeled a mere sentencing factor. This Part argues that the key de-
terminant should be whether a binding law links the presence or ab-
sence of a fact with a prescribed amount of punishment and limits ju-
dicial discretion to depart from that legislative judgment by allowing
the government to seek review of the judge's decision. As this Part
explains, it is this legislative judgment that upsets the constitutional
balance of powers and undercuts the valuable role the jury serves.
Thus, under this analysis, juries, not judges, must apply mandatory
sentencing laws.
I. THE ROLE OF THEJURY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
OF SEPARATED POWERS
Determining the constitutional role of the jury is, admittedly, not
a straightforward task. The text of the Constitution provides little
guidance as to what a trial by jury entails-save to point out that
the jury is responsible for the trial of all "[c]rimes" 50 and "criminal
prosecutions. Unfortunately, the question of what is a "crime"
50 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
51 Id. amend. VI.
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admits of no easy answer. 2  If the definition of a criminal law was
straightforward in the eighteenth century, it is far less clear today.
This Part therefore seeks the constitutional meaning of trial by
jury by looking at the constitutional structure, the historical roots of
the jury, and the subsequent history of the jury guarantee . 3 Section A
begins by discussing how the jury protects liberty under the constitu-
tional structure. The way we conceptualize how the jury protects lib-
erty is critical to understanding the relationship between the jury and
sentencing laws. Section A will show that a strong power both to find
facts and to check general laws imposing criminal punishment is at
the core of the jury's function and that this power has firmly estab-
lished historical roots. Section B then traces the development of the
jury's constitutional role up to the advent of mandatory sentencing
laws.
52 The dictionaries published at the time of the Framing do not even bother defin-
ing "crime" or "criminal." See, e.g., GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.,
London, H. Woodfall & W. Strahan 1762) (neglecting to define these terms); 1 T.
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed., London 1783) (same).
These "omissions" perhaps suggest that the words' meanings required no definition or
elaboration. See John W. Poulos, Liability Rules, Sentencing Factors, and the Sixth Amend-
ment Right to a Jury Trial: A Preliminary Inquiry, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 643, 698 (1990)
(suggesting that "the [F]ramers had such a clear conception of 'crime' in mind that
the word needed neither debate nor definition"). At the Constitutional Convention,
the Committee on Detail originally phrased the relevant language in Article III as "trial
of all criminal offenses." Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses
and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by juy, 39 HARV. L. REv. 917, 969 (1926). On
the floor of the Convention, however, a motion was approved without debate to
change the language to "trial of all crimes." Id. Felix Frankfurter and Thomas Cor-
coran surmised that the intention behind the change was to exclude petty offenses
from the constitutional requirement. Id.; see also Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65,
70 (1904) (stating that the change from "criminal offenses" to "crimes" was meant to
exclude petty criminal offenses from the jury trial requirement). But see id. at 98
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("A crime is a criminal offense and a criminal offense is a
crime."). "Offence" was defined at the time as "an Act committed against a Law, or
omitted where the Law requires it, and punishable by it." JACOB, supra.
53 There are, of course, many ways to go about the task of interpreting the Consti-
tution. It is not the aim of this Article to resolve the fundamental question of how best
to do so. Rather, I look to the most generally accepted sources of meaning: the text,
structure, original history, and subsequent history. Because these lines of inquiry all
point to the same conclusion, it is not necessary to resolve which methodology should
supercede the others. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194-1209 (1987) (presenting "a ty-
pology of constitutional argument" based on five different approaches); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 577-90 (2001) (arguing that constitutional interpretation is based
on text, history, and structure).
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A. The Jury's Function in the Constitutional Structure
Even before the addition of the Bill of Rights, Article III estab-
lished that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury.'54 The placement of the criminal jury in Article III
highlights that the criminal jury is not a constitutional afterthought,
but a central institution in the operation of the government.55 Article
III makes clear that the jury is to play the judicial role of trying crimi-
nal cases. The addition of the Sixth Amendment confirms the im-
portance of a local jury in all "criminal prosecutions."57
This constitutional language highlights that the jury serves a key
function in all criminal cases. To gain a fuller appreciation of what
that function is, however, it is necessary to move beyond the text and
look at the power vested in the criminal jury through its authority to
issue a general verdict and through the operation of the Double Jeop-
rdy Clause. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, 'Juries at the
time of the Framing could not be forced to produce mere 'factual
findings,' but were entitled to deliver a general verdict pronouncing
the defendant's guilt or innocence."58 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has always respected "the historical and constitutionally guaran-
teed right of criminal defendants to demand that the jury decide guilt
or innocence on every issue, which includes application of the law to
the facts. ' 9 Because the Double Jeopardy Clause shields absolutely a
jury's general verdict of acquittal from review, the jury has necessarily
been given the power to decide the law as well as the facts in criminal
.-A U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
55 SeeAkhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1196
(1991) (stating that the Article III mandate of trial byjury is "a command no less man-
datory and structural" than the other commands of Article III); see also Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Mod-
est Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. L. REv. 671, 689 (1995) [hereinafter
Paulsen, Some Modest Proposals] (asserting that the jury is understood as the "single most
important check on overweening government power" and "a vital institution for put-
ting the People in charge of the administration of government"); Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217,
291 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch] (noting that "[t]he power
ofjuries has a stronger claim to legitimacy than does that ofjudges" because "the jury's
interpretive supremacy is substantively conferred by the Constitution").
See U.S. CONsT. art. 1II, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be byJury ... ").
57 Id. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment specifies that "the accused shall enjoy
the right to ... an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law." Id.




cases. And this unreviewable power to acquit gives it a check on the
government. The jury is, by design, like the other checks and bal-
ances in the government: "further protection against arbitrary ac-
tion.","
As to the executive, ajury verdict of acquittal is an absolute check
against executive action to punish an individual for a criminal of-
fense."' Once a jury has acquitted a defendant, the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits the executive from prosecuting the individual again
for the same offense. Thus, the jury requirements established in Arti-
cle III and the Sixth Amendment "constitute specific assignments of a
'trump everyone' power to juries in criminal cases, for purposes of a
particular criminal case only."
2
The jury's unreviewable power to issue a general verdict of acquit-
tal further acts as a check on judges. While judges have the power to
block government action against the individual even when the jury
agrees with that action-that is, the power to overturn jury convictions
to protect a defendant63'-they cannot impose a conviction when the
jury disagrees. 4 The verdict of not guilty "'is, in every respect, absolutely
60 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). For an economic analysis of
why it is valuable to give the jury this power to check the government and prevent rent-
seeking, see KEITH N. HYLTON & VIKRAMADITYA S. KHANNA, TowARD AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 42-44 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Econom-
ics, Working Paper No. 01-02, 2002), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/
faculty/papers/pdfjfiles/HyltonKhanna033001 .pdf.
(3 Nancy King has likened this power to the executive's power to pardon. See
NancyJ. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the Court-
room, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 433, 455 (1998) ("Neither jury] acquittal nor pardon estab-
lishes a precedent for any other case, neither can be overturned by the judiciary nor by
Congress, and both can achieve the same result: the release of a person guilty of a
criminal offense as defined by the legislature." (footnotes omitted)). King also ob-
served that "[t]hejury's check on punishment is... similar to the power of the execu-
tive to refuse to prosecute: both are assumed to be beyond the reach of judicial order
or legislative mandate." Id.
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 55, at 289. Indeed, because of
these provisions, Michael Stokes Paulsen, one of the most vocal advocates for a strong
executive, argues that "[t]he power ofjuries has a stronger claim to legitimacy" on the
executive "than does that ofjudges." Id. at 291.
63 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c) (outlining the steps for a defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict). To be sure, the standard for reviewing
jury convictions is deferential. But the judge nevertheless has some power to check
juries that convict for improper reasons. Id. As a result, the broad discretionary power
that rests with juries is essentially a one-way ratchet that allows the jury to protect the
defendant's liberty, not to threaten it.
64 See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 124-26 (1904) (holding that the Dou-
ble jeopardy Clause does not permit a criminal acquittal to be overturned).
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final." 6 5 Thus,judges cannot issue directed verdicts of guilty in crimi-
nal cases or overturn jury acquittals." Nor can they require a special
verdict in a criminal case that allows the jury to decide only the facts
and prevents the jury from applying the law to those facts. As the
First Circuit explained, underlying these rules "is the principle that
the jury, as the conscience of the community, must be permitted to
look at more than logic.""'
The jury's unreviewable power to apply the law to the facts before
it also serves as a potent check on the legislature. It allows the jury to
ignore the letter of the law when it believes justice so requires. ' ' Un-
like the civil jury, whose factual findings and applications of law can
be overturned, the criminal jury enjoys constitutional protection of
both. The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause protects the
jury's general verdict of acquittal, whether it is because the jury dis-
agrees that the facts establish legal guilt or because the jury believes
that, although the defendant is guilty under the letter of the law, she
65 Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 149 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (quoting
People v. Croswell, 3Johns. 337, 368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804)).
66 See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977) (explain-
ing that, because the jury's "overriding responsibility is to stand between the accused
and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Government[,] ... a trial judge is prohibited
from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come forward with
such a verdict"); see also Sparf 156 U.S. at 105 (finding a directed guilty verdict to be
inappropriate); United States v. Garaway, 425 F.2d 185, 185 (9th Cir. 1970) (per cu-
riam) (holding that a directed verdict is improper even when the evidence is undis-
puted); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180 (1st Cir. 1969) ("In a criminal case a
court may not order the jury to return a verdict of guilty, no matter how overwhelming
the evidence of guilt.").
See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1995) (explaining that the
jury's general verdict allows it to decide questions of law); Spar, 156 U.S. at 80-81 (find-
ing a special verdict inappropriate); Spock, 416 F.2d at 181 ("'It is one of the most es-
sential features of the right of trial by jury that no jury should be compelled to find any
but a general verdict in criminal cases, and the removal of this safeguard would violate
its design and destroy its spirit."' (quoting GEORGE B. CLEMENTSON, SPECIAL VERDICTS
AND SPECIAL FINDINGS BYJURIES 49 (1905))); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A
Brief History of the Criminal Jury Trial in the United States, 61 U. C-II. L. REV. 867, 912-13
(1994) ("[N]ineteenth-century disputants agreed that.., judges should not require
juries to return 'special verdicts' in criminal cases" because doing so "would have
forced juries into too narrow a factfinding role."). Special verdicts have been permit-
ted in two instances: (1) when "the determination of a particular fact will be crucial to
sentencing the defendants," Spock, 416 F.2d at 182 n.41, and (2) in treason cases, id.
G8 Spock, 416 F.2d at 182.
69 Juries in eighteenth-century England had a similar power to apply the law-a
power long part of the English jury system-and used it to mitigate the harshness of
the law. See THOMAS ANDREw GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PER-
SPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIALJuRY 1200-1800, at 313-15 (1985) (discuss-
ing howjuries in eighteenth-century England mitigated capital offenses).
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should not be deemed morally blameworthy because of some higher
principle ofjustice.7 0 The criminal 'jury's constitutional responsibility
is not merely to determine the facts, but to apply the law to those facts
and draw the ultimate conclusion of guilt or innocence.",7' As a result,
the jury has broad power to apply-and, if it deems necessary, nul-
lify-the law.
71
History confirms this reading. Although capturing the "original
understanding" of any provision of the Constitution can be difficult,
the jury guarantee presents a situation in which there was broad con-
sensus about its importance and function. Even before the Constitu-
tion was ratified, it appears that the jury was esteemed precisely be-
cause it could provide a key check on the government by the people
in order to protect individual liberty. And that sentiment carried for-
ward to the constitutional debates.
When the colonists came to North America, they immediately be-
gan "enact[ing] local laws to preserve and exercise their right to
[ury] trials." 3  To a large extent, the provision for jury trials went
70 See Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Ap-
peals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L REv. 1001, 1012-17 & nn.41-57, 1033-34, 1034
n.99 (1980) (commenting on the jury's "prerogative to acquit against the evidence").
Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 514.
72 See Westen, supra note 70, at 1016-17 (concluding that the absence of directed
verdicts in criminal trials allows juries to nullify the law); see also Harris v. Rivera, 454
U.S. 339, 346 (1981) (noting that the jury has "unreviewable power... to return a ver-
dict of not guilty for impermissible reasons"); Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward
a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 81, 131-32 ("[A]t some level, at
least, nullification is implicit in the constitutional notion of trial by jury, because noth-
ing else explains why a criminal defendant has a right to resist a directed verdict of
conviction, why he has a right to insist on a general verdict.., and why neither he nor
the prosecutor has the right to challenge a verdict for factual inconsistency." (foot-
notes omitted)).
73 AndrewJoseph Gildea, The Right to Trial by Jury, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1507, 1508
(1989). The only existing recorded law from the first five years of the Plymouth Col-
ony, for example, is a list of criminal offenses and a provision for jury trials in all
criminal cases. Id. Other colonies inserted similar jury trial provisions in their govern-
ing documents. Id. at n.7. Not all of the colonists, however, were equally concerned
with jury trials at the outset. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 24-27 (1993) (recounting the minimal role that juries played in
some colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
It should also be noted that, in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, ju-
rors "became the first line of defense against the abuses of royal officials." Matthew P.
Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 377, 384.
In several prominent cases, such as Bushell's Case and the Seven Bishops' Case, the jury
refused to convict, establishing their independence from judicial instructions and re-
sisting pressure to render verdicts of conviction. Id.; see also Note, The Changing Role of
the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 171 (1964) (noting the "popularity of
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hand-in-hand with the establishment of the colonies themselves. The
colonists did not envision a jury trial as merely a paper ideal or a fact-
finding process. They viewed the jury as an essential protector of their
liberty against government overreaching.
The case of John Peter Zenger provides an illustration of the
strong role assumed byjuries in the United States.74 In 1734, the royal
governor in New York sought to punish Zenger for publishing criti-• • • 75
cism of the administration. After three grand juries refused to indict
Zenger, the governor prosecuted him on the basis of an "informa-
tion. ,76 At the trial, Zenger's lawyer argued that the petit jurors
"ha[d] the right, beyond all dispute, to determine both the law and
the fact"77 and could conclude that the truth of Zenger's criticisms
could be the basis of an acquittal, even though the law on the books
stated that truth was not a defense to libel. The jurors used their
power to return a general verdict to acquit. The case was highly pub-
licized; an account of the trial was produced in pamphlet form and
widely circulated throughout the colonies . It "impressed thousands
of Americans with the importance of the right to jury as a bulwark
against official oppression '79 and "'revolutionized America."' '  It was
one of many cases in which ajury essentially nullified the law of sedi-
tious libel s l and it demonstrated the jury's power to decide cases
based on its notions of fundamental law. 2
In the 1760s and 1770s, criminal juries routinely wielded their
power against the Crown. Criminal grand juries refused to indict
"persons accused either of political offenses such as rioting or of
violating imperial statutes such as the revenue laws., 83 John Reid has
the jury in eighteenth century England, where it was regarded as a check on the ma-
nipulation of the law as an instrument of royal despotism").
74 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 67, at 871.
75 Ironically enough, one of his criticisms was that the governor disposed of trial
by jury at will. Id. at 872.
76 Harrington, supra note 73, at 393.
77 Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 146 (1895) (Gray,J., dissenting).
78 Harrington, supra note 73, at 393-94.
79 J. GUINTHER, THEJURY IN AMERICA 30 (1988).
80 RIcHARD B. MORRIs, FAIR TRIAL 91 (1953) (quoting Gouverneur Morris).
81 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 67, at 874.
82 See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARv. L. REV. 4, 31-32 (2001) (describing the jury's power to enforce fundamental
law).
83 JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN A DEFIANT STANCE 45 (1977). Juries were used offen-
sively as well. Criminal juries convicted customs officials who used violence to repel
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explained thatjuries were one of the legal institutions that the colo-
nists used "to oppose or harass the enforcement of that part of British
imperial law that American whigs viewed as unconstitutional. 84
Given the importance of the jury, it is no surprise to learn that
one of the aggravating factors leading to the American Revolution was
the perception that the Crown had been attempting to emasculate co-
lonialjuries.i5 Among the jury-related events leading to the American
Revolution, some of the greatest instigators were the various Acts of
Parliament that deprived colonists of their right to jury trial. For in-
stance, although the Stamp Act earned its infamy as an instance of
taxation without representation, colonists were also outraged that vio-
lators of the Act were to be tried in admiralty courts in London,
thereby depriving them of a local jury.89 John Adams and the Town of
Braintree decried the Stamp Act for "mak[ing] an essential Change in
the Constitution of Juries," noting that it was "directly repugnant to
the Great Charter itself."'
7
Thus, when the First Continental Congress passed the 1774 Decla-
ration and Resolves,88 which encouraged colonists to boycott English
goods, it attacked these Acts for "depriv[ing] the American subject of
trial by jury.. . and [for being] subversive of American rights. '8' The
document declared that "the respective colonies are entitled to the
common law of England, and more especially to the great and inesti-
mable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according
to the course of that law."9 In 1775, the Second Continental Congress
listed England's interference with the right to trial by jury among its
grievances in the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking
Up Arms." The Declaration of Independence in 1776 restated many
whig mobs. Id. at 56-59. Colonists also filed civil cases before colonial juries to harass
customs agents. Id. at 2840.
84 Id. at 72.
85 See Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries To Determine the
Law in Colonial America, 89J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I H, 123 (1998) (stating that
England's "threats-and actual attempts-to bypass ... juries helped bring about the
Revolution").
86 Gildea, supra note 73, at n.17.
87 Instructions, DRAPER'S MASS. GAZETTE, Oct. 10, 1765, reprinted in 1 PAPERS OF
JOHNADAMS 140, 142 (RobertJ. Taylor ed., 1977).
88 Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (Oct. 14, 1774), re-
printed in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE
AMERICAN' STATES 1 (Charles C. Tansill ed., GPO 1927).
89 Id. at 4.
90 Id. at 3.
91 Harrington, supra note 73, at 395.
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of the complaints in the first two Declarations, including the "de-
priv[ation] in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial byJury.
9 2
The right to jury trial, then, was a key concern of Revolutionary
America. The jury was seen as much more than a factfinder; it was a
valuable check on government action-including duly enacted crimi-
nal laws. John Adams explained:
As the Constitution requires, that, the popular Branch of the Legisla-
ture, should have an absolute Check so as to put a peremptory Negative
upon every Act of the Government, it requires that the common People
should have as compleat a Controul, as decisive a Negative, in every
93
Judgment of a Court ofJudicature.
The general verdict, he proclaimed, not only gives jurors the right,
but the duty "to find the Verdict according to his own best Under-
standing, Judgment and Conscience, tho in Direct opposition to the
Direction of the Court."
9 4
By the time "the delegates to the Constitutional Convention gath-
ered in 1787, the fundamental nature of a citizen's right to jury trial in
a criminal case was deeply embedded in the national consciousness."
9 5
As Bill Nelson has observed, "For Americans after the Revolution, as
well as before, the right to trial byjury was probably the most valued of
all civil rights. 9 6 Each state guaranteed the right to trial by jury in a
criminal case, as had the Articles of Confederation.' 7 Indeed, because
"its excellences are so well understood," it was not thought "necessary
to be very prolix in pointing them out."9
The right to ajury trial in criminal cases was one of the rare sub-
jects on which both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists agreed.
Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist No. 83 that "[t]he friends
and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing
92 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
93 John Adams, Diary Notes on the Right of Juries (Feb. 12, 1771), in 1 LEGAL
PAPERS OFJO1IN ADAMS 228, 229 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
94 Id. at 230.
95 Gildea, supra note 73, at 1514.
96 WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 96 (1994).
97 Id.; Harrington, supra note 73, at 396.
98 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 515 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippin-
cott Co. 1891) [hereinafter 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
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else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial byjury. '1199 All,
he noted, "are satisfied of the utility of the institution. '"'0 0 As he put it,
the distinction is, at most, between the Federalist view that it is "a
valuable safeguard to liberty" and the Anti-Federalist view that it is
"the very palladium of free government. ' ' 0° As a result, guaranteeing a
jury in criminal cases drew no objection at the Federal Convention or
in the state ratification debates.1'
0 2
Even with an elected government, there was agreement that the
people should have another check on government action in the
criminal context, an area in which the government's power is at its
apex. Only by interposing the people directly between the state and
the individual charged with a crime could the people guarantee that
the new government would not mimic the tyranny of its predeces-
sor. °10 As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, thejury was "a political insti-
tution ... one form of the sovereignty of the people. ,0 4 "The jury sys-
tem as it is understood in America appears to me to be as direct and as
extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal
suffrage.""'5
The Framers continued to believe that the criminal jury was much
more than "a utilitarian fact-finding body." '  Instead, a common




102 Gildea, supra note 73, at 1516. The debate centered instead on whether and
how to expand the right to trial byjury. The Anti-Federalists demanded a constitutional
guarantee of civil jury trials and the right to have jurors drawn from the vicinage. 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 109-14; Essay of a Democratic Federalist, PA. HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787, re-
printed in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 58, 59-61 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981); 2
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587, 628 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1966); The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Penn-
sylvania to Their Constituents, PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1797, reprinted in
3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 145, 159-61.
103 "For the [Rlevolutionary and [F]ounding generations, the criminal jury relia-
bly stood between the individual and government, protecting the accused against
overzealous prosecutions, corruptjudges, and even tyrannical laws." JEFFREY ABRAMSON,
WE, THEJURY87 (1994).
104 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 283 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Kno0f 1945) (1835).
Id.
106 Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory
Sentencing Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1249 (1995); see Jon M. Van Dyke,
The Jury as a Political Institution, 16 CATH. LAW. 224, 233-37, 240 (1970) (describing Su-
preme Court cases that endorse aview of the jury's role as more than a mere factfinder);
see also Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal
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theme expressed at that time compared the jury's power to that of a
voter, checking the government and its laws .' Just as the people
check laws in their capacity as voters, "no Man can be condemned of
Life, or Limb, or Property or Reputation, without the Concurrence of
the Voice of the People. '" The Maryland Farmer, an Anti-Federalist,
described the jury as "the democratic branch of the judiciary power-more
necessary than representatives in the legislature."'
The distinction drawn between jurors and judges stemmed from
the fact thatjurors were a form of direct popular sovereignty, whereas
judges were still mere agents of the people."0 Some thought judges
were "always ready to protect the officers of government against the
weak and helpless citizen.""' Others deemedjudges "untrustworthy ....
exposed to bribes .... fond of power and authority, and.., the de-
pendent and subservient creatures of the legislature. " ' The multi-
member jury drawn from the people was therefore thought a
necessary safeguard against "the compliant, biased, or eccentric
Juries, 61 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 723, 736-37 (1993) (noting that a mere factfinding func-
tion for the criminal jury would make it an "imperfect check[] on the possible abuse of
power by legislators, prosecutors, or law enforcement officials" because abuse of power
in the criminal context may include not only the prosecution of the innocent, but also
"prosecution under an unjust law, prosecution of a defendant against whom applica-
tion of a facially just law would nonetheless cause injustice, or bad faith prosecution of
a defendant for conduct that violates no law" (footnote omitted)).
107 John Adams noted that "[t]he Rights of Juries and of Elections, were never at-
tacked singly in all the English History. The same Passions which have disliked one
have detested the other." Adams, supra note 93, at 229. Tocqueville, too, recognized
the parallel, arguing that, "in order that society may be governed in a fixed and uni-
form manner, the list of citizens qualified to serve on juries must increase and dimin-
ish with the list of electors." TOCQUEVII.LE, supra note 104, at 283-84; see also Vikram
David Amar, Juiy Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 203,
218-21 (1995) (describing the Framers' vision ofjuries as avenues for political partici-
pation).
108 Adams, supra note 93, at 229.
109 Essays by a Farmer (IV), MD. GAZETrE, Mar. 21, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 36, 38 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981). Indeed, the jury has
been deemed the "lower judicial bench." JOHN TAiLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 209 (W. Stark ed.,
1950). Akhil Amar has argued that this analogy to the voter holds in interpreting the
Fifteenth Amendment, which he claims "restore [s] much of the original political vision
underlying juries that the Fourteenth Amendment had warped." AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 274 (1998).
1o See Kramer, supra note 82, at 38-44 ("The legislature and the judiciary are ...
the people's 'servants.'. .. If conflicts arise... it is 'the people' who constitute the
authoritative 'tribunal' to whom such conflicts must be submitted.").
I:2 Essay of a Democratic Federalist, supra note 102, at 61.




judge."' " It was deemed "essential in every free country, that common
people should have a part and share of influence, in the judicial as
well as in the legislative department."" 4
The jury was the means by which "the people" were injected into
the affairs of the judiciary.' Thomas Jefferson felt the jury was so
critical that he claimed, "[w]ere I called upon to decide whether the
people had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department,
I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative."" 6 The
jury, in other words, was to check the law in a particular case to ensure
justice.
Given their constant struggles with the Crown and the perceived
difficulties with judges in England, the Framers wanted the common
man's (and, at that point, the jurors were all men) views to be heard
before the state's power over criminal laws could deprive an individual
of her liberty and brand her with the stigma of a conviction. Even
though the Constitution was creating an independent judiciary, there
still existed a concern that judges would favor the government over
'.3 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). Nor, as it turns out, was the
Framers' inclusion of this extra check on the government an unnecessary one. In-
deed, right on the heels of the Constitution's drafting, the government passed the
Alien and Sedition Acts, and federal judges enforced them. Thus, publishers prose-
cuted under the Acts tried to plead their First Amendment defense directly to juries in
order to "appeal to the sense of the community," Letter from James Madison to Tho-
masJefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 11 THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 298-99 (R.
Rutland & C. Hobson eds., 1977), instead of to the federal judges appointed by the
administration. Amar, supra note 55, at 1150-51, 1209.
"4 Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, No. 4 (Oct. 12, 1787), in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 245, 249 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter
Federal Farmer, Oct. 12]. As a leading Anti-Federalist tract, the Federal Farmer, ob-
served:
If the conduct ofjudges shall be severe and arbitrary, and tend to subvert the
laws, and change the forms of government, the jury may check them, by de-
ciding against their opinions and determinations, in similar cases. It is true,
the freemen of a country are not always minutely skilled in the laws, but they
have common sense in its purity, which seldom or never errs in making and
applying laws to the condition of the people, or in determining judicial
causes, when stated to them by the parties. The body of the people, princi-
pally, bear [sic] the burdens of the community; they of right ought to have a
controul in its important concerns, both in making and executing the laws,
otherwise they may, in a short time, be ruined.
Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, No. 15 (Jan. 18, 1788), in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 315, 320 [hereinafter Federal Farmer,Jan. 18].
115 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abb6 Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THE
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the people themselves. After all, in order to be nominated and con-
firmed, federal judges would need to be sufficiently well-connected to
government officials."' They would not necessarily have any connec-
tion to the community in which they would sit. They would likely de-
velop an allegiance with the government that appointed them and
that appeared before them repeatedly. As Justice Gray explained a
century later:
There may be less danger of prejudice or oppression from judges ap-
pointed by the President elected by the people, than from judges ap-
pointed by a hereditary monarch. But, as the experience of history
shows, it cannot be assumed that judges will always be just and impartial,
and free from the inclination, to which even the most upright and
learned magistrates have been known to yield-from the most patriotic
motives, and with the most honest intent to promote symmetry and ac-
curacy in the law-of amplifying their own jurisdiction and powers at the
expense of those entrusted by the Constitution to other bodies. And
there is surely no reason why the chief security of the liberty of the citi-
zen, the judgment of his peers, should be held less sacred in a republic
than in a monarchy."s
Even if the people's representatives agreed that certain behavior
should-be criminalized, the Framing generation wanted the people
themselves to have a final say in each case."9 In criminal trials-trials
that, at their core, are trials of the human condition and morality-
the jury would allow the morality of the community and its notions of
fundamental law to inform the interpretation of the facts and, in some
cases, to overcome the rigidity of a general criminal law.'12 That the
jurors may have no expertise in questions of legal interpretation was
H7 SeeAiMAR, supra note 109, at 87 (noting that "federaljudges would be appointed
by the central government and might prove reluctant to rein in their former benefac-
tors and current paymasters").
Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 176 (1895) (Gray,J., dissenting).
As Theophilus Parsons stated in the Massachusetts Convention of 1788:
Let [a man] be considered as a criminal by the general government, yet only
his own fellow-citizens can convict him; they are his jury, and if they pro-
nounce him innocent, not all the powers of Congress can hurt him; and inno-
cent they certainly will pronounce him, if the supposed law he resisted was an
act of usurpation.
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 98, at 94.
120 Jeffrey Abramson states it well:
The jury served freedom not only by getting the facts right but also by getting
the people right. Local citizens were empowered to control the actual ad-
ministration of justice-thus, the jury was our best assurance that law and jus-
tice accurately reflected the morals, values, and common sense of the people
asked to obey the law.
ABRAMSON, supra note 103, at 28.
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not a cause for concern. 2 ' The purpose of the jury was to inject the
common-sense views of the community into a criminal proceeding to
ensure that an individual would not lose her liberty if it would be con-
trary to the community's sense of fundamental law and equity.
Thus, the criminal jury's structural power to check general crimi-
nal laws-to nullify them in particular cases if equity requires-has
firm historical footing.'2 2 It is not by chance that the jury has the
power to issue an unreviewable general verdict of acquittal; it is a con-
sidered decision that the people should apply laws when criminal pun-
ishment is at stake to ensure that an individual does not lose her lib-
erty unless it would be just in a particular case. Law application, as
Henry Monaghan has observed, "is a complex psychological process,
one that often involves judgment. The more general the rule, the
larger the domain forjudgment. Thus, law application frequently en-
tails some attempt to elaborate the governing norm."'123 The jury pos-
sesses the power to elaborate the governing norms underlying crimi-
nal laws from the perspective of the community and its sense of moral
blameworthiness. Trial by jury "gives protection against laws which
the ordinary man may regard as harsh and oppressive" and provides
"insurance that the criminal law will conform to the ordinary man's
idea of what is fair and just.' 124 As Wigmore observed, "as a rule of law
only takes account of broadly typical conditions and is aimed on aver-
age results, law and justice every so often do not coincide." 1'2' The
jury's power to issue a general verdict gives the jury flexibility to en-
sure justice in a particular case when law and justice are in conflict.
121 As John Adams noted, "The general Rules of Law and common Regulations of
Society, under which ordinary Transactions arrange themselves, are well enough
known to ordinary Jurors. The great Principles of the Constitution, are intimately
known." Adams, supra note 93, at 230.
122 The "[flear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Govern-
ments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon
community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence." Duncan v. Lou-
isiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
123 Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 236
(1985) (footnote omitted). Additionally, see Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullify-
ingJury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877 (1999), who notes that "the jury plays a role in inter-
preting the law," id. at 911, "in saying that the law applies in this kind of case, or that it
does not apply in another case," id. at 909, which causes the law to evolve over time.
124 SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BYJURY 160 (1966).
125 John H. Wigmore, A Program for the Tial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM. JUDICATURE
Soc'Y 166, 170 (1929); see also VALERIE P. HA.NS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THEJURY 155
(1986) (noting that, "[b]ecause lawmakers cannot anticipate every set of circum-
stances, it is up to the jury to adjust the general rule of law to the justice of the specific
case").
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This unreviewable power to be lenient makes the jury a more
powerful judicial check on the state than a judge. Although some
scholars have argued that the 'judicial [p]ower" vested in Article III
judges also encompasses the broad power to interpret laws equitably
beyond the plain text of the laws themselves,2 6 this is not a position
without controversy.'2 7 Most critically, it is not universally accepted by
judges themselves. Thus, many (perhaps most) judges will resist this
broad role for themselves. 128 Moreover, even if some judges believe
that this equitable power should be deemed part and parcel of the
'judicial power," it is certainly limited by appellate review. 12" Judges
must give reasons for their decisions, and aside from the cases heard
by the United States Supreme Court and some cases heard by state
supreme courts, those decisions are reviewable by otherjudges. If the
reviewing judge believes it is not the judge's role to reconstruct laws in
the name of equity or disagrees with the lower court's assessment of
where the equities lie, the lower court judge will be reversed. This
dual review gives the state (the legislature and the executive) far
greater power over the individual because the likelihood of a judicial
check decreases. In addition, judicial review is not the only check on
judges. If the legislature does not like a judge's interpretation of the
law, it can overrule that interpretation by statute.3 " Or, in the case of
126 See William N. Eskridge,Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial
Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 992 (2001) (argu-
ing that the doctrine of equity of the statute has strong historical roots in our Nation's
early constitutional history and is consistent with the concept of 'judicial power" in our
constitutional structure).
127 For arguments that the English doctrine of equity of the statute is inconsistent
with our constitutional structure, see John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Inter-
pretationfrom the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1648 (2001);John F. Manning, Tex-
tualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2001). Regardless of what
the ight answer is to that question, it is clear that juries have always had such power.
Jonathan Molot's recent article makes a persuasive argument that "there are
powerful institutional forces at work that distinguish judicial from political decision-
making and lead judges more often than political officials to try to fit their decisions
into existing legal materials and to strive for consistency and stability over time." Jona-
than T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institu-
tional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1239, 1308
(2002).
129 See id. (noting the role of appellate and peer review in constraining judicial de-
cision making).
130 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Micli. L. REv.
505, 562 (2001) (noting that "interpretations of criminal statutes were overruled fre-
quently [by Congress]-more so, by a large margin, than any other class of statutory
decisions" and that, in virtually all of those instances, interpretations favoring defen-
dants were the ones that were overruled).
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what it believes to be extreme recalcitrance, the legislature might even
seek the impeachment of thatjudge.
The jury, in contrast, does not need to give any reason for an ac-
quittal, and it faces no review by a court or legislature. It therefore
has a greater opportunity than a judge to check the state and these
general punitive laws. This check on general laws may at first blush
seem in tension with "rule of law" values. Why should twelve (or fewer
in some states) individuals override a multitude of voters?
There are at least two reasons for this equitable safety valve in
criminal cases. First, the potential deprivation of liberty is greatest in
criminal cases. An inequitable or rigid application of an overbroad
law in this context may result in the most extreme deprivations of lib-
erty the state can exact-criminal punishment-even when punish-
ment is morally inappropriate.' 31 Thus, to avoid these high error
costs, it makes sense that a more substantial check would be used to
ensure that general laws are, in fact, well-conceived and make sense in
a particular case.
Second, the risk of this harm is not hypothetical. Even when
criminal laws make it past both houses of the legislature-and the ex-
ecutive-these laws (like all laws of general applicability) will be over-
inclusive. 32 Legislatures cannot predict ex ante all the situations that
will be covered by a general law; therefore, the law inevitably will be
overbroad and cover some situations that legislators (and those voting
for them) would not want covered. This is especially true given the
dynamics of crime and punishment in the political process.
People view the law quite differently depending on whether they
are acting asjurors facing an individual defendant or as voters viewing
1 See Poulos, supra note 52, at 669 ("The government oppression restrained by
the ni ht to ajury trial is the oppression of unwarranted punishment.").
For an insightful explanation of why criminal laws are especially vulnerable to
being overinclusive, see Stuntz, supra note 130, at 547-57. Kate Stith andJos6 Cabranes
argue that sentencing guidelines will be similarly overinclusive. They note that "genu-
ine judgment, in the sense of moral reckoning, cannot be inscribed in a table of of-
fense levels and criminal history categories." STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 82.
Rather, "it is in the nature of moral and juridical principles that they must be informed
by a particular set of facts before they can be applied." Id. Whereas they argue for the
trial judge to have more discretion, I focus on the corollary point that, when the legis-
lature strips judges of discretion, rules establishing prescribed amounts of punishment
must go to the jury. For the argument that discretionary sentencing decisions should
rest with juries, see Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951
(2003);Jenia lontcheva,Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practic 89 VA. L. REV. 311 (2003);
Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come
(Again)?, 108YALE LJ. 1775 (1999).
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the law in the abstract. 133 As voters, people consider the perceived
overall threat of crime and tend to be harsher than when they are pre-
sented with a concrete case. '3 4 Jury trials force the people-in the
form of community representatives-to look at crime not as a general
matter, the way they do as voters, but instead to focus on the particu-
lar individual being charged. The result is a more measured, indi-
vidualistic evaluation of whether liberty deprivation is appropriate. It
is the essence of the judicial role-law application in an individual
case-performed by the people.""'
Bill Stuntz's recent article demonstrates that this checking func-
tion is especially valuable today because current institutional incen-
tives increase the likelihood that laws will be overbroad. As he ex-
plains, legislatures will tend to err on the side of overinclusive as
opposed to underinclusive laws because they will trust prosecutorial
discretion to weed out cases that should not be prosecuted even if
those cases fall under the technical definition of the broad law. 36 Leg-
islatures would prefer overinclusion to underinclusion because, while
prosecutors can blame legislators when someone falls through the
cracks of an underinclusive law and is not punished, legislators can
blame prosecutors if they seek to charge individuals under an overin-
clusive law. And, too, by passing broad laws with fewer elements to
prove, legislatures also make it easier for prosecutors to obtain convic-
tions. This gives prosecutors enormous power, both at trial and in the
133 See Lanni, supra note 132, at 1780-81, 1781 nn.24-25 (summarizing research
findings that reflect the public's desire for harsher penalties in the abstract and more
lenient penalties in the face of a specific case). Other studies have shown that the pub-
lic is not harsher than the courts in its preferences for punishment and, indeed, is
sometimes more lenient. For example, Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and
Criminal Justice, 16 CRIME ANDJUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99 (Michael Tonry ed.,
1992), cites studies that find the U.S. public less harsh than judges, id. at 150, and in
some cases, "markedly less punitive" than criminal justice professionals, id. at 152.
134 Lanni, supra note 132, at 1781.
35 Martha Nussbaum defends this result as consistent with equity andjustice:
The point of the rule of law is to bring us as close as possible to what equity
would discern in a variety of cases, given the dangers of carelessness, bias, and
arbitrariness endemic to any totally discretionary procedure. But no such
rules can be precise or sensitive enough, and when they have manifestly erred,
it is justice itself, not a departure from justice, to use equity's flexible standard.
MARTHA C. NuSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIALJUSTICE 162 (1999).
136 Stuntz, supra note 130, at 549 (explaining why "too little criminalization tends
to be riskier than too much" for legislatures).
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more common situation of plea bargaining, where prosecutors use
this leverage to extract guilty pleas.
3 7
The Constitution therefore does not establish the political process
and political actors as the only check on the government's determina-
tions of what is criminal. Instead, it places ajudicial veto in the hands
of the people because the danger of state abuse is especially high and
the consequences are especially troubling. Just as the division of Con-
gress into a House and Senate serves the interests of two different
(though possibly overlapping) constituencies and checks state abuse of138
power, so, too, does the division of the judiciary among jury and
judge. It is a familiar point that the judiciary provides a critical check
on the executive and legislative branches by preventing them from be-
ing judges in their own cause."' Less commonly observed is the fact
that the judiciary is comprised of both judges and juries and that this
division also checks state abuse of power.
Injecting the jury into the affairs of the judiciary and giving it a
nullification power that the judge does not possess gives the people a
greater say on how criminal laws are applied to members of their
community.4 0  Not only does this curb the authority of the judges
themselves, 41 but it also provides a check on the legislature and
137 As Bill Stuntz notes, this systemic bias toward overly broad laws means that
"there is no reason to suppose that any given crime definition accurately reflects ma-
joritarian preferences. The public may wish to punish 'core' fraud, and legislators and
prosecutors may share that preference, yet the statute books may (and do) criminalize
a great deal more." d.
138 See Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 761-88
(1999) (identifying constituencies as the basis for the power of each branch of gov-
ernment and advocating an approach to separation of powers questions that focuses
on the relative power of different constituencies); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power:
The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 743-52 (1997) (highlighting the importance
of "nested constituencies" to the constitutional balance of power). Interestingly, while
these separation of powers scholars recognize the two distinct branches of the legisla-
ture and their different constituencies, they speak of a single judiciary.
139 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (arguing that liberty only exists because the judiciary is an independent entity).
140 As Todd Peterson has noted, "the best way to avoid the concentration and
abuse of power by government officials is not to give it to the government in the first
place, but to reserve it to the people." Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on
Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 41, 58 (1995).
141 See Federal Farmer, Jan. 18, supra note 114, at 320 (reiterating the importance
of the jury's check on judicial conduct); Peterson, supra note 140, at 51-52 (discussing
the Anti-Federalists' worries over giving the judge unchecked power and describing
how thejnry addressed the Anti-Federalists' concerns). Although these sources discuss
the checking function of civil juries, the same check is provided by criminal juries-
indeed, it is a much more significant check because of the greater power of criminal ju-
ries.
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executive, which both serve broader constituencies that may not have
the same interests as the jury drawn from the community.142 Remov-
ing the check of the jury therefore creates a "majoritarian" danger: "a
risk that individual rights would be subject to political will" because a
lessening ofjury power leads to a corresponding increase of legislative
and executive power.143
Thus, like other manifestations of the separation of powers, this
check is liberty-protecting. 4 4 Elizabeth Magill has explained one theo-
retical defense for separating functions among the legislature, execu-
tive, andjudiciary called "the coordination thesis.' 4 5 Under this theory,
"[s]eparating functions is necessary so that three different institutions
142 In the federal system, it is easy to see how the jury serves local community in-
terests to a greater extent than a federal judge who was nominated by the President
and confirmed by the Senate or than a United States Attorney who was appointed by
the same process. In states where judges and prosecutors are elected, it could be ar-
gued that they serve the local constituency as well-or even better than-the jury be-
cause they represent the entire community whereas twelve jurors may not. It is a de-
batable point whether elected judges and prosecutors serve community interests as
well asjuries given the influence of special interest groups and the teachings of public
choice theory. Moreover, as discussed above, voters and jurors view criminal cases dif-
ferently. Because elected officials must respond to voters, they may seek to punish in-
dividuals to a greater extent than the people would want, if the people were reviewing
the facts of the individual case instead of responding to crime in the aggregate as vot-
ers. Thus, jurors may well represent community sentiment more accurately than
elected officials in the context of particular cases.
143 Nourse, supra note 138, at 794 (discussing Commodity Futures Trading Commission
v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) as a case involving "a shift from a less to a more politically
tied decisionmaker-from the judiciary to an [administrative law judge] within the ex-
ecutive department").
144 See Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 531, 569-70 (1998) [hereinafter Brown, Accountability] (arguing that the election
of representatives allowed the people to check governmental abuse of power and
thereby protect individual liberty); Rebecca Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1514-16 (1991) [hereinafter Brown, Separated Powers] (arguing
that the separation of powers is designed to protect individual rights). Indeed, it is on
this basis that Brown disagrees with the Court's approach to the separation of powers
question in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1988), in which the Court up-
held the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and its creation of a Sentencing Commission
within the judicial branch. According to Brown, "[t]he Court should have decided
whether the innovative structural techniques Congress employed in commissioning the
[S]entencing [G]uidelines posed a threat to individual rights," and that inquiry should
have led the Court to strike down the Guidelines for "consolidating in the Executive
Branch the power both to prosecute and to sentence." Brown, Separated Powers, supra,
at 1560; see also Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 168, 183 n.49 (1972) ("The jury is a democratic institution not in terms of major-
ity rule but rather in terms of rule by the people over themselves.").
145 M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L.
REv. 1127, 1185 (2000).
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• • • ,146must agree before the government can injure an individual. The
criminal jury provides yet an additional check-one from outside the
government itself. Before an individual can lose her liberty in a
criminal case, the people themselves must agree. Indeed, that is why
the jury's verdict of acquittal-but not its verdict of conviction-is un-
reviewable.
To be sure, the jury is not a perfect check, and we do well to ques-
tion whether additional safeguards are necessary. 47 However, it is im-
portant to acknowledge the threshold protection that the Constitution
provides in the form of the jury, especially given the fact that even this
baseline protection has been under siege.
B. Equity in the Jury Box
As the previous Section demonstrated, there is no question that, at
the time of the Framing, the jury was a considerable force in the struc-
ture of government and a powerful judicial check. Nor is there a
question that the jury retains considerable power. But it would be
misleading to stop the historical analysis at the time of the Constitu-
tion's Framing without describing the subsequent history of the jury,
for the jury's role has changed dramatically in the past two centu-
ries-and aspects of its authority have eroded.
146 Id. As Magill points out, this same argument can be expressed as protection
against arbitrary governmental action. See id. at 1185, 1185-86 nn.173-74 (citing schol-
ars advocating this argument). Magill has criticized the coordination thesis because, in
her view, the executive and the courts do not independently analyze Congress's judg-
ment: "[b]arring a colorable constitutional claim about the statute or its enforcement
in a particular case, the Executive (which, by definition, has either consented to the
law or had a veto overridden) would never claim it was not enforcing a statute because
the legislature made the wrong choice; nor would a court claim its interpretation had
nothing to do with the statute approved by Congress." Id. at 1190. Whatever the mer-
its of this argument with respect to the executive and the courts-see id. at 1188-89,
1189 n.178, for a discussion about the broad executive power to check the legisla-
ture-the criminal jury's power to nullify (and its use of that power in particular cases)
shows that the coordination thesis has practical import in those cases where the threat
to liberty is greatest.
147 Bill Stuntz, for example, proposes greater judicial involvement in defining sub-
stantive criminal law to correct the defects of the criminal lawmaking process. Stuntz,
supra note 130, at 587-98. Although he advocates what he calls "constitutionalized sen-
tencing discretion" as part of this package, he is skeptical that the legal case for this is a
strong one. Id. at 595. This Article attempts to show that the legal foundation for such
a claim is, in fact, quite persuasive.
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First, there is evidence that, both before the Framing and for a
time thereafter, juries were deciding questions of law. For some
years after the Revolution and America's founding, many judges re-
fused to tell jurors that they were obliged to accept the judge's view of
the law. 4") Furthermore, lawyers argued questions of law before the
jury in some cases.180 Several states explicitly barred judges from in-
truding upon the jury's power to decide legal questions. l ' In the
nineteenth century, however, a debate arose as to whetherjuries had a
"right" to answer questions of law or merely the "power" to do so by
virtue of their authority to issue a general verdict and to apply the law
to their factfindings.12 In 1895, in Sparf v. United States, 1 53 the Supreme
Court concluded that criminal juries did not have such a right. 
54
This was a more limited view of the jury than that which existed at
the Nation's founding.1 55 Indeed, Nancy King and Susan Klein have
148 See NELSON, supra note 96, at 21 (noting thatjuries "had vast power to find both
the law and the facts"); David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited: Why the Court
Should Instruct the Jury of Its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 89, 98-101 (1995)
(describing the evidence from early American history that "supports the proposition
that juries had the power and the right to decide the law in a criminal case"); R.J. Far-
ley, Instructions to juries, 42 YALE L.J. 194, 202 (1932) ("In America by the time of the
Revolution and for some time thereafter, the power to decide the law in criminal cases
seems to have been almost universally accorded the jury...."); Mark DeWolfe Howe,
Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REv. 582, 590-96 (1939) (citing examples of
nineteenth-century cases in whichjuries were authorized to decide questions of law).
See Harrington, supra note 73, at 379, 402 (discussing judges that deferred to
juries on points of law).
Id. at 390, 402-03.
151 Id. at 391; see Howe, supra note 148, at 602, 609-12 (mentioning several state
laws that protected the jury's authority to decide legal questions from judicial intru-
sion); Note, supra note 73, at 174-75 (discussing the 1808 Massachusetts legislature's
adoption of a statute recognizing the right of the jury to decide questions of law).
152 See James B. Thayer, "Law and Fact" injury Trials, 4 HARV. L. REV. 147, 171
(1890) (distinguishing between the "power" and the "right" of a jury to decide ques-
tions of law); see also Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to De-
termine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 212 (1998)
(concluding that colonial evidence remains inconclusive as to whether a jury had the
right to decide questions of law, but not disputing that the jury had the power to decide
such questions); Note, supra note 73, at 176 (arguing that, in Massachusetts, there was
"a general acceptance of the jury's fight to decide matters of law in criminal cases").
As Michael Stokes Paulsen has observed, however, the power to interpret the law
"arises by implication, as a necessary incident to the exercise of specifically delegated
powers." Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 55, at 241.
13 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
154 Id. at 70. For an excellent discussion of how the jury's power to decide ques-
tions of law eroded, see ABRAMSON, supra note 103, at 67-88.
155 Although some judges had begun to question the jury's right to decide questions
of law by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, it is noteworthy
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relied on Sparf as establishing the "complete demise"1 56 of the jury's
authority to engage in nullification or "pious perjury" to lower penal-
ties. 157 One can legitimately question whether the Court reached the
right result in Sparf; but even accepting the Court's decision, it is
more limited than King and Klein intimate.
While King and Klein are correct that the Court in Sparf did not
afford the jury a right to nullify or to engage in "pious perjury," the
Court did not question the jury's power to do so. The Court did not
second-guess the jury's authority to issue a general verdict, nor the
protection of its verdict of acquittal-which unquestionably gives the
jury the ability to ignore or temper the law in an individual case. The
Court's distinction between a right to decide the law and the power to
do so affected only the instructions a jury would receive. Although
these instructions undoubtedly prevent some jurors from questioning
the law and the judge's interpretation of it, there are also undoubt-
edly otherjurors who will interpret the law differently from the judge,
in spite of the instructions." ' The compromise reached-essentially a
that the Supreme Court had not questioned the jury's right to decide questions of law
until Sparf--almost three decades after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.
IM King & Klein, supra note 7, at 1485.
157 Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *238-39).
158 Although instructions may affect juror behavior in some cases, the empirical
evidence shows that jury comprehension of instructions is low and that jurors bring
and cling to preconceived ideas of the content of the law. See Robert P. Charrow &
Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study ofJuy
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306, 1358 (1979) (describing the results of a study
showing that standard legal instructions "are not well understood by jurors"); Dan M.
Kahan, Lay Perceptions ofJustice vs. Criminal Law Doctrine: A False Dichotomy ?, 28 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 793, 796 (2000) (describing empirical research on jurors' conceptions of legal
insanity and criminal offenses which indicates that jurors' perceptions "are unaffected
by the definitions contained in the instructions that courts give them"); Vicki L. Smith,
Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 858 (1991) (claiming that research has shown jury comprehension
of instructions to be "quite poor"). This empirical evidence therefore confirms the
legal realist critique that "modern jury procedures mask a charade: we have judges go
through the motions of instructing jurors on the law and tell them they must abide by
the instructions, but we suspect thatjurors do not fathom the instructions and fall back
on their own gut reactions or common sense in deciding how the case should come
out." ABRAMSON, supra note 103, at 91; see also United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The jury knows well enough that its prerogative is not
limited to the choices articulated in the formal instructions of the court. The jury gets
its understanding as to the arrangements in the legal system from more than one
voice.... There is the informal communication from the total culture-literature
(novel, drama, film, and television); current comment (newspapers, magazines and
television); conversation; and, of course, history and tradition." (footnote omitted)).
For a description of a study evaluating the effect of nullification instructions on jurors,
see SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
2003]
68 UNIVERSFTY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
"don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding nullification-reflects the fact
that the Court was not prepared to remove the safeguard of the jury's
equitable power, even if it was reluctant to encourage its use as a mat-
ter of course.159 Put another way, the jury "must judge not merely the
defendant's guilt or innocence but the merit of the judge's instruc-
tions for the particular case."160
Similarly, although the ight/power distinction with respect to
questions of law has led the Court to condone limits on the kind of
evidence a defendant may put before the jury-such as those disallow-
ing express arguments about why laws should be nullified or why a
particular defendant might be especially sympathetic' '1 Y-the defen-
dant retains quite a bit of flexibility in telling her story of what hap-
pened and why. Thus, the defendant can still appeal to the jury's
sense ofjustice, even if she must do so indirectly.
In sum, although this erosion is significant, it did not strip the jury
of its core power to check the state and reach an equitable result, even
162if it means nullif)ing the law in a particular case. 1 2 The criminal jury
has retained its power to issue an unreviewable general verdict of ac-
quittal, thus protecting the jury's law-application function and reaf-
firming that the criminal jury performs more than a factfinding role
under the Constitution.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 160-61 (1988). For a discussion of how jurors reasona-
bly interpret the law differently from judges, see Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification
Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1149 (1997).
159 This sentiment was reflected in the D.C. Circuit's Dougherty opinion when Judge
Leventhal praised the "equilibrium [that] has evolved-an often marvelous balance-
with the jury acting as a 'safety valve' for exceptional cases, without being a wildcat or
runaway institution." 473 F.2d at 1134. The opinion goes on to state, "What makes for
health as an occasional medicine would be disastrous as a daily diet." Id. at 1136.
160 MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A
STUDY OF LAWrUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 61 (1973). "Because the jury sys-
tem requires the conscientious juror to distinguish between departing from an instruc-
tion at will and departing from an instruction because he has 'damn good reason' for
doing so as determined by the role ends he is committed to serve, the jury role retains
the obligatory status of the judge's instructions while permitting departures from
them." Id. at 62.
161 See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REv. 939, 975-79 (1997) (noting that evidentiary rules limit
defendants from "presenting evidence and arguments that explicitly court nullifica-
tion" and that this prevents the jury from knowing all the information necessary to
check the prosecutor).
See ABRAMSON, supra note 103, at 64 ("Even critics ofjury nullification concede
that criminal juries have the raw power to pardon lawbreaking because there is no de-
vice for reversing ajury that insists on acquitting a defendant against the law.").
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Indeed, perhaps the greatest testament to the legitimacy and vital-
ity of the criminal jury's equitable power is the fact that the criminal
jury has retained it even as the civil jury's authority has been weak-
ened. The Supreme Court has not allowed the kinds of limits on the
criminal jury that it has condoned in the civil context. Devices to cor-
rect errors of law that are permissible in the civil context-such as
judgments notwithstanding the verdict and appeals-are not available
to the government in criminal cases. '" If the Court did not intend the
criminal jury to exercise such powers, the criminal jury would be sub-
jected to these same review mechanisms. The criminal jury's power,
then, is no mere accident. The Supreme Court has deliberately and
consistently declined to remove the critical-if imperfect--safety valve
for jurors to check general criminal laws. The unreviewable verdict of
acquittal allows the jury to continue to check the government based
on community sentiment.6 4 And, it is a power that enables the jury, in
effect, to "create[] (its] own sentencing discretion" 165 based on its
sense ofjustice.
But the "right" to decide questions of law was not the only realm
of the jury that eroded. A second area in which the jury's power di-
minished involved whether the right to jury trial could be waived.
Prior to 1930, jury trials in federal court, like other jurisdictional
163 Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253, 264 (de-
scribing the many error-correction devices in the civil context that are not permissible
in criminal cases and noting that the rationale is "to protect the jury's authority to ac-
quit against the evidence"). But while Leipold views this as an historical accident that
has somehow managed to survive for more than two centuries, this Article explains the
structural, historical, and normative basis for reading a law-application power into the
criminal jury's constitutional role.
164 Moreover, since Sparf the Court has heralded this political function of the jury.
See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 125, at 15.7 (summarizing cases in which the Court sees
the jury's function as political and noting that these cases "can be interpreted to mean
that the Court supports the infusion of community sentiment in jury verdicts, and
would sanction, under certain circumstances, jury verdicts at odds with unfair laws or
oppressive prosecutorial practices").
165 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 640 (1980). Although the jury can affect sen-
tences through its application of general criminal laws, this power is distinct from a
direct constitutional power to sentence. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459
(1984) (noting that "[t]he Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a
right to a jury determination" of the "appropriate punishment to be imposed on an
individual"). That is, while the jury does not have the direct power to decide the spe-
cific sentence a defendant should receive if the law provides a range of zero to ten
years, the jury does have the power to determine whether a defendant is guilty of a
manslaughter charge which carries a range of zero to ten years or a murder charge
which carries a range of ten years to life. If the jury concludes the defendant is not
guilty of the murder charge, it has effectively limited the sentence that can be imposed
even though the jury does not have the power to sentence directly.
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provisions, could not be waived. This reflected the mandatory lan-
guage in Article III that the trial of all crimes "shall" be byjury and the
larger view that the jury plays a key role in the constitutional design.
In Patton v. United States, 167 however, the Supreme Court concluded
that the parties could agree to waive a jury trial in favor of a bench
trial. 68 This development may seem to stand in tension with the view
of the jury as a structural check on government.
6 9
Critically, however, the government cannot dispense with the jury
unless the defendant agrees. 17 Thus, the individual whose liberty is at
stake and who faces the stigma of a criminal conviction must approve
of the shift from jury to judge. If the defendant wants the check of
the people to apply in her case, it will. The jury, then, remains a criti-
cal equitable check on general laws because the jury will apply those
laws if the defendant does not agree to a bench trial. The defendant's
gatekeeping power makes sense when one considers that the defen-
dant herself suffers the inequities of an overinclusive law.
There is, however, still a third development that has made inroads
on the jury's ability to protect a defendant's liberty interest against
government intrusion. The growth of discretionary judicial sentenc-
ing allowed judges to make critical factfindings that determined the
length of a defendant's sentence. At common law, "[t]he substantive
criminal law tended to be sanction-specific; it prescribed a particular
sentence for each offense."' To the extent the law mandated a
166 SeeAAR, supra note 109, at 108 ("[A]s late as 1898, the Supreme Court... was
squarely on record as declaring that a criminal defendant could not waive jury trial.");
Amar, supra note 55, at 1198-99, 1199 n.299 (noting that, prior to 1930, court decisions
held thatjury trials could not be waived).
167 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
169 Id. at 312. For an argument that the Supreme Court reached the wrong result
in Patton, see Amar, supra note 55, at 1196-99.
169 To be sure, the claim that the jury is a structural check loses some force when it
can be waived at will. But other constitutional doctrines of power and structure, such
as sovereign immunity, also permit waiver of some kind. See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) ("[A] State
may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit."). Moreover, this exception
places the focus on the defendant's liberty interest, and the protection of individual
libertg against the state is the ultimate purpose of the jury.
1,0 The law varies on whether the government must also consent to a non-jury
trial. In federal court, approximately half the states, and the District of Columbia, the
government can veto a defendant's request for a bench trial. See Adam H. Kurland,
Providing a Federal Criminal Defendant with a Unilateral Right to a Bench Trial: A Renewed
Call To Amend Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a), 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309, 321-23
(1993) (discussing the variations across differentjurisdictions on whether government
consent is needed for a bench trial).
171 Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479 (2000).
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particular punishment, the jury's verdict dictated the defendant's sen-
tence. This gave jurors a de facto sentencing function because their
acquittal on a greater charge would dictate a lesser sentence or give
judges the authority to impose a lesser sentence.' Although such
mandatory sentences for felonies were prevalent at the time of the
Constitution's Framing,173 there was already a move toward discretion-
ary sentencing, which allowed judges to sentence defendants within a
broad range prescribed by statute. '" In the nineteenth and most of
the twentieth centuries, discretionary sentencing became the norm,
and judges and correctional personnel were given broad leeway to de-
termine prison sentences "according to informed judgments concern-





This flexibility allowed judges to make factual findings that af-
fected a defendant's punishment-arguably a task for the jury because
those findings would bear on a defendant's blameworthiness and pun-
ishment. The Supreme Court in Williams v. New York, 7'  however, en-
dorsed this broad authority for thejudge. 7 Although this gave judges
172 See infra text accompanying notes 198-205. Judges, too, could reduce sentences
under certain circumstances. See Bibas, supra note 7, at 1124-26 & nn.204-07 (discuss-
ingjudges' discretion to downgrade sentences).
173 See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978) ("In the early days of the
Republic, when imprisonment had only recently emerged as an alternative to the
death penalty, confinement in public stocks, or whipping in the town square, the pe-
riod of incarceration was generally prescribed with specificity by the legislature. Each
crime had its defined punishment." (citing REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 83-85
(1976))).
174 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 ("J]udges in this country have long exercised dis-
cretion ... in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the individual case."); Bibas,
supra note 7, at 1125-26 (describing the sentencing discretion that existed at common
law); King & Klein, supra note 7, at 1506-08 (noting that judges had discretion to sen-
tence within broad ranges); Nancy J. King, The Origins of Felony .Jury Sentencing in the
United States, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937, 985-89 (2003) (describing the judicial sentenc-
ing that existed in Virginia, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania). Moreover, even at the Fram-
ing,judges had discretion to extend the benefit of clergy to defendants in capital cases.
See id. at 948-49 (discussing the benefit of clergy as it was used in colonial Virginia).
The discretion to exercise mercy is, however, quite consistent with the view of the judi-
ciary advanced here.
175 Grayson, 438 U.S. at 46 (citing REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE, supra note 173, at 82).
176 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
177 Id. at 246-49. For an argument that this regime violated due process and equal
protection, see Saltzburg, supra note 48, at 248. Because this Article is concerned with
the jury's constitutional role, my focus is on how the prior regime interfered with the
jury guarantee, not on whether it violated more general notions of due process and
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a factfinding power that arguably rests with juries, it did not strip the
jury of its law-application power in criminal cases.
The criminal jury protects individual liberty differently from
judges in both respects: its factfinding power and its law-application
power. The jury may protect "legal innocence" differently from the
judge through its factfinding responsibility. The jury, as a multi-
member body, is "more likely than one person to reflect public senti-
ment""" and may view the facts in a different light than would the sin-
gle trial judge.1 7' The fair cross-section requirement "enhanc[es] that
likelihood" because it makes it more likely that juries will represent
the community's perception of the facts than "trial judges [who] col-
lectively do not represent-by race, sex, or economic or social class-
the communities from which they come.""' Moreover, because the
judge is a repeat player, she might be more inclined to favor the gov-
ernment's view of the facts as the government is also a repeat player in
the criminal justice process. Thejudge may also become desensitized
to the enormity of what is at stake in a criminal proceeding because it
so familiar. Thejury, by contrast, comes to the process with a fresh set
of eyes and brings no institutional bias to its vision of the facts.
Thus, even if the jury and judge agree on the proper application and
equal protection. In particular, the key question for purposes of this Article is whether
the prior regime-even if accepted as constitutionally permissible-provides authority
for a Guidelines regime because the jury's role had already been diminished under the
old regime or whether the latter regime represents an even greater constitutional
threat to the jury's function.
178 Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 63 (1980).
179 See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 125, at 50 (discussing the difference in jurors'
perceptions based on their backgrounds and experiences and noting that "[t] he jury's
heterogeneous makeup may also lessen the power of prejudice"); Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory ofJuror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L.
REv. 519, 525 (1991) (noting that "[d]ifferent jurors will construct different stories"
about the evidence at trial based on each juror's life experience and knowledge about
the world); see also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes injury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L.
REv. 1261, 1278 (2000) (arguing that "Ulurors necessarily rely on context and individ-
ual interpretation as they sift through often disjointed and complex presentations of
evidence to find facts and to make decisions").
ISO Gillers, supra note 178, at 63; see also NancyJ. King, Postconviction Review ofJury
Discrimination: Measuring the Effects ofJuror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63,
100 & n.139 (1993) (observing that judges are "primarily white, male, middle-class");
Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amend-
ment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 169 (1991) ("In federal




interpretation of the law, they may see the facts quite differently given
these institutional differences.""
In Williams, as noted, the Supreme Court approved the power of
judges to make critical factual findings in the sentencing phase of
criminal cases. If ajury acquits a defendant outright, of course, there
is no danger that the judge can override its decision. Thus, when a
defendant is acquitted of all charges, a jury's unique perspective on
the facts is preserved. But under a discretionary sentencing regime, a
judge can increase criminal punishment on the basis of facts that the
jury has not found as long as the jury has convicted the defendant of
some crime. That is, ajury acquittal on a greater charge does not pre-
vent the judge from overriding the jury's determination and increas-
ing a defendant's sentence on the basis of acquitted or uncharged
conduct as long as the jury convicted on a lesser charge that carries a
sufficiently high statutory maximum. This scenario presents one of
the very risks the jury is designed to address: having the government
alone determine guilt or innocence about a fact that will affect pun-
ishment.
If the government can punish an individual found innocent by a
jury on a greater charge as long as the jury convicts of a lesser charge,
the jury's power to check the government becomes greatly dimin-
ished. The jury might have acquitted on the greater charge precisely
because it had reasonable doubts about the defendant's guilt based on
the facts as the jury saw them. Bringing its collective experience and
perspective to bear on the case, the jury may have concluded that the
government had not met its burden and the defendant should not be
punished for the greater conduct. The judge is a poor replacement
for the jury, for her potential bias is as strong in sentencing as it would
be at trial.
18 2
Yet the Supreme Court has allowed a single judge to override a
jury's acquittal decision based on that judge's lone view of the facts. It
is undeniable that this development curtailed the jury's factfinding
power, and one can legitimately question whether the Court's decision
181 See Marder, supra note 123, at 918 (describing the jury as "a check on profes-
sionals, who may have grown too removed from the experiences and common sense
reasoning of ordinary citizens").
182 See Murphy, supra note 106, at 790 (arguing that jury participation is as impor-
tant at sentencing as it is at trial because of the jury's lack of government bias).
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was correct as an initial matter.8 3 But even accepting judges' power
over sentencing facts-which this Article does for the sake of argu-
ment and also because of its strong historical roots and longevity-
discretionary judicial sentencing did not diminish the jury's equitable
power over law. When judges sentenced defendants under the discre-
tionary sentencing regime, they did so based on their assessment of
the individual and the particular facts and circumstances of the case.
There were no generally applicable laws being applied by judges.
Thus, although judges' power increased vis-;I-vis juries to decide facts,
the judiciary as a whole did not sacrifice any power to the legislature
or executive. Judges and juries together retained broad power to en-
sure equitable results in particular cases. Judges made their own fac-
tual assessments about sentencing, and juries retained the power to
determine which (if any) general laws imposing punishment applied.
Thus, juries could continue to check (or nullify) those laws in particu-
lar cases if they believed equity demanded such a result.
This is not to say, however, that this jury power comes at no costs
for defendants or the system. It is of course possible that the jury
might exercise this discretionary power in undesirable ways, that "the
wishes and feelings of the community"' 1s4 might be the kind of popular
prejudice that is troubling. For example, jurors in the South fre-
quently acquitted white defendants in lynching cases even when faced
with overwhelming evidence of guilt.8 5 Social science research has
found that white jurors are more likely to acquit white defendants
than African American defendants and that white jurors are more
likely to acquit when the victim is African American than when the vic-
tim is white.8 6 Similarly, there is some data indicating that African
ISs See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 48, at 247-48 (characterizing the discretionary
sentencing regime described in Williams as "arbitrary and virtually undefensible" and
raisinh significant constitutional due process and equal protection questions).
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443,
460 (1899).
185 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 67, at 890-91.
186 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611, 1626 (1985) (summarizing conclusions of nine studies, all of which found that
white jurors were "more likely to find a minority-race defendant guilty than they were
to find an identically situated white defendant guilty"); King, supra note 180, at 82-85
(describing study findings). Studies have also shown a bias on the basis of the victim's
race in jurors' decisions to impose the death penalty. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 401
(1990) (describing a study of Georgia death penalty cases that revealed a higher
risk of death penalty imposition for white victims than black victims); SAMUEL R. GROSS
& ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL
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American jurors are more likely to acquit African American defen-
dants. Thus, defendants may be treated disparately depending on
their own race or the race of their victims. In addition, jurors might
use their unreviewable power to acquit to express their broader dis-
agreement with the policy behind a criminal law, regardless of the cir-
cumstances of the individual defendant. For example, juries have re-
sisted laws against statutory rape and drunk driving, especially when
they were initially passed, because jurors did not agree with the social
norms underlying those laws.'" As social norms have changed, juries
have followed suit.'" But to the extent we want the criminal laws to
change social norms and not merely follow them, this jury function
has the potential to stunt that development.
These dangers are significant, but it is important to recognize that
the same risks are present whenever any actor in the criminal justice
system is given discretion to mitigate punishment. For example, these
same concerns arise when the police make determinations about
which crimes to investigate and whom they will target for stops and
searches.190 The executive's power to pardon and prosecutorial discre-
tion not to enforce the law can also suffer from these biases.'' Studies
SENTENCING 109 (1989) (reporting findings of capital sentencing disparities that cor-
related to the race of the victim).
187 SeeJeffrey Rosen, After 'One Angiy Woman', 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 179 & n.3
(1998) (discussing the perceived rise in "race-based jury nullification" (citing Michael
D. Weiss & Karl Zinsmeister, When Race Trumps Truth in the Courtroom, in CENTER FOR
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: How RACE AFFECTS
JURY TRIALS 63 (Gerald A. Reynolds ed., 1996))); see also Douglas 0. Linder, Juror Em-
pathy and Race, 63 Tenn. L. Rev. 887, 904-05 (1996) (noting that "[r] ecent trial statistics
indicate that the growing racial diversity of urban juries has substantially increased ac-
quittal rates for black criminal defendants" and that studies support the argument that
black *urors are likely to empathize with black defendants).
s HARRYKALVEN,JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 276-80, 293-96 (1971).
189 For example, in the first half of the 1960s, the conviction rate in rape cases was
only twenty-seven percent. By 1987, it shot up to seventy-three percent. JAMES P.
LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 110-11 (1992). A similar trend appears with the convic-
tion rate in civil rights cases. Id. at 112-13.
190 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and
Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271, 1271-75 (1998) (discussing racial profiling
by police officers); William J. Stuntz, Essay, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1795, 1799 (1998) (arguing that the police focus on urban crack markets, rather than
on other drugs, reflects class bias). For descriptions of the power of police to "nullify"
criminal laws by failing to enforce them and of the potential for unequal treatment
based on the views of the individual officer, see KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 84-90 (1969); Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Dis-
cretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962).
191 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 130, at 594 (noting that "prosecutors prosecute if
and when they choose" without formal legal oversight); James Vorenberg, Decent
20031
76 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
on race and capital sentencing have found even greater disparities inS • 192
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion than in jury discretion. In
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1522 (1981) (discussing the
"great and essentially unreviewable powers" of prosecutors). The Baldus study dis-
cussed in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987), for example, highlighted not
only juror bias, but prosecutorial bias as well. Lanni, supra note 132, at 1800-01. As
Albert Alschuler has noted, "when the discretion of prosecutors and other officials not
to enforce the law is not only tolerated but applauded, it is difficult to argue (as prose-
cutors, of all people, often do) that affording a dispensing power to jurors would bring
the rule of law to an end." Albert W. Alschuler, A Teetering Palladium?, 79 JUDICATURE
200, 201 (1996) (book review).
192 See Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Race and the Victim: An Examination of Capital Sentencing
and Guilt Attribution Studies, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 533, 537 (1998) (citing the Supreme
Court's discussion of the Baldus study in McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287); see also Lanni, su-
pra note 132, at 1800-01 (same). Thus,just as it is possible that jurors may improperly
exercise their discretion, it is also possible that prosecutors may improperly exercise
the discretion they possess under the Sentencing Guidelines. Commentators have ob-
served that some of the discretion that previously resided with judges under the discre-
tionary sentencing regime now resides with prosecutors under the Sentencing Guide-
lines. See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501, 557 (1992) (finding that, although the guideline system has not
transferred to prosecutors all of the sentencing discretion that judges previously exer-
cised under the discretionary sentencing regime, there is empirical evidence suggest-
ing significant circumvention of the Sentencing Guidelines by prosecutors); David
Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse of Federal Guideline Sentencing, 74 WASH.
U. L.Q. 881, 902 (1996) ("Charging decisions, charge selection, and plea agreements
can allow the prosecutor to determine the resulting sentence to a far greater degree
than the federal judiciary."); see also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge:
Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 199, 236 (1997) (detailing the substantial discretion prosecutors have
tinder the Guidelines to request a downward departure for defendants on the basis of
"substantial assistance" and explaining how that discretion reintroduces the problem
of disparity into the sentencing process).
This substantial discretion might explain, at least in part, the fact that the Guide-
lines have failed to eliminate sentencing disparity on certain levels. Some data indicate
that, before the Guidelines, the average sentence for African American males between
the ages of eighteen and thirty-five was two months longer than the average sentence
for white males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Gerald W. Heaney, The
Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 207
(1991). Under the Guidelines, the average sentence for African American males be-
tween eighteen and thirty-five is now approximately two years longer than the average
sentence for white males in the same age group. Id. at 206. And this disparity is not
merely because of harsher drug sentences (where the differential went from seven
months before the Guidelines to thirty months after the Guidelines). Id. at 207. The
differential for violent crimes increased from six months before the Guidelines to thir-
teen months after the Guidelines were adopted. Id.
Stephen Schulhofer has questioned the accuracy of some of this data because the
disparity might reflect differences in the nature of the cases being compared. The pre-
Guidelines cases being analyzed were more complex than the post-Guidelines cases,
and some of the pre-Guidelines cases may have involved date bargaining, in which
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other words, no criminal justice or sentencing scheme will eliminate
all disparity as long as some actors in the process have discretion. Yet
some discretion is necessary to ensure that the application of the laws
remains just.'"1
The jury's enshrinement in the Constitution and the powers it has
retained in criminal cases for 200 years reflects the judgment that any
risk of disparity from jury involvement in the criminal justice process
is outweighed by the benefits the jury brings. The jury adds a unique
perspective to the criminaljustice system: the views of the community.
Even when all of the government actors-the police, the prosecutor,
the judge, and the legislature-agree that the defendant's behavior
should be punished, the jury stands as a final barrier. The jury, like
the judge, is a judicial actor. Its function is to apply the law in a par-
ticular case. But because the jury has an unreviewable power to ac-
quit, it can correct overinclusive general criminal laws in a way that
judges cannot. As Bill Nelson has observed, the jury's power
to fit the circumstances of individual cases has great potential for flexibil-
ity, for records of jury determinations of points of law are seldom pre-
served, and hence those determinations do not become precedents with
a binding effect on future juries. In each case, ajury is free, if justice re-
quires, to reach the same result reached by other juries in analogous
cases in the past; if, on the other hand, justice requires departure from
past verdicts, the jury is free so to depart. Moreover, no record is kept of
such departures, and therefore legal change and development are im-
perceptible; men have the valuable illusion of legal stability. . .. The
broad power ofjuries to find law thus gave the legal system real flexibility
while simultaneously giving the illusion of stability-two values that are
important in doing justice in individual cases and in convincing litigants
194that justice has been done them.
This accommodation is necessary because "[a]ll new laws, though
penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and
prosecutorsagreed to limit an indictment to conduct that took place before the effec-
tive date of the Guidelines. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Proc-
ess: The Problem is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 840-41 (1992).
But Schulhofer acknowledges that the discrepancies between the sentences received by
African Americans and by whites for drug offenses and violent crimes post-Guidelines
"undoubtedly warrant further study." Id. at 841.
193 ,"The existence of discretion, somewhere in the [criminal justice] system, to
make a context-sensitive evaluation of the offender's conduct and character is intrinsic
to criminal law because context-specific, retrospective assessments of the offender and
his wrongdoing are intrinsic to just punishment." Kyron Huigens, What Is and Is Not
Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L. REv. 811, 818 (2002).
194 NELSON, supra note 96, at 28-29.
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most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and
equivocal. '19 5
The drafters of legal rules cannot anticipate and take account of every
case where a defendant's conduct is "unlawful" but not blameworthy, any
more than they can draw a bold line to mark the boundary between an
accident and negligence. It is the jury-as spokesman for the commu-
nity's sense of values-that must explore that subtle and elusive bound-
196
ary.
Although juries are often criticized for lacking the necessary expertise
to apply increasingly complicated laws and for rendering verdicts on
the basis of emotion and sympathy, that is, in a very real sense, the
point of the jury.
The jury trial is where the law meets the individual, and the par-
ticular facts and circumstances of the individual's case are evaluated
not by an impersonal lawmaker, but by her peers. Here is where nu-
ance can make the difference. Here is where the law can yield to
community values. Here is where government abuse can be checked
by the people. 197 If rigid and predictable application of the law were
the goal, the criminal jury trial would never have been mandated by
the Constitution in the first place, and we would have long ago dis-
pensed with the unreviewable general verdict of acquittal.
The jury has, in fact, made ample use of this power to correct what
have been, in its view, overly broad or harsh laws. As the Supreme
Court noted in Jones v. United States,'98 "[t] he potential or inevitable se-
verity of sentences was indirectly checked by juries' assertions of a
mitigating power when the circumstances of a prosecution pointed to
political abuse of the criminal process or endowed a criminal convic-
tion with particularly sanguinary consequences."'9 Because jurors
could find the defendant guilty of any lesser offense included in the
offense charged at common law,jurors could "create[] their own sen-
tencing discretion by distorting the factfinding process" and acquitting
195 THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
196 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note
6, at 169 ("[N]o system of formal rules can fully capture our intuitions about what jus-
tice requires.").
'97 See HYLTON & KHANNA, supra note 60, at 42 (noting that the jury guarantee,
among other procedural protections for the defendant, checks self-interested behavior
by the prosecutor and other government agents).
198 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
199 Id. at 245.
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the defendant of the more serious charge.0 ° In his study of juries in
England from 1200 to 1800, Thomas Green found that jurors consis-
tently acquitted defendants of capital charges and convicted on lesser
charges because they believed the laws to be too harsh as applied to
the defendant.2°1 In another example, John Langbein reports that, in
eighteenth-century England, "It]he jury not only decided guilt, but it




Thus, jurors would downgrade from grand to petty larceny if the
goods were of relatively small value or if the jury sympathized with the
defendant.2 0 3  In this country, jurors would "persistently" refuse to
convict a defendant of first-degree murder to avoid a mandatory death
sentence.2 4 Indeed, the frequency with which juries acquitted even-
tually led to more humane sentencing laws.
20 '
Juries still possess the power to nullify unjust laws, although it is
admittedly more difficult for juries to check laws that would, in their
estimation, produce overly harsh results when they are unaware of
what the actual sentence will be. (And most jurisdictions forbid
judges and parties from instructing the jury about penalties.)2 0 1 But
200 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 640 (1980).
201 See GREEN, supra note 69, at 360 (noting "the long history of official acquies-
cence in jury mitigation of the law"). Green recounts the common practice of English
jurors in simple homicide and non-professional theft cases of manipulating the fact-
finding process to prevent the defendant from being executed. Id. at 28-64, 261, 269.
Green labels this as "sanction nullification," id. at 97, or an "intermediate form of nulli-
fication," as distinct from the jury nullification in its "strongest sense," which "occurs
when the jury recognizes that a defendant's act is proscribed by the law but acquits be-
cause it does not believe the act should be proscribed," id. at xviii.
202 John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Dial: A View from the
Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 55 (1983).
203 Id. at 54; see also KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 188, at 310-11 (discussing how
early nineteenth-century English juries would refuse to convict defendants of capital
crimes if they felt the punishment was disproportionate).
204 Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 388 (1985) (quoting Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976)).
205 See Sauer, supra note 106, at 1257 (citing examples from seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century England that exhibit how jury acquittals led to the amelioration of
harsh laws); cf GREEN, supra note 69, at 147 (noting that "authorities modified the sub-
stantive law" in light of widespread resistance). John Poulos has pointed to the com-
mon law distinction between murder and manslaughter to highlight that the Framers
understood the difference between "greater and lesser offenses created from what was
once a single crime." Poulos, supra note 52, at 700. He has argued that the Framers
therefore understood that a crime can perform two basic functions: "creat[ing] liabil-
ity for punishment when none existed before [the law was enacted]" and "creat[ing]
liability for enhanced punishment." Id. at 700-01.206
Although states are permitted to use jury sentencing-see Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1973) for the proposition thatjury sentencing does not
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the jury does attempt to make such predictions, and if it predicts that
the punishment will be disproportionate to what the defendant did, it
is less likely to convict. 2 7 There is evidence of juror resistance to laws
imposing mandatory sentences or "three-strikes" sentences when ju-
rors are aware of the consequences of a conviction.2 0 8 Jurors even try
to anticipate what the sentence will be under the Guidelines in de-
termining whether to convict. For instance, one juror in the District
of Columbia related her experience on a hung jury where four jurors
refused to convict because they "knew exactly what the sentencing
guidelines called for" and they felt that penalty was too harsh given
the offense.
violate due process-when ajury has no sentencing function (which is the case in fed-
eral court and most state courts), the jury typically does not receive any information
about the sentencing consequences of its verdict. See Sauer, supra note 106, at 1242
("The general rule in federal and most state judicial systems is that neither the judge
nor advocates should inform the jury of the sentencing consequences of a guilty ver-
dict."); see also Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 580 (1994) (noting the "princi-
ple that jurors are not to be informed of the consequences of their verdicts"). Indeed,
juries are often expressly instructed not to think about sentencing consequences in
rendering their verdicts. See, e.g.,Johnson v. United States, 636 A.2d 978, 980 n.3 (D.C.
1994) (citing CRIMINALJURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR D.C., Instruction 2.74 (4th ed. 1993),
which states, "The question of possible punishment of the defendant in the event of
conviction is no concern of [the jury] and should not enter into or influence your de-
liberations in any way"). For an argument that the jury should receive an instruction
on sentencing consequences with respect to mandatory penalties, see Sauer, supra note
106, at 1260-70. See also United States v. Datcher, 830 F. Supp. 411, 416 (M.D. Tenn.
1993) (arguing that segregating factfinding and sentencing creates "an artificial, and
poorly constructed, fence around the jury's role."). But see United States v. Chesney,
86 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that, in general, "juries should be instructed
not to consider defendants' possible sentences during deliberations").
207 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2385, 2450-
51 (1997) ("As penalties increase, people may not be as willing to enforce them be-
cause of the disproportionate impact on those caught.").
208 See Iontcheva, supra note 132, at 332 (presenting evidence that the adoption of
mandatory sentencing laws led to increased jury nullification); King, supra note 61, at
433 (arguing that jury nullification takes place in the face of "three-strikes" laws and
other mandatory sentences); Marder, supra note 123, at 891-92, 895-97 (noting that
there is evidence that "three-strikes" laws lead to jury nullification).
209 Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, Panel Discussion-Jury Nullification, 145 F.R.D. 149, 191 (1992); see also Lanni,
suptra note 132, at 1784 (describing other instances of nullification based on antici-
pated penalties). While most of the political support for harsh sentences comes from
suburban voters, most crimes occur in "certain neighborhoods of large cities." Sara
Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-
Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
23, 37 (1997). "In the poor and minority community [sic], personal experience with
offenders and their families forces the public to see the tradeoffs that result from
longer terms of imprisonment." Id. at 64. Jurors in these communities might vote to
acquit on some charges, regardless of the weight of the evidence, if they believe too
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More controlled studies and surveys have confirmed the tendency
of jurors to alter their verdicts based on their prediction of punish-
ment. Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel found that juries will nullify
when they perceive "a gross discrepancy between the offense and the
anticipated punishment., 210 Several psychology experiments also show
that verdicts are dramatically affected by what the jurors believe will
211
happen to the defendant upon conviction.
Moreover, even if a jury does not know the precise punishment
for an offense, it will understand the relative punishment. That is, if a
defendant faces more than one charge, the jury can reasonably esti-
mate that it can mitigate the consequences for the defendant by ac-
quitting on one charge and convicting on another. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has acknowledged and supported the jury's power to be
lenient in its acceptance of inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases.2 1 2
As Alexander Bickel noted, allowing inconsistent verdicts "reaffirms
the jury's power to exercise leniency by limiting punishment to sen-
tence upon only one of many counts." ' "To deny the jury a share in
this endeavor is to deny the essence of the jury's function, which is
finding a solution for those occasional hard cases in which 'law and
justice do not coincide.' 21 4  In other words, the jury deliberately
acquits on some charges and convicts on others, even when such re-
sults are logically inconsistent, in order to reach a just outcome. In
many people from their communities are being sent to prison and that the punish-
ments are too severe for the crime. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Juiy Nullification:
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 716 (1995) (arguing that
there should be a presumption in favor of nullification when an African American is
charged with a victimless crime because "[b]lack people have a community that needs
building, and children who need rescuing, and as long as a person will not hurt any-
one, the community needs him there to help").
210 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 188, at 306. Darryl Brown has pointed out that
jurors are not necessarily behaving outside the rule of law when they nullify, but might
be interpreting statutes in creative ways-akin to the dynamic statutory interpretation
methods used by many judges-to reflect their normative judgments of culpability.
Brown, supra note 158, at 1167, 1169-71, 1190-91.
211 KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 158, at 159,166 n.69.
2 See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984) ("[Tlhe possibility that the
inconsistent verdicts may favor the criminal defendant as well as the Government mili-
tates against review of such convictions at the defendant's behest."). But see Eric L.
Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV.
L. REv. 771, 797 (1998) (arguing that the jury's power to be lenient is not constitu-
tionally based, and therefore, the Supreme Court should not support inconsistent ver-
dicts on this basis).
213 Alexander M. Bickel, Judge and Juy-Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63
HARv. L. REV. 649, 651-52 (1950).
214 Id. at 651 (quoting Wigmore, supra note 125, at 170).
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upholding inconsistent verdicts, the Supreme Court expressly relied
on the fact that it is the jury's "historic function" to act "as a check
against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power., 215 The jury knows
that its compromise position will result in a reduced sentence; it miti-
gates punishment precisely because it believes the defendant should
not be blamed for the entirety of the conduct with which she is
charged.
Roscoe Pound praised this check by the jury-this "[]ury lawless-
ness"-as "the great corrective of law in its actual administration. The
will of the state at large imposed on a reluctant community, the will of
a majority imposed on a vigorous and determined minority, find the
same obstacle in the local jury that formerly confronted kings and
ministers., 216 And this communication from the jury sends important
signals to the legislature that laws may need to be changed.
Thus, while the reasons for mitigation will not always be laudable,
giving the jury this power allows it to err on the side of protecting the
legally and morally innocent, even if we might disagree with the moral
judgment made by the jury. Like the reasonable doubt standard, this
power symbolizes our societal judgment that it is better to let a guilty
person go free-or at least be punished to a lesser degree-than to
punish the legally or morally innocent.
215 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984); see also Dunn v. United States,
284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932) ("Consistency in the verdict is not necessary."). Albert Al-
schuler has observed, however, that inconsistent verdicts might instead be viewed as
permitting unlawful convictions. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury:
VoirDire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 212-
14 (1989). By relying on the Supreme Court's logic in inconsistent verdict cases, I do
not mean to suggest that juries always issue inconsistent verdicts to be merciful. I
agree with Alschuler that it is inappropriate to assume juries are always benevolent. My
point here, however, is simply to note that the Supreme Court has allowed inconsistent
verdicts based on the Court's acceptance of the jury's power to nullify.
216 Pound, supra note 11, at 18.
217 The empirical evidence on how the jury exercises its power is mixed. In their
classic study of the American jury, Kalven and Zeisel found that, although juries and
judges agreed roughly seventy-five percent of the time, in the cases involving dis-
agreement, the jury was more likely to acquit. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 188, at 56-
57. Specifically, they found that the jury was likely to be more lenient than the judge
in more than eighty-five percent of the cases in which juries and judges disagreed. Id.
at 59. As Kalven and Zeisel put it:
In the end the point is that the jury, as an expression of the community's con-
science, interprets (the norm that we live in a society preferring to let ten
guilty men go free rather than risk convicting one innocent man] more gen-
erously and more intensely than does the judge.
Id. at 189. For a critical view of Kalven and Zeisel's methodology, see Michael H.
Walsh, The American Jury: A Reassessment, 79 YALE L.J. 142 (1969) (book review).
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The Supreme Court has recognized this value of the jury in cases
involving the ultimate power of the state: death penalty proceedings.
And it has praised precisely those less predictable features of the jury
by acknowledging that "[i] ndividual jurors bring to their deliberations
'qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the
range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable,' 2 1 8 and never-
theless claiming that "the inherent lack of predictability of jury deci-
sions does notjustify their condemnation.""9 Rather, the Court stated
that "it is the jury's function to make the difficult and uniquely human
judgments that defy codification and that 'buil[d] discretion, equity,
and flexibility into a legal system.' 20 Here is one instance, at least,
where death is not different. The criminal jury plays this valuable role
in all criminal proceedings.
As the Supreme Court has remarked, "On many occasions, fully
known to the Founders of this country, jurors-plain people-have
manfully stood up in defense of liberty against the importunities of
judges and despite prevailing hysteria and prejudices. 2 2' " [T]he prem-
ise underlying the constitutional method for determining guilt or in-
nocence in federal courts is that laymen are better than specialists to
perform this task., 222 Similarly, Justice Gray noted:
[I] t is a matter of common observation, thatjudges and lawyers, even the
most upright, able, and learned, are sometimes too much influenced by
technical rules; and that those judges who are wholly or chiefly occupied
in the administration of criminal justice are apt, not only to grow severe
in their sentences, but to decide questions of law too unfavorably to the
accused.2 2 3
Whether because of its valuable function or its historical pedigree,
the jury to this day commands the respect and admiration of
the American people. Recent studies have found that seventy-eight
In a comparison of jury and judge conviction rates from 1945 to 1980, James Le-
vine similarly found that juries were more lenient during the period from 1945 'to
1962. But he also found that juries were more likely to convict than were judges from
1962 until the early 1970s. LEVINE, supra note 189, at 122-24. It is unclear, however,
whether these comparisons were apt because it is possible that the caseloads ofjudges
and juries varied. For instance, it is possible that defendants facing more serious
charges opted forjury trials and that prosecutors devoted more time to those trials.
F98 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493, 503 (1972)).
219 dI .
220 Id. (quoting KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 188, at 498).
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1955).
2 Id. at 18.
223 Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 174 (1895) (Gray,J., dissenting).
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percent of Americans believe "[t]he jury system is the most fair way to




Sixty-nine percent believe that "U]uries are the most important part of
ourjudicial system."
2 2
Thus, despite the curtailment of jury power at the margins-for
example, allowing judges to instruct juries that they must follow the
law-the Court has never attempted to cut back "the unreviewable
power of a jury to return a verdict of not guilty for impermissible rea-
sons. " 226 As the Court itself has noted, "this is not a case where a once-
established principle has gradually been eroded by subsequent opin-
ions. ',2 7 Rather, the jury's raw power to acquit without review has per-
sisted since the Nation's founding. Thus, as long as the jury applies
general laws imposing punishment, there is an equitable safety valve.
The argument in this Article depends critically on this conception
of the jury and its importance. For those who reject this-and instead
view the criminal jury as an anachronistic holdover that fits uneasily in
the modern administration of criminal justice-the remainder of the
argument may be unsatisfying. But for those who continue to believe
in the jury's importance-because the Constitution enshrines its
power, because history documents the jury's use of its power to pro-
tect liberty, because the jury continues to act as a valuable check
against the state, because the American people continue to place the
jury in high regard-the threat the jury faces today in the form of
mandatory sentencing laws applied by judges is the sort of "secret
machination" Blackstone warned against, that which threatens the
very purpose of the jury.
II. THE THREAT OF MANDATORY SENTENCING LAWS
Mandatory sentencing laws made their way onto the legal land-
scape without much analysis of what they would mean for the judiciary
writ large-that is, the combined power of judges and juries in the
constitutional structure. They were passed in response to the concern
thatjudges had too much power. No one-not legislatures, notvoters,
224AM. BAR ASS'N, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999), at http://
www.abanet.org/media/perception/perception40.html.
225 Id. Another study found that participants rated juries higher than judges in
terms of fairness, accuracy, lack of bias, and the representation of minorities. RobertJ.
MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens'Perceptions of the CriminalJury: Procedural
Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 338 tbl.2 (1988).
226 Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981) (emphasis added).
227 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63 (1984).
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not courts-seemed to consider that they might have an impact on ju-
ries. So, for example, when the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United
Stateds upheld the Federal Sentencing Guidelines against an attack
that the Guidelines were an improper delegation of legislative power
that violated the separation of powers,2 29 the Court did not consider
the jury's role in that system. The Court in Mistretta permitted Con-
gress to delegate to an unelected commission a fundamental question
of lawmaking-under what circumstances the state should deprive an
individual of liberty and even life.90 It did not, however, address the
following questions: whether the responsibility for applying those laws
could be transferred from the jury to the judge and how that transfer
increases legislative and executive power at the expense of the judici-
ary.
Legislatures, courts, sentencing commissions, and scholars have
largely ignored the effect of mandatory sentencing laws on juries be-
cause it is not immediately apparent how those laws amount to a
greater intrusion on the jury's constitutional power than the discre-
tionary regime that came before. In fact, there is a world of difference
between the two regimes, and that difference directly impacts the
jury's equitable role.
Mandatory sentencing laws intrude far further on the jury's-and
thus the judiciary's-constitutional function because they diminish
not merely the jury's factfinding power, but also its law-application
power. As noted, under the previous sentencing regime, judges had
complete freedom to individualize their factual findings in particular
cases because they were not applying general laws of any kind. In-
deed, their sentencing decisions were largely unreviewable. This gave
judges power much like that possessed by juries, for it allowed judges
to adjust their rulings to the individual circumstances before them
regardless of legislative or executive demands. To be sure, judges
lacked the community perspective of the jury. Butjudges at least pos-
sessed an institutional power similar to that of the jury: the ability to
"do justice" in an individual case.
Mandatory sentencing laws, in contrast, pose the same threat as
other general criminal laws: they may lead to an unjust result in a par-
ticular case. The Guidelines and other mandatory sentencing laws
228 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
229 Id. at 374.
230 See id. at 378 n.ll ("We assume, without deciding, that the [United States Sen-
tencing] Commission was assigned the power to effectuate the death penalty provi-
sions of the Criminal Code.").
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dictate that specified facts will be deemed blameworthy as a general
matter and establish punishment that will apply in all cases. Further-
more, if the prosecutor believes the trial judge has ignored the letter
of these laws, she can appeal the ruling and the appellate court must
rule for the government if the trial judge misapplied the law.231
Hence, there is little room for the trial judge to bend the law as a mat-
ter of justice or equity. This obviously strengthens the legislature's
and executive's position as compared to the situation the political
branches would be in if the jury applied these laws. If the jury applied
these laws and determined they should not apply in a particular
case-for whatever reason-that would be the end of the matter.
Thus, the new threat posed by mandatory sentencing laws, as dis-
tinguished from the prior sentencing regime, is to the jury's valuable
function of applying laws of general blameworthiness to ensure their
just employment in individual cases. If legislatures can demand that
these laws be applied by judges instead of juries and prosecutors can
appeal trial judges' determinations as inconsistent with these general
laws, legislative and prosecutorial power increases because judges
cannot check these laws to the same extent as juries can. As a result,
judicial power as a whole is diminished.
This Part details the threat mandatory sentencing laws pose for
the system of separated powers and the jury's role within that system.
Because an evaluation of all federal and state mandatory sentencing
regimes would be impractical, this Article focuses on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.3 2 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines apply
throughout the federal criminal system,233 and because of their rigidity,
they provide a vivid demonstration of how such laws can undercut the
constitutional scheme of separated powers. Section A examines the
ways in which the Guidelines shift the law-application responsibility in
23! just as this Article assumes that trial judges will perform their factfinding func-
tion in good faith, see infra note 271, it also assumes that appellate judges will act in
good faith. If the trial judge ignores the law or engages in manipulative factfinding,
the Article assumes that most appellate courts will reverse the trial judge, regardless of
the equiitable arguments.
To the extent that state sentencing guidelines are similarly restrictive ofjudicial
discretion, the same concerns for the jury will apply. Some states, however, have flexi-
ble guidelines that do not appear to raise the same constitutional difficulties. See infra
notes 372-73 and accompanying text (noting that some state sentencing systems are
more flexible in allowing judicial discretion than the Federal Guidelines).233 
In 2001, the Guidelines applied in almost 60,000 cases. OFFICE OF POLICY
ANALYSIS, U.S. SEN-TENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE,
DISTRICT & CIRCUIT: OCTOBER 1, 2000, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2001, at tbl.2, avail-
able at http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2001.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
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a criminal case from the jury to the judge, which has the effect of in-
creasing legislative and executive power. Section B describes the op-
eration of the Sentencing Guidelines in a plea bargaining regime,
which is the overwhelming method by which most criminal cases are
resolved, and explains the relationship between the jury and plea bar-
gaining.
A. The Guidelines as Criminal Laws
To understand fully the relationship of the Guidelines to the jury
trial guarantee and their similarity with general criminal laws, it is
helpful to retrace briefly the evolution of the Guidelines themselves.3
As noted above, before the advent of sentencing guidelines and man-
datory minimum sentences, most federal and state statutes gave judges
extensive discretion to sentence defendants. The commonly stated
purpose for this discretion was an underlying belief in rehabilitation.
The judge-and later in the process, the parole officer-needed
broad discretion to calibrate sentences based on the defendant's par-
ticular prospects for reformation. The sentence was, at least in theory,
designed to "treat" the defendant.235 Under this theory, the judge
needed a broad statutory range in which to operate, and the sentencing
proceeding itself needed to be flexible enough to permit the
introduction of a wide array of information that might pertain to
236rehabilitation.
234 For an exhaustive and informative look at the legislative history of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, see generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing
Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
223 (1993).
235 See Pat Carlen, Crime, Inequality, and Sentencing, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT
309, 315 (R. A. Duff& David Garland eds., 1994) ("[T]he general rehabilitative model
has always been less committed to making the punishment fit the crime and more con-
cerned with fitting the punishment to the offender .... ); Herman, supra note 33, at
302 (suggesting that, "as rehabilitation became a goal of sentencing, the need for dis-
cretion in sentencing increased" because judges needed to look both to the past and
the future in assessing a defendant's prospects for rehabilitation); Kevin R. Reitz, Sen-
tencingbacts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45STAN. L. REV. 523, 531, 542-43 (1993)
(describing the importance of the rehabilitative rationale to the Court's decision to
allow discretionary sentencing in Williams). In practice, of course, many judges based
their sentencing decisions on a host of goals that may have had nothing to do with re-
habilitation. These included deterrence, incapacitation, and just deserts.
236 See Carlen, supra note 235, at 315 (noting that the general rehabilitative model
focused on "an individualized sentencing aimed at removing (or ameliorating) the
conditions presumed to have been part-cause of the criminal behaviour"); Herman,
supra note 33, at 303 (observing that, with the goal of rehabilitation, "most jurisdictions
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The rehabilitation ideal faced attacks from both the left and right
sides of the political spectrum in the 1970s and 1980s.2 7 Liberals were
dissatisfied with the arbitrariness and disparity that resulted from in-, 238
determinate sentencing and doubted the state's ability to find and
treat the causes of criminal behavior.3 9 Conservatives believed that
the vagaries of the rehabilitative approach were at odds with the de-
terrence and incapacitation goals of the criminal law.240
Thus, the federal government (and many state governments)
sought to reform sentencing. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984241
created the United States Sentencing Commission, an independent
federal agency in the judicial branch that is empowered to promul-
gate Sentencing Guidelines. The Sentencing Reform Act provided
that the Guidelines would take effect if Congress did not disapprove
242them within six months.
The Sentencing Commission adopted a modified "real" offense
approach to sentencing as opposed to a "charge" offense system.
A charge offense system "would tie punishments directly to the of-
fense for which the defendant was convicted."243 A real offense system
is "driven not by the particularities of the charge, but by what the
defendant 'really' did., 244  Under a pure real offense sentencing
regime, "the sentencing authority is permitted to consider all manner
of facts not necessary to the defendant's conviction on the offense
actually tried ('extra-element facts') ."24 The Sentencing Commission
rejected a pure charge-based system because it believed that a
assumed that a separate sentencing proceeding was needed to develop whatever of-
fender-oriented facts the sentencing judge might consider relevant").
237 Harold Edgar, Herbert Wechsler and the Criminal Law: A Brief Tribute, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 1347, 1356 (2000); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 30-31, 39-48
(discussing the politics of the 1970s and 1980s which led to the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984). For an illuminating account of how cultural forces shaped this political shift,
see DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001).
238 See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WqTHOUT ORDER 23 (1973)
("[A] regime of substantially limitless discretion is by definition arbitrary, capricious,
and antithetical to the rule of law.").
239 Id. at 87-89.
240 Edgar, supra note 237, at 1356-57.
241 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
242 Id. § 235 (B) (ii) (1) (1II).
243 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1, 9 (1988).
244 James E. Felman, The Fundamental Incompatibility of Real Offense Sentencing Guide-
lines and the Federal Criminal Code, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 125 (1994).
245 Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-
Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342, 1344 (1997).
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charge-based system would vest enormous discretion in the prosecutor
to determine what charges to bring and could lead to the same dispar-
ity in sentencing that prompted the Sentencing Guidelines in the first
place.146 But too many "real offense" elements could make the process
"unwieldy or procedurally unfair",47 because it could shift to the judge
and the sentencing proceeding-which lacks the procedural protec-
tions of a trial-too many critical determinations.2 48 The Commission
attempted to forge a middle-ground position. Under its modified real
offense system, the offense of conviction forms the "base offense
level," but that level is modified "in light of several 'real' aggravating
or mitigating factors[] (listed under each separate crime), several
'real' general adjustments ('role in the offense,' for example) and
several 'real' characteristics of the offender, related to past record.",
249
The Sentencing Guidelines, therefore, do not merely address the
problem of disparate sentencing ranges for similar statutory offenses.
Rather, they put in place substantive changes-they simply do so in
the form of sentencing guidelines, as opposed to an alteration of the
statutory offense itself.
50
216 See Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1204
(1993) (noting that the Sentencing Commission adopted its form of modified real of-
fense sentencing because of its "concern that prosecutorial charging decisions would
undermine the new sentencing system"); O'Sullivan, supra note 245, at 1346, 1400-32
(explaining the reasons behind a modified real offense system and, in particular, how
such a system prevents prosecutors from undermining the goals of sentencing reform
through charging and plea bargaining decisions).
24 Breyer, supra note 243, at 11.
248 In addition, the implementation of a pure real offense system would preclude
defendants from obtaining the benefits of negotiated charge or count bargains. Nagel
& Schulhofer, supra note 192, at 512-13.
249 Breyer, supra note 243, at 12 (footnotes omitted); see also Lear, supra note 246,
at 1194 (describing the "modified" real offense system); O'Sullivan, supra note 245, at
1361 (recognizing the Commission's "compromise between charge- and real-offense
sentencing").
250 See Gerard E. Lynch, The Sentencing Guidelines as a Not-So-Model Penal Code, 7
FED. SENTENCING REP. 112, 112 (1994) [hereinafter Lynch, Sentencing Guidelines] ("By
rendering the offense of conviction ordinarily insignificant for sentencing purposes,
and replacing the code offenses for these purposes with comprehensive codified
guidelines, the new federal sentencing regime to a considerable extent rationalizes
and displaces congressionally-enacted criminal statutes."); see also STITH & CABRANES,
supra note 6, at 3 ("In essence, the Sentencing Commission has identified a multitude
of new 'Guidelines crimes,' each a variant of one or more statutory crimes and each
with its own mandated range of punishment."); Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal
Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRiM. L. REv. 297, 316
(1998) [hereinafter Lynch, Model Penal Code] ("The substantive distinction between
legislative enactments carving an offense into different degrees with different punish-
ment structures, and sentencing guidelines subdividing a single legislatively-defined
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Consider first the types of factual determinations made by judges
under the Sentencing Guidelines, all of which result in an increased
sentence for the defendant. Ajudge must increase a defendant's sen-
tence if the judge finds that the defendant perjured herself on the
stand.2 5' The Guidelines give judges the authority to calculate the
amount of loss suffered by victims of a fraudulent scheme.2 5' A judge
similarly decides how much a defendant stole (or intended to steal) in
the course of a burglary"2 or robbery.2"' A judge determines the
amount of drugs trafficked by a defendant.255 She decides whether a
25"
defendant convicted of a drug offense possessed a dangerous weapon.
Similarly, a judge must increase a defendant's sentence if she con-
cludes that the defendant brandished a weapon in the course of a
robbery.' 7 Ajudge even determines whether the defendant's conduct
resulted in the death of a victim, and she must increase a defendant's
sentence if such a determination is made.2 " For example, in United
States v. Fenner,259 a jury convicted the defendants of weapons and nar-
cotics offenses.2 ° During sentencing, the trial court concluded that
the defendants were also responsible for a murder in relation to these
offenses. 26' The Fourth Circuit upheld the large sentence enhancement
crime (or a group of related crimes) according to regulations identifying aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, is of course a slim one.").
251 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(b) (2002); see also
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 89 (1993) (holding that the Constitution per-
mits sentence enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines "if the court finds [that]
the defendant committed perjury at trial").
252 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Fl.1 (1998) (consolidated with
§ 2Bl.1 effective Nov. 1, 2001); see also United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs.,
Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 256-59 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding trial court's calculation of loss
under § 2F1.1 for defendants convicted of fraud).
253 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B2.1 (b) (2) (2002); see also id.
§ 2Xl.l(a) (requiring the trial court to determine the base offense level "from the
guideline for the substantive offense" attempted or intended); United States v. Lamb,
207 F.3d 1006, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (calculating defendant's base offense level based
on amount he intended to steal).
254 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1 (b) (7) (2002).
255 Id. § 2D .1(c).
256 Id. § 2Dl.I (b) (1); see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 150, 157 (1997)
(per curiam) (approving a sentencing enhancement for weapon possession under §
2D 1.1 (b) (1) even though the jury acquitted the defendant of possessing a weapon in
relation to his drug offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
257 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1 (b) (2) (2002).
258 Id. § 2K2.1 (c) (1) (B).
259 147 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 1998).




resulting from the defendants' responsibility for a death, despite the
fact that a state jury had acquitted the defendants of murder2
Now consider the effect of these factual findings. As a result of the
judge's finding in Fenner that a death resulted from the defendants'
conduct, one defendant's sentence was increased by seven years, and
26.3the other's increased by thirteen years. The judge's factual findings
had predetermined consequences for the defendants' punishment as
a matter of law. The judge has little discretion to depart from the
Guideline ranges and faces appellate review of her departure deci-
264sions.
Thus, the generally applicable laws of blameworthiness contained
in the Sentencing Guidelines resemble criminal laws in all relevant re-
spects. The Guidelines, as Gerard Lynch notes:
bear all the formal attributes of a penal code. Splitting some offenses
into . .. multiple degrees . . . , and combining others under the same
guideline provision, the guidelines create, in effect, a simplified codifica-
tion of the behavior criminalized by federal law. By rendering the of-
fense of conviction ordinarily insignificant for sentencing purposes, and
replacing the code offenses for these purposes with comprehensive codi-
fied guidelines, the new federal sentencing regime to a considerable
extent rationalizes and displaces congressionally-enacted criminal stat-
263utes.
Like the criminal code itself, the Sentencing Guidelines have the
force and effect of law. For one, the Sentencing Guidelines identify
particular conduct as blameworthy no matter what the individual
circumstances. Furthermore, the Sentencing Guidelines specify
precisely how blameworthy conduct is by dictating the punishment
262 Id. at 366-67.
263 Id. at 363.
264 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) ("Congress allows district
courts to depart from the applicable Guideline range if 'the court finds that there ex-
ists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines
that should result in a sentence different from that described."' (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b))). For a discussion of how courts have treated this "heartland" standard, see
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin'Heart(land): The Long Search for Admin-
istrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723, 770-802 (1999). Some factors can
never be the basis for departure, including race, sex, national origin, creed, religion,
socioeconomic status, lack of guidance as a youth, and drug or alcohol dependence.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.4, .10, .12 (2002). For a discussion of
recent congressional changes to the departure standard, see infra text accompanying
notes 357-63.
265 Lynch, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 250, at 113.
20031
92 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW
associated with the crime. And although there is departure power, it
is limited.266
The Guidelines do what substantive code revisions would have
done, with one fundamental difference. Whereas code reform would
have left these factual and law-application decisions with the jury, the
267Sentencing Commission placed this responsibility with the judge.
The judge's power-and duty-under the Guidelines to consider
facts apart from those of conviction extends not only to criminal be-
havior that was never charged, but also to behavior that was charged
but that the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt (i.e., that the
jury acquitted). Thus, as the Fenner case discussed above illustrates, an
individual can receive an increase in punishment on the basis of ac-
quitted criminal conduct as long as the individual is convicted of some
other charge.
Of course, prior to the Guidelines, courts often considered at sen-
tencing the broad range of conduct committed by a defendant and
did not limit themselves to the offense of conviction in setting pun-
ishment.26s Intuitively, then, it may seem that the Guidelines do not
amount to a significant change.. But there is a difference. Previously,
consideration of "relevant conduct" was not mandatory, so the judge
could use her discretion in deciding whether or not to consider
it. Nor did the consideration of relevant conduct yield a predeter-
mined amount of punishment.2 69 In other words, the judge previously
had complete discretion to adapt her ruling to the individual
266 See infra Part III (discussing both the implicit and explicit constraints placed on
departure).
267 The Sentencing Guidelines' substantive changes to the criminal law have led
Judge Lynch to ask, "if crimes are to be divided into more rather than fewer degrees,
shouldn't defendants have the traditional right to have a jury of their peers decide the
level of their guilt?" Lynch, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 250, at 114. Judge Nancy
Gertner, of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, has simi-
larly observed that "[t]here is something fundamentally troubling about the choice to
abandon substantive code reform, which would have empowered the jury, and the
choice to pursue a system of sentencing code reform that has only empowered a Sen-
tencing Commission." Judge Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice:
Lessons from Criminal Trials and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 419, 431 (1999).
268 See William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 504 (1990) (stating that, prior to
the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines, "courts customarily have considered [a]
broad range of offense conduct when imposing [a] sentence").
269 See David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real Offense Sentencing and the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REv. 403, 418 (1993) (discussing how "[t]he im-
pact of real-offense elements was... not rigid and predetermined" in the federal sys-
tem before the Guidelines).
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circumstances before her because she was not applying a generally
applicable law that dictated how a fact would affect punishment.
Thus, although the judge was previously engaged in factual findings
similar to those made by juries, the judge was not performing a law-
application function akin to that performed by the jury. Indeed, the
judge was not applying any law at all; therefore, the judge retained
discretion to adjust her findings as she saw fit in a particular case.
In contrast, under the Guidelines, a sentence must be increased
on the basis of relevant conduct that is proven by a preponderance of
the evidence. So, if one believes that judges perform their judicial
function in good faith, federal judges no longer have an option of ig-
noring evidence of relevant conduct in determining a defendant's
271sentence. If the prosecutor proves such conduct by a mere prepon-
derance of the evidence, the judge must increase the sentence. This
enhancement typically makes an enormous difference. For example,
272in United States v. Manor, the defendant was charged with one count
of conspiracy to distribute 250 grams of cocaine and with other distri-
273
bution counts involving approximately nineteen grams of cocaine.
The jury acquitted him on the conspiracy count but convicted him on
274the intent to distribute nineteen grams. At sentencing, the judge
treated the conspiracy to distribute 250 grams as relevant conduct,
which tripled the defendant's sentence exposure. 275 As a result, the
defendant faced the identical punishment range he would have faced
if he had been convicted of the conspiracy charge. 276  The jury's
acquittal was rendered essentially meaningless.
Only if a defendant is already at the maximum for the convicted
offense will the jury's acquittal shield the defendant from an increase
in punishment under the Guidelines. But because the statutory
maximum authorized is typically far higher than the average sentence
270 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) ("A district judge now must
impose on a defendant a sentence falling within the range of the applicable Guideline,
if the case is an ordinary one." (emphasis added)).
271 Some might argue that judges can avoid the sentencing consequences of the
Guidelines by manipulating their findings of fact. That is, they can deny that the
prosecutor has demonstrated that particular conduct has occurred. While this is, of
course, possible, this Article presumes that most judges will make honest findings of
fact and uphold their duty to apply the law to those facts.
272 936 F.2d 1238 (11th Cir. 1991).
273 Id. at 1242.
274 Id.
275 Id.; Lear, supra note 246, at 1196-97, 1197 n.74.
276 Lear, supra note 246, at 1196-97.
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prescribed by the Guidelines, the relevant conduct provision generally
271
has an enormous effect on the actual sentence a defendant receives.
One study, for example, found that half of all sentences had been in-
creased-sometimes doubled or tripled-by uncharged conduct.
Several respectedjurists and commentators have spoken out against
this aspect of the Guidelines. Judge Richard Arnold has called this at-
tribute "unseemly and unworthy of the United States of America."
27
Judge Jon Newman has argued that "[a] just system of criminal sen-
tencing cannot fail to distinguish between an allegation of conduct re-
sulting in a conviction and an allegation of conduct resulting in an
acquittal." 80 Judge Gilbert Merritt believes that "[tihe 'relevant con-
duct' provisions of the new sentencing code are so fundamentally in-
equitable and contrary to principles of evenhanded justice that they
violate due process of law., 81' Jeffrey Standen has noted that, under
true real offense sentencing, federal statutes become "trivial." 2"2 He
argues, moreover, that real offense guidelines are not needed (or
even effective) in checking prosecutorial discretion. Instead, he ar-
gues, Congress should spend more time defining crimes with specific-
ity and eliminating overlapping offenses because it is the "current
plasticity of the federal code [that] provides the foundation for prose-
cutors to select among statutes, often carrying different sentencing
outcomes, in charging and convicting offenders.,
283
The Supreme Court, however, has thus far been willing to con-
done real offense guideline sentencing. Without even hearing argu-
ment on the question, the Court approved the Guidelines' mandate
that judges consider relevant conduct, even when ajury has acquitted
2814a defendant of that conduct. The Court relied on the false premise
277 Id. at 1206-07.
278 Herman, supra note 33, at 311-12.
279 United States v. England, 966 F.2d 403, 410 n.5 (8th Cir. 1992).
280 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 396 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J.,
dissenting to denial of reh'g).
281 United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1527 (6th Cir. 1992) (Merritt, CJ.,
dissenting).
282 Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF.
CRiM. L. REv. 249, 280 (1998).
283 Id. at 285-86. EvenJulie O'Sullivan, who has written a persuasive defense of the
relevant conduct provisions, has conceded that increasing sentences based on relevant
conduct "undermine[s] the jury's role, in public perception as well as in reality."
O'Sullivan, supra note 245, at 1381 n.155.
284 See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154 (1997) (per curiam) ("In short, we
are convinced that a sentencing court may consider conduct of which a defendant has
been acquitted."). The Court used similar reasoning to uphold-against a Double
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that, if discretionary sentencing was permissible, mandatory sentenc-
ing must be as well. s" And from this fatal assumption, mandatory sen-
tencing took root.
B. The Sentencing Guidelines and Plea Bargaining
Thus far we have considered the operation of the Guidelines
when a defendant takes her case to trial. But, the overwhelming ma-
jority of criminal cases never go to trial. Although plea bargaining for
jeopardy challenge-a prosecution for conduct which had previously been used to in-
crease a sentence under the Guidelines' relevant conduct provision. See Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399 (1995) ("[U]se of evidence of related criminal con-
duct to enhance a defendant's sentence for a separate crime within the authorized
statutory limits does not constitute punishment for that conduct within the meaning of
the Double jeopardy Clause."). In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice
Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) pointed out that there is "no real difference" in the
majority's distinction between punishing a defendant twice for the same offense and
"'punish [ing a defendant] twice as much for one offense solely because [the defendant]
also committed another offense, for which other offense we will also punish [the de-
fendant] (only once) later on."' Id. at 407 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
285 The Supreme Court simply relied on Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247
(1949). Watts, 519 U.S. at 152. A sentencing enhancement in the Guidelines based on
relevant conduct, the Court held, does not "punish a defendant for crimes of which he
was not convicted, but rather increase [s] his sentence because of the manner in which
he committed the crime of conviction." Id. at 154. The problem with this logic, how-
ever, is that, in the absence of the acquitted or uncharged conduct being used as "rele-
vant conduct," the defendant would not receive the same amount of punishment as a
matter of law. Put another way, if defendant A committed the same offense as defen-
dant B but did not perform the acquitted or uncharged conduct, defendant A would
receive a lesser punishment than defendant B as a matter of law by operation of the
Guidelines. Thus, defendant B is, in a very real sense, being punished on the basis of a
general law for which he was not convicted. See Lear, supra note 246, at 1222 (explain-
ing why, "[o]nce the decision is made to condemn specific conduct as, in and of itself,
criminally reprehensible, a conviction must be treated as a prerequisite to punishment
based on that conduct"); Reitz, supra note 235, at 531-33 (detailing a case in which co-
defendants tried on the same counts received identical sentences, even though a jury
had acquitted one defendant of one of the three crimes with which both were
charged); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Criminal Acts and Sentencing Facts: Two Constitutional
Limits on Criminal Sentencing, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 459, 488 (1993) (" [T] he sentence
is a response to a set of circumstances or a pattern of behavior-relevant conduct-
that may never have been presented to the jury, that the defendant may not have had
an adequate opportunity to rebut or that may not even be criminal." (footnotes omit-
ted)); Matthew MacKinnon Shors, Note, United States v. Watts: Unanswered Questions,
Acquittal Enhancements, and the Future of Due Process and the American Criminal Jfiy, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1388 (1998) ("Once the legislature decides to classify conduct as
criminal.... a conviction is a prerequisite to any punishment based on that con-
duct."). This has led some courts of appeals to conclude that, at the very least, relevant
conduct must be shown by clear and convincing evidence when it would dramatically
increase a sentence. Watts, 519 U.S. at 156.
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felony cases was relatively rare in the eighteenth century,286 it is now
the norm .28  Approximately ninety-one percent of defendants con-
victed in federal and state courts plead guilty.28" The percentage of
felony convictions obtained by plea tops ninety-seven percent in some
289
areas.
Perhaps the greatest danger posed by plea bargaining is the one
thejury trial is designed to avoid: too much power in the hands of the
government without a check by the people.2" Even in regimes in
which judges can override bargains, they are an inadequate check on
the prosecution. As George Fisher recently detailed, judges are un-
likely to disagree with the deal that has been struck because their
incentives now largely coincide with those of prosecutors. ' They are
likely to accept the plea bargain to ease the burden of their docket.2
9
2
The more substantial protection for the defendant comes from
293the fact that she can threaten to take her case to the jury. In the
286 John Langbein has argued that plea bargaining was unheard of in the eight-
eenth century. See John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disap-
pearance of Criminal Jury 7ial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 120 (1992) (explaining
that "[v]irtually every prisoner charged with a felony insisted on taking his trial" (quot-
ing JOHN M. BEA'rFIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800, at 336-37
(1986))). But George Fisher has recently offered evidence of plea bargaining during
this time period. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF
PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 158-61 (2003) (exploring instances of plea bargaining in
Manchester, England, during the late eighteenth century).
287 In 1970, the Supreme Court claimed that plea bargaining was "inherent" in our
criminal law and held it to be constitutional. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751
(1970).
288 Bibas, supra note 7, at 1150 & n.330 (citing LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, app. tbl.D-4
(2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/appendices/d04sep00.pdf;
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1998, at 403 tbl.5.17, 417 tbl.5.42 (1999); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.3(o), at 124 n.207 (2d ed. 1999)).
289 William J. Stun tz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1997).
290 See Langbein, supra note 286, at 124 ("Plea bargaining achieves just what the
Framers expected the jury to prevent, the aggrandizement of state power.").
291 The incentives for plea bargaining became especially strong in the twentieth
century, as procedural protections for criminal defendants expanded, jury trials be-
came more costly and time-consuming, and new opportunities for trial error arose. See
George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1039 (2000) (discussing
the efficiency of pleas).
292 Id.
293 See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 188, at 31 (noting that decisions regarding pre-
trial dispositions are "in part informed by expectations of what the jury will do"). If the
government and defendant agree to proceed by a bench trial, then it is the expected
outcome of the bench trial that will shape the contours of the bargain.
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course of the bargain, the prosecutor will determine what deal to offer
the defendant based on the prosecutor's evaluation of the societal
costs of a reduced sentence; the costs of going to trial, which include
the actual costs in time and resources; and the risk that a jury will ac-
quit. In determining whether to take the prosecutor's offer, the de-
fendant must also estimate the likelihood of a conviction if the case
goes to the jury and the likely sentence if the jury convicts.2 9 4 The jury
trial guarantee is still relevant in the plea bargaining context, then,
because it defines the parameters of the bargaining terms . zg If the
chance of acquittal is high enough-because the prosecutor's evi-
dence is weak or the defendant's case is otherwise sympathetic-the
case is more likely to go to trial because the prosecutor cannot offer a
deal with terms favorable enough for the defendant to accept.
Thus, the anticipated outcome at trial governs the plea bargain. It
is therefore critically important that the jury's power at trial is not un-
dermined 29 because, to the extent the jury's authority is eroded, plea
bargaining is largely unconstrained and the government can name its
price without any oversight.
The Sentencing Guidelines make plea bargaining a cause for con-
cern both because they curtail the judge's discretion and because they
diminish the jury's ability to limit the sentence a defendant could re-
ceive even if she were to take her case to trial. George Fisher has ex-
plained that prosecutorial bargaining power is greatest when the
prosecutor can offer a guaranteed concession if the defendant pleads
and can threaten a guaranteed increase in the defendant's sentence if
294 Stephanos Bibas points out that the plea bargain must also be weighed against
the outcome of a guilty plea without an agreement. Bibas, supra note 7, at 1159-60,
1159 n.359. But, of course, the guilty plea without an agreement will itself be weighed
against the jury trial option; thus, the availability of ajury trial will still affect the calcu-
lus.
IUS, Our traditional adversarial procedure, including the jury trial, "keep[s] at least
a loose rein on executive power." Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Crimi-
nal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2144 (1998). The jury trial serves to "protect[]
against the punishment of those.., whom the government disapproves, but about
whose blameworthiness there remain troubling doubts" and also acts "as the fail-safe
appellate process that promotes the reasonableness of prosecutorial-administrative de-
terminations by setting the limits within which it operates." Id. at 2145-46.
296 For example, as Judge Lynch has noted, a non-unanimous jury verdict rule
might have a damaging effect on the defendant in the bargaining process. Id. at 2147.
The benefit of turning some hung juries into convictions (and a smaller number into
acquittals) will be outweighed, he argues, by the enormous indirect effects that aban-
doning the unanimity rule will have on plea bargaining. Id. Because a defendant
would be more likely to lose at trial, there will be fewer trials and less oversight of the
bargaining process. Id. at 2146-47.
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the defendant goes to trial 9. In discretionary sentencing schemes, a
judge may or may not increase a sentence if a defendant takes her
case to trial. As a result, the prosecution has little concrete support
for a threat that a defendant's sentence will increase if a defendant
298goes to trial.
The Sentencing Guidelines change this dynamic. Under the
Guidelines' provisions, if a defendant goes to trial and is convicted,
the penalty is generally increased from what it would have been had
the defendant pleaded guilty, with or without a deal from the prosecu-
tor. That is because the Sentencing Guidelines offer defendants a
two- to three-level reduction for "acceptance of responsibility," which
does not typically apply to defendants who deny elements of factual
guilt at trial. 9 This reduction can mean several years to a defendant
facing a high penalty. In addition, mostjudges tend to give sentences
at the lower end of a sentencing range when a defendant pleads
guilty,3°° so the defendant typically receives a reduction in her sen-
tence if she pleads even without an extra discount from the prosecu-
tor. Thus, the defendant is indirectly punished for going to trial be-
fore ajury.
In many cases, the prosecutor will offer the defendant a further
reduced sentence for pleading guilty. Although the real offense
aspect of the Guidelines limits the prosecutor's bargaining power
somewhat, federal prosecutors still retain some leeway. 31 For in-
stance, if a defendant pleads guilty, a prosecutor may avoid charging
the defendant under a statute that contains a mandatory minimum or
a statute that prevents the defendant from obtaining a reduction un-
302
der the "safety valve" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines. In
297 FISHER, supra note 286, at 224.
298 See id. at 225 ("Before the Guidelines, then, defendants generally could not
predict with confidence the costs of wagering trial and losing. In the face of this un-
certainty, we may expect that many defendants measured those costs too low and un-
reasonably passed up the benefits of a plea.").
299 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (1998) cmt. nn.2-3; Bibas, supra
note 7, at 1153 n.340, 1154-55 n.345.
300 Bibas, supra note 7, at 1153.
301 In addition to manipulating charges, prosecutors can engage in fact manipula-
tion as well, at least to the extent that the probation officer relies on the prosecution's
factual claims and does not investigate the claims independently. See STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 6, at 87 (describing how "[i]n practice, many probation officers
simply report the facts of the case as directly recounted to them by the prosecutor").
302 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 (2002) provides that the man-
datory minimum sentences required by certain statutes do not apply if a defendant
meets the eligibility criteria established in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2000). A prosecutor
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addition, the prosecutor might agree to file a motion recommending
a downward departure from the authorized guideline range."'
The prosecutor also has a less explicit-but potent-bargaining
chip under the Sentencing Guidelines in that a jury acquittal on one
charge does not shield the defendant from punishment for that con-
duct. °4 As noted, a jury verdict can protect the defendant only if she
is acquitted of all charges. If the prosecution has a strong case on any
single charge but has weak evidence on other charges, the defendant
may still not want to risk going to trial. That is because, even if the
jury acquits the defendant of these weaker charges, the judge must in-
crease the defendant's sentence on the basis of the acquitted conduct
if the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the con-
duct occurred. This increase can extend all the way up to the statu-
tory maximum for the convicted offense. Because most offenses do
not come close to the statutory maximum under the Sentencing
Guidelines, that is a substantial risk. Recall the facts of Manor. 30 5 Even
though the jury acquitted Manor of the count involving conspiracy to
distribute 250 grams of cocaine, he was sentenced as if he had been
found guilty. " ° He therefore gained nothing by going to trial, even
though the jury acquitted him of the more serious charge. Instead, he
lost the benefits of whatever the prosecutor may have offered as part
of a plea bargain.
It is not difficult to see the bargaining power this gives the prose-
cutor. Even if the defendant is innocent of a greater offense, by going
to trial, she runs the risk of being sentenced as if she were guilty be-
cause the jury cannot shield her from having her sentence increased
on the basis of the acquitted conduct. The jury's determination does
not restrict the judge from taking the acquitted conduct into account.
On the contrary, the Guidelines require a judge to consider such con-
duct if the judge finds it has been demonstrated by a preponderance
of the evidence. The judge is likely to be less skeptical of the prosecu-
tor's case than the jury. Under a preponderance of the evidence
standard and without the procedural protections and evidentiary rules
could therefore agree not to charge a defendant under a statute that is ineligible for
the safety valve reduction, such as 21 U.S.C. § 860 (2000).
.33 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5Kl.1, 5K2.0 (1998) (discussing
substantial assistance and other grounds for departure).
304 See supra text accompanying notes 270-85 (discussing the government's power
to punish a defendant who is acquitted by ajury on a greater charge as long as the jury
convicts on a lesser charge).
V35 936 F.2d 1238, 1240 (11th Cir. 1991).
306 Jd. at 1242.
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of trial, the danger is even greater that the judge will side with the
prosecutor. Therefore, a prosecutor can credibly threaten a defen-
dant with an increased sentence if she risks going to trial under the
Sentencing Guidelines. °7
Thus, together the Sentencing Guidelines and plea bargaining
provide a dangerous mix that the judiciary has little power to check.
The jury in essence is nothing more than a low-level gatekeeper. Its
conviction clears the way for substantial government abuse, and its ac-
quittal does nothing to prevent the defendant from being punished
for her acquitted conduct unless the acquittal is on all counts or the
defendant's Guideline sentence is already at the statutory maximum
for the convicted offense. When plea bargaining takes place in the
shadow of this regime, fewer defendants will take the risk of a trial.
Instead, they will acceptjust about whatever bargain they can get from
the prosecutor, as long as the ultimate deal leaves them better off than
they would be going to trial. The prosecutor, therefore, has enor-
3081mous bargaining power.
The Sentencing Guidelines work an enormous change in the bal-
ance of separated powers. Under the discretionary regime that ex-
isted before mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing guide-
lines, judges had ample authority to ensure that a defendant received
punishment commensurate with her individual circumstances. In-
deed, that was the entire point of the discretionary sentencing model:
judges had wide latitude to consider whatever facts they deemed rele-
vant to formulating a sentence that would further the rehabilitation of
the offender. To be sure, this was hardly a perfect system. With such
broad power, there was the potential for abuse and disparity. But
there was no question the judiciary had the power to prevent an
307 See FISHER, supra note 286, at 216 (arguing that it is relatively easy for the
prosecutor to prevail on relevant conduct because of the lower standard of proof and
because the relevant conduct in question "often is among the most readily proved
parts of the government's case").
308 Note that the judge provides almost no check on the prosecutor. The relevant
conduct provisions allow the judge to impose a harsher sentence, but the judge cannot
suggest that the plea bargain take place on terms more lenient to the defendant. See
id. at 214-15 (evaluating the "limited powers of leniency" afforded judges under the
Sentencing Guidelines). Moreover, in the typical plea agreement under the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, there will be a stipulation as to relevant conduct (e.g., drug quantity).
Thus, the judge is unlikely to make her own determination regarding this issue. She
will likelyjust accept the plea.
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overinclusive law from applying when it would be unjust. Juries still
decided whether general criminal laws applied and those laws gave
judges a wide range within which to sentence, based on whatever facts
the judge deemed appropriate and without the threat of a govern-
ment appeal. Thus, the judiciary-judge and jury-had ample power
to ensure ajust result in an individual case.
Similarly, under our Nation's early regime of mandatory punish-
ments-in which particular offenses yielded specific punishments-
there was also a check. Before general criminal laws dictating
particular punishments could be applied in a particular case, a jury
had to agree to convict. And with an unreviewable power to acquit,
the jury possessed authority to make sure the general law was properly
applied in individual cases.39 The jury's power to correct these
general laws was, of course, a blunt instrument; the jury could only
acquit or convict. Thus, the jury could not make the kinds of finely
calibrated sentencing determinations judges made under the
discretionary sentencing regime. Moreover, the judge's evidentiary
decisions could prevent some facts about the defendant's
circumstances or the crime from coming before the jury, which
further limited both the jury's power to evaluate those individual
circumstances and its ability to convey the community's sense of• . 310
justice. But for all its faults, the jury could at least impose some
check on the operation of general laws if the evidence in the
particular case justified a departure or if the general law itself was
flawed (in the jury's estimation).
Thus, in both of these situations, which together dominated the
American legal landscape for more than 200 years, the judiciary pos-
sessed authority to ensure that a general criminal law was being prop-
erly applied to a defendant; the executive and the legislature did not
have similar unchecked power to make that determination. The prob-
lem with modem sentencing laws, like the Guidelines and mandatory
minimums, is that they strip this power from both judicial actors. The
legislature passes general laws with particular punitive effects, but it
309 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 10 (listing the jury's power to nullify as
a discretionary check on mandatory capital punishment schemes that existed through-
out most of the nineteenth century).
310 See Richman, supra note 161, at 976 (noting that "[e]very evidentiary rule
that-for fear of jury misvaluation, 'inflammation,' or nullification-prevents the jury
from learning something about a criminal defendant, his victim, or his crime tends to
rob verdicts of the power to communicate the community's actual prosecutorial priori-
ties"). The defendant, however, will be able to tell the jury what happened and why, so
there will always be some level of individualization in each case, regardless of what ad-
ditional evidence about the defendant's personal circumstances is kept from the jury.
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requires judges to apply those laws within strictly confined limits or
face an appeal by the prosecution. As a result, neither the judge nor
the jury has the power to ensure that the law is being properly applied
in a particular case. 1  That power rests with the government. As
David Garland observes:
These methods of fixing sentences well in advance of the instant case
[such as sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences] ex-
tend the distance between the effective sentencer (in reality, the legisla-
ture, or the sentencing commission) and the person upon whom the
sentence is imposed. The individualization of sentencing gives way to a
kind of 'punishment-at-a-distance' where penalty levels are set, often ir-
reversibly, by political actors operating in political contexts far removed
from the circumstances of the case. The greater this distance, the less
likely it is that the peculiar facts of the case and the individual character-
312istics of the offender will shape the outcome.
In other words, under such a regime, the legislative and executive
branches may dictate criminal punishment without an effective judi-
cial check.313
This is the danger of stripping the adjudicatory process of discre-
tionary power: it paves the way for unchecked legislative and execu-
tive power that invites abuse and threatens individual liberty.
III. REINVIGORATING THE CONSTITUTIONALJURY CHECK
When the Supreme Court decided Apprendi, it opened the door to
the possibility that the Court would finally consider the threat manda-
tory sentencing laws pose for the jury. But that door was quickly shut
311 See GARLAND, supra note 237, at 172 (noting that, with sentencing guidelines
and mandatory minimum sentencing, "legislatures and government ministers have ac-
quired more direct and unimpeded means of shaping practical outcomes," and
"[p]ublic demands for greater punishments are now more easily and instantly trans-
lated into increased sentences and longer jail terms"). Judges could, of course, at-
tempt to nullify the law by manipulating their factual findings and hoping that they
would not be reversed under a clearly erroneous standard. But, as noted above, supra
notes 231, 271, this Article rests on the assumption that trial and appellate judges will
exercise their duties in good faith and not engage in such manipulation.
312 GARLAND, supra note 237, at 179.
3 See also King & Klein, supra note 7, at 1535 ("[Slome outer limit on the substan-
tive criminal law is necessary in order to prevent legislatures from bypassing criminal
procedural guarantees wholesale. Procedure and substance are inexorably linked, and
Apprendi suggests the importance of keeping that link secure."); cf. Donald A. Dripps,
The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1665, 1700-02
(1987) (arguing that ajury should be required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, any
fact that triggers a distinct range ofjudicial sentencing discretion).
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in Harris when the Court found mandatory sentencing laws permissi-
ble as long as they do not dictate punishment over the statutory
maximum for the charged offense.3 4 Unless the Court shifts gears in
Blakely and distinguishes mandatory minimums from binding sentenc-
ing guidelines, a legislature is free to raise statutory maxima as high as
it wants-subject only to the Eighth Amendment and the political
process itself-and then allow mandatory minimums and Sentencing
Guidelines to do all the real work of sentencing."
The Court is reluctant to find punishment disproportionate under
the Eighth Amendment.3 16 And it should go without saying that the
314 536 U.S. 545, 567-68 (2002).
315 Under the Court's narrow test, which is tied to a statutory maximum, the Guide-
lines would presumably survive in toto because they exist in the subterranean world be-
low the statutory ceiling. Thus, under this reading of Apprendi, the Supreme Court's
decisions in Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995), United States v. Watts, 519 U.S.
148 (1997) (per curiam), and Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998), remain
good law. These decisions permitted sentencing enhancements for uncharged drug
conduct, acquitted conduct, and the type and quantity of drugs, respectively, within a
statutory maximum. Blakely may call into question the Federal Sentencing Guidelii.es,
however, if the Court were to recognize that a maximum can be created by binding
sentencing guidelines. But because Blakely involves sentencing guidelines enacted by a
legislature, it is possible that the Court would distinguish the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines from their state counterparts.
3 Indeed, the Court this past Term upheld two consecutive sentences of twenty-
five years to life under a three-strikes law for a defendant whose third strike was steal-
ing approximately $150 worth of videotapes and whose prior offenses were nonviolent.
Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1169-70, 1175-76 (2003); see also Ewing v. Califor-
nia, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1189-90 (2003) (upholding a sentence of twenty-five years to life
for a defendant whose third strike was stealing three golf clubs); Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (holding that a mandatory life sentence without parole for a
first-time drug possessor is not cruel and unusual); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371-72
(1982) (per curiam) (holding that a forty-year sentence for the distribution of nine
ounces of marijuana is not disproportionate). Given the Court's acceptance of these
draconian sentences, it is clear that Congress and state legislatures essentially have free
reign to raise statutory maxima. See King & Klein, supra. note 7, at 1522 ("Tlhe Eighth
Amendment will rarely, if ever, check legislative efforts to bypass procedure through
redefinition of substantive criminal offenses already serious enough to be punished as
felonies."). It is for this reason that Ronald Allen's suggested limit on legislatures is
really no limit at all. He has argued that, unless a fact is necessary to make the author-
ized punishment proportionate to the offense under the Eighth Amendment, that fact
need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. RonaldJ. Allen, Structuring Jury Deci-
sionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94
HARv. L. Rrv. 321, 342-44 (1980); RonaldJ. Allen, The Restoration of In Re Winship: A
Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH.
L. REV. 30, 46-48 (1977). But, in practice, the Supreme Court's proportionality review
gives a legislature essentially unfettered discretion to raise statutory penalties. Indeed,
under this standard, the statutory scheme in Apprendi would have survived because the
penalty ultimately imposed (twelve years) would certainly have survived Eighth
Amendment proportionality review.
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political process fails to provide a check given politicians' perceptions
that voters demand a tough stance on crime. 7 Criminals are a prime
example of a politically powerless group-almost four million Ameri-
cans have been stripped of their voting rights (some permanently) be-.• 318
cause of a felony conviction 3-and the vast majority of voters support
stiffer sentences.3 1 9 The severity of drug sentences, three-strikes laws,
and mandatory minimum sentences are testament to that which is po-
litically popular. Nancy King and Susan Klein recently examined how
state legislatures have responded to Court decisions-such as Patterson
V. New York, 2° McMillan v. Pennsylvania,32 1 and Almendarez-Torres v.
United States 22 --that upheld state laws circumventing criminal proce-
dural requirements and found that other states have eagerly 'jumped
on the bandwagon, easing the prosecutor's procedural burden through
modification of the substantive law., 323 From this study, they con-
cluded that "some rewriting of the substantive criminal law after Ap-
prendi will undoubtedly be attempted. 2 4 The political process writ
large, then, seems unlikely to stop inflated statutory maxima and the
John Jeffries and Paul Stephan have attempted to correct for the inadequacies of
proportionality review in imposing a meaningful limit on legislatures by arguing that
the Constitution requires an actus reus and a mens rea in the definition of any crime
in order to make its punishment proportional. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B.
Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burdens of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J.
1325, 1370 (1979) ("As commonly understood, criminal law doctrine postulates two
essential components of crime definition .. "). The Supreme Court, however, has
been unwilling to identify components, such as actus reus and mens rea, that are con-
stitutionally required before criminal culpability can attach. See Scott E. Sundby, The
Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 477 (1989)
(commenting on the Court's "unwillingness to delineate constitutional principles of
substantive law"); infra text accompanying notes 403-14 (addressing the arguments for
a substantive limit on punishment determinations).
317 For a discussion of how institutional dynamics between legislatures, prosecu-
tors, and appellate judges lead to the expansion of criminal law, see Stuntz, supra note
130, at 528-29.
318 THE SENTENCING PROJECr, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2003), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf.
319 See Beale, supra note 209, at 25 (citing statistics showing that at least eighty per-
cent of the public supports increased sentences).
320 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
31 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
32 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
3" King & Klein, supra note 7, at 1491.
324 Id. at 1492. King and Klein also argue that some statutes will be altered more
easily than others, depending on whether the enhancement is contained within the
same statute as the underlying core conduct or whether it was enacted as a separate,
add-on statute, designed to apply to a variety of offenses. See id. at 1492-94 (distin-
guishing between "nested" and "add-on" statutes).
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growing importance of sentencing guidelines and mandatory mini-
mums.
Thus, despite the Court's broad rhetoric about mediating the
"competition developed between judge and jury over the real signifi-
cance of their respective roles, ' '2  the rule it actually adopted does very
little to protect the jury's structural role. Apprendi's limit on the legis-
lature's ability to define crime really provides no protection at all for
the jury, given the ease with which a legislature can draft around it.
Barring a change of course in Blakely, a legislature can increase the
overall statutory maxima and use sentencing guidelines to dictate sen-
tences for specific conduct.3 6 There is, then, little to distinguish the
Court's rule from the one of deference proposed by the dissent; both
offer the legislature "a means of dispensing with inconvenient consti-
tutional 'rights.' 3 2 7 Despite Justice Scalia's proclamation that we have
rejected Justice Breyer's "sketch[] [of] an admirably fair and efficient
325 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1998).
326 Ironically, the Court's rule can actually be harmful to defendants because of
the way it will operate with the Sentencing Guidelines. See Bibas, supra note 7, at 1159-
69 (explaining why defendants might be worse off after Apprendi due to the interaction
between its elements rule and the Sentencing Guidelines regime); Ross, supra note 48,
at 200 (describing the negative impact Apprendi could have on defendants). As noted
in Part I, because of the effect of relevant conduct provisions, defendants likely will
not risk taking their case to a jury even if it is probable they will be acquitted on some
counts because that acquitted conduct could still be used against them at sentencing.
Now, however, when the defendant pleads guilty, she must plead guilty to all of the
facts that are deemed elements of the offense (including, for example, drug quantity),
so she will no longer have a sentencing hearing on those factors. See Bibas, supra note
7, at 1160-65 (using a hypothetical case of drug trafficking to illustrate how Apprendi
might work in practice); see also Ross, supra note 48, at 200 (arguing that this increase
in stipulated factors will also lead to greater charge bargaining, which, in turn, will give
prosecutors even more power). Based on this dynamic, Stephanos Bibas argues that
the Court should have adopted instead a rule to "fit the legal landscape of the old,"
which would have included plea bargaining and the Guidelines. Bibas, supra note 7, at
1159. His proposed rule, however, makes no pretense of protecting the jury trial guar-
antee.
While I disagree with his solution, Bibas highlights that the relevant conduct
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines may make it futile for the defendant to take
her case to the jury. See Bibas, supra note 7, at 1165 (explaining that, for most defen-
dants, "the relevant-conduct rule undercuts any benefits from the reasonable-doubt
standard"). Otherwise, placing a fact with the jury will strengthen the defendant's po-
sition. In the absence of a relevant conduct provision, if a defendant is acquitted of
some subset of charges, her sentence cannot be increased as a matter of law on the ba-
sis of that conduct. Thus, if she has a strong case, she can plea bargain with the prose-
cutor, knowing that the prosecutor will cut a better deal to avoid the risk of trial. See
id. at 1169-70 (conceding that a defendant can extract a better plea bargain if the
court's rule makes the threat of trial plausible).
327 Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 740 (1998) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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scheme of criminal justice designed for a society that is prepared to
leave criminal justice to the State, 32 s the Court seems to have em-
braced it wholeheartedly.
A. Reconceptualizing the jury's Domain
The Supreme Court's statutory maximum test for identifying what
juries must decide rests on the formalistic argument that the jury's
conviction authorizes punishment up to that point. The jury, in other
words, has acted as an appropriate gatekeeper because it has ruled on
the facts that establish that maximum punishment.
It undermines the point of the jury, however, to give them the
power to apply only the laws that impose the statutory maximum for
the offense because those laws represent only one of the laws in a pro-
ceeding that might be unjust to apply in a particular case or that
might be unjust as a general matter. To be sure, that authority allows
the jury to shield a defendant from all punishment if the jury acquits
the defendant of all charges. But if the jury convicts the defendant of
any of the charges, the government can seek to invoke additional
general laws that dictate criminal punishment in the same proceed-
ing.3 29 And those laws pose the same equitable threat as the law imposing
the statutory maximum. 330 Because the threat of overinclusive laws is the
same in the case of all general laws of blameworthiness that mandate
criminal punishment-whether sentencing laws or liability laws-the
response should also be the same: a check by the people, operating in
the judiciary, to provide an equitable check against executive and
328 Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
329 Indeed, because federal judges typically sentence defendants at the low end of
the permissible sentencing range, it is often the minimum allowable sentence (whether
from Guidelines or statutes) that holds the greatest practical importance for the de-
fendant, not the maximum.
330 Bill Stuntz questions whether this threat amounts to a strong "legal case,"
Stuntz, supra note 130, at 595, but nevertheless notes that, as a matter of logic:
[i]t is hard to understand why constitutional law should make it impossible for
legislatures to command that a given course of conduct be punished (the
power to acquit for any reason does away with that legislative power, at least in
theory), and yet leave legislatures free to require that, if behavior is to be pun-
ished, it should be punished at least so much.
Id. at 596. Indeed, this rationale can be used to explain why the Court reasoned in Ap-
prendi that the jury guarantee does not merely extend to the determination of guilt or
innocence, but also to the length of a defendant's sentence. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484.
The Court further noted that the criminal law "'is concerned not only with guilt or in-
nocence in the abstract, but also with the degree of criminal culpability' assessed." Id.
at 485 (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975)).
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legislative overreaching. It is insufficient to give the jury authority
over only a subset of those laws, as the Supreme Court's test does.
Put another way, in developing a benchmark for when legislatively
identified facts must be decided by the jury instead of the judge, the
key is whether the judiciary has sufficient discretion to ensure that a
general law is not applied to impose criminal punishment in an indi-
vidual case when it would be unjust to do so. If the judge's discretion
is greatly curtailed in this regard, the laws that mandate punishment
on the basis of those facts should be applied by juries, which have a
built-in discretionary power to check those laws and to ensure that
they properly lead to criminal punishment in an individual case.
When a law associates a particular fact with a particular pun-
ishment (or range of punishment), that law requires a judicial check
to secure its appropriate application in an individual case. The jury is
uniquely suited to that task because of its functional power to acquit
without review. If a legislature wishes to take advantage of the ex-
pressive and actual power of a generally applicable criminal law, it
must leave the responsibility of applying the law to the jury so that the
community's voice can check the general rule. But the legislature is
free to deem anything it wishes criminal-subject to other constitu-
tional limitations such as the Due Process Clause, Eighth Amendment,
and Ex Post Facto Clause. The legislature is limited simply in its abil-
ity to rest such key determinations with judges instead ofjuries unless,
at the very least,judges have general broad powers similar to the jury.
Thus, this limit leaves crucial substantive determinations with the
legislature, while preserving the jury's role as a check on the general
laws. And unlike the statutory maximum rule adopted by the Court,
which also leaves crucial substantive determinations to the legislature,
331 This is not meant to be an endorsement of mandatory sentences. The relative
merits of discretionary versus mandatory sentencing are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. Instead, the focus here is on how to guarantee that, when the legislature opts for
mandatory sentences,, the judiciary can provide an appropriate check.
332 Mark Knoll and Richard Singer have found that "no federal court, prior to
McMillan, had doubted that any statutorily enunciated fact which was tied to punish-
ment had to be pled in the indictment and proved at trial." Mark D. Knoll & Richard
G. Singer, Searching for the "Tail of the Dog": Finding "Elements" of Crimes in the Wake of
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SFATrLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1085 (1999). Stephanos Bibas
argues that judges at common law had the "discretion to downgrade felony sentences
of transportation to branding and to trigger the pardon and commutation process."
Bibas, supra note 7, at 1125. But allowing judges to depart downward at their discre-
tion based on the individual facts of a defendant's case is far different from requiring
them to increase a sentence when certain facts are found pursuant to a generally appli-
cable law.
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this rule does not allow the legislature to undermine the jury's role. It
is a real limit that protects the procedural guarantee of a jury trial
without requiring the courts to legislate.
It is a limit, moreover, that preserves the jury's power when cases
go to trial and when they are settled by plea. As noted above, under
the current Sentencing Guidelines regime, prosecutors determine the
deal they can offer the defendant with reference to the likely outcome
if the case goes to trial. Currently, as long as the jury convicts the de-
fendant of any charge, the defendant is subject to punishment on the
basis of all charges-and uncharged conduct as well-up to the
maximum for the charged offense. That maximum is often far higher
than the applicable Guidelines range, so it typically will not act as a
substantial check . Thus, even if the evidence on a particular charge
is weak, the prosecutor may still assume it could obtain a higher sen-
tence on the basis of that charge if the case went to trial because the
prosecutor believes it can convince a jury of the defendant's guilt on a
lesser charge and can convince a judge of the defendant's guilt on the
greater charge. Unlike the jury, the trial judge is not free to ignore
the law-because the prosecutor can appeal-so the judge must apply
the law and increase a sentence as long as she makes the relevant fac-
tual finding. 4 This becomes all the more likely because the prosecutor
need only prove her factual case by a preponderance of the
evidence. The prosecutor can therefore demand more at the bargain-
ing table because the jury's power at trial has been weakened.
In contrast, if all laws that require increased punishment must go
to the jury, the prosecutor would perform a different calculus in de-
termining what "bargain" to offer the defendant. In that situation, the
jury is the only judicial actor applying a general law imposing punish-
ment. Thus, if the jury would likely convict the defendant of a lesser
charge and acquit the defendant of a greater charge, the prosecutor
can no longer argue that the trialjudge must increase the defendant's
sentence on the basis of the acquitted conduct as a matter of law be-
cause there is no general law that the judge must apply. Instead, the
prosecutor can only appeal to the judge's discretiofi (assuming there
33 As Jacqueline Ross points out, the more significant threshold is likely to be a
mandatory minimum sentence. Jacqueline E. Ross, What Makes Sentencing Facts Contro-
versial? Four Problens Obscured by One Solution, 47 VILL. L. REV. 965, 969 (2002).
.34 Thus, only if the trial judge is willing to manipulate her factual findings can she
avoid what she might otherwise believe to be a harsh result. Although some judges
might engage in such tactics, many will find it offensive to their judicial task. In many
cases, then,judges will be applying laws that they believe produce unjust outcomes.
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is a sentencing range for the charged conduct). Because the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines frequently result in sentences higher than those judges
would prefer to impose, this limits the prosecutor's demands. Thus,
even under a plea bargaining scenario, the defendant's liberty interest
against the government receives greater protection when the jury ap-
plies laws imposing mandatory punishment.
This is true even though a regime with greater jury involvement
may create a greater likelihood of charge bargaining than the modi-
fied real offense regime in the Guidelines.: As noted, the modified
real offense regime is designed to check charge bargaining because it
requires the judge to take into account the full range of the defen-
dant's conduct at sentencing, whether that conduct was charged or
not. Under the regime proposed here, judges could not be required
to take uncharged conduct into account, thus bargaining over the
charge itself could take on greater meaning. But although prosecu-
tors may attempt to charge bargain more frequently under a regime
where all laws mandating criminal punishment must be applied byju-
ries, the defendant's interest is protected by the fact that the defen-
dant can reject the bargain and take her case to trial. Because the
prosecutor must make her decisions based on the anticipated result at
trial, the judiciary-juries and judges-indirectly exerts control over
the prosecutor's conduct in the bargain. As Daniel Richman has ob-
served, "From this ex ante perspective, the mere possibility of a jury
trial can bring an often overlooked degree of accountability into our
system of essentially administrative justice.,
336
Analyzing modern sentencing laws through this lens, two conclu-
sions can be drawn. First, facts that yield 'mandatory minimum
punishments in statutes must be decided by juries. The very term
335 But note that charge bargaining also occurs under the Sentencing Guidelines.
See FISHER, supra note 286, at 17 (explaining that "sentencing guidelines often em-
power prosecutors to dictate a defendant's sentence by manipulating the charges").
336 Richman, supra note 161, at 975. Richman also points out that:
The prosecutor who wants to maximize her conviction rate, by plea or by trial,
must make all her decisions in the shadow of projected jury responses. By do-
ing so, she gives the community a voice across the whole range of her case se-
lection decisions. It is not necessarily the strongest of voices, since considera-
tions of evidentiary strength or numerous other factors may predominate in
the calculus. Nor is it the clearest of voices, given the inscrutability of general
verdicts. And it is not a voice finely calibrated to differentiate among all cases.
Yet through it, the community has a far greater say in how prosecutors deploy
their resources than it has through any more direct mechanism of political
accountability.
Id. at 973-74 (footnotes omitted).
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"mandatory" reflects the legislature's intent to limitjudicial discretion
to make exceptions to these sentencing floors.3 3 ' And, in fact, the
judge's power to depart from these laws is minimal. Under federal
law, for example, the judge needs either the executive's permission
(in the form of a prosecutor's request for a substantial assistance de-
parture)3 s or the legislature's approval (through the defendant's
qualification for the narrow "safetyvalve" exception, which applies
only to low-level drug offenders who have no or minimal criminal his-
tory) 3 . Obviously, the judiciary's check on the legislature and execu-
tive is an ineffectual one if judges cannot ignore a general law of
blameworthiness without legislative or executive permission. This is
precisely the sort of situation in which the jury's check is so critical,
for it ensures that some judicial actor has the opportunity to intercede
before a general law of blameworthiness can be used to punish an in-
dividual.
The second conclusion that flows from this analysis is that the laws
linking facts to punishment in the Sentencing Guidelines should also
be found byjuries. As Part II explained, in many critical respects, the
Guidelines are indistinguishable from general criminal laws. The
Guidelines, as much as the underlying statutes to which they apply,
are binding laws.3 From a defendant's perspective, her liberty inter-
est is defined by the Guidelines to a much greater extent than by stat-
341ute.
337 Although mandatory minimums are "mandatory" forjudges, some "mandatory"
penalties are "discretionary" in the sense that prosecutors have the discretion whether or
not to bring charges tinder such laws. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory
Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 199, 202-14 (1993). As Schulhofer points out,
however, this exacerbates the problems posed by mandatory penalties because the dis-
cretion that exists with prosecutors is "largely unguided" and "exercised at the lowest
levels of visibility. Indeed, the very illegitimacy of such discretion in an ostensibly
mandatory system drives discretionary judgments further underground, obscures ac-
countability, and invites disparity and abuse." Id. at 221.
338 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000).
339 Id. § 3553(f).
340 See Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 523 n.ll (2000) (Thomas,J., concur-
ring) (stating that the Guidelines "have the force and effect of laws" (citing Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). As Judge Eugene
Nickerson explained, "The Commission's function is not to guide or give advice to a
Federal Court; it is to promulgate provisions, that is, laws that, unless they are uncon-
stitutional, the federal courts are bound by law to follow on pain of being reversed."
United States v. Norris, 128 F. Supp. 2d 739, 742 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), vacated by 281 F.3d
357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 949 (2002). He observed that "[t]he Guidelines,
despite the name bestowed upon them, do not 'guide' a district court. Rather they
direct a district court." Id. at 743.
341 See Rosenberg, supra note 285, at 493-95 (arguing that the Guidelines "confer a
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The effect and purpose of the Guidelines is the same as the effect
and purpose of general criminal laws: to declare blameworthy con-
342duct and establish the penalty for that conduct. Moreover, the fac-
tual determinations the Guidelines require judges to make are pre-
cisely those traditionally made byjuries. Justice Scalia has highlighted
the parallel with the following hypothetical: A state passes a single
crime of "knowingly causing injury to another," with various en-
hancements based on mens rea, severity of injury, and other circum-
stances. 43 Justice Scalia argued that it would destroy the meaning of
trial by jury to allow a judge to determine such facts as "whether the
defendant acted intentionally," "whether he used a deadly weapon,"
or "whether the victim ultimately died. 3 4 4 Although his hypothetical
had a thirty-day penalty for the base offense, with statutory enhance-
ments for each additional fact, it is difficult to see why the scheme
would be any less troublesome if a judge decided these same facts be-
cause the statute had one maximum penalty of life imprisonment and
the Commission passed different sentencing ranges based on the par-
ticulars of the offense. Yet that is exactly what the Guidelines do. The
Guidelines require a judge to increase the range of punishment to
which a defendant is exposed if the judge finds that the defendant
liberty interest that is entitled to due process protection"); Richard Singer, The Model
Penal Code and T-hre Two (Possibly Only One) Ways Courts Avoid Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REv. 139, 167 (2000) (arguing that the question of whether a fact is an offense ele-
ment or a sentencing factor should be decided based on the "impact on the defen-
dant, not the method by which the legislature has sought to make the impact").
342 Mark Knoll and Richard Singer attempt to distinguish the Guidelines from
other statutes on the basis that the Guidelines are never discussed or even adopted by
Congress, but instead become effective as long as Congress does not object. Thus, ac-
cording to their argument, "Congress has not, neither as a factual nor theoretical mat-
ter, considered the factors involved in the Guidelines with as much precision as it has
weighed the impact of factors that are expressly enunciated in a statute." Knoll &
Singer, supra note 332, at 1061 n.21. If anything, however, this argument lends even
greater support to the proposition that the jury find these facts. Under this characteri-
zation of the Sentencing Commission, only a non-democratic agency has concluded
that these facts are relevant to punishment, and it has placed the factfinding responsi-
bility in a non-democratic judiciary. Thus, at no point have the "people"-either in
the form of the legislature or the jury-had a say. This is completely contrary to the
constitutional design. At the very least, a jury should check the Sentencing Commis-
sion's determinations by finding these sentencing facts. On the other hand, if Con-
gress effectively monitors the Sentencing Commission such that the Guidelines it pro-
duces can fairly be characterized as the laws of Congress, then the Guidelines should
be treated the same as all other criminal laws and therefore be applied by juries.
343 Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 738 (1998) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
344 Id.
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used a dangerous weapon 34 or her offense resulted in the death of a• . 346
viCtim. The trial judge's decisions, moreover, can be appealed by
the prosecutor. Thus, if the judge attempts to mitigate the operation
of the Guidelines, the prosecutor can check the judge.
What complicates the constitutional analysis in the case of the
Guidelines, however, is that they allow judges to depart under certain
circumstances. Indeed, Congress directed the Commission to ensure
that its Guidelines would permit "sufficient flexibility to permit indi-
vidualized sentences."347 Thus, it is necessary to consider whether the
departure power actually allowed under the Guidelines gives judges a
sufficient check on general laws such that the jury power is unneces-
sary (as was arguably the case with the discretionary sentencing re-
gime). An inspection of how the Guidelines operate in practice shows
that they do not grant judges sufficient flexibility to mimic the jury's
function.
A trial judge can depart from the Guidelines in two main in-
stances. First, the Guidelines permit departure when the prosecution
files a motion requesting a sentence below the Guideline range be-
cause the defendant gave the government "substantial assistance.
Since this departure rests with the discretion of the prosecutor, not
the trial judge, it obviously does not allow trial judges to check abuse
by the prosecutor or correct what the trial judge believes to be an
overly broad application of a general law. Yet almost half of all depar-
349tures under the Guidelines result from this process.
A trial judge can also depart from the Guidelines if she "finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to
a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sen-
tence different from that described."350 The Sentencing Commission,
345 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1 (b) (1) (2002).
346 Id. § 2K2.1(c) (1) (B); see also United States v. Miller, No. 00-5142, 2001 WL
845256, at *1 (10th Cir. July 26, 2001) (upholding the use of two unconvicted homi-
cides as relevant conduct in setting the offense level).
347 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b) (1)(B) (2000).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2002).
349 See OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 233, at tbl.8 (showing that 35.4% of
all cases in 2001 resulted in downward departures and that almost half of these depar-
tures-9390 out of 19,416-were substantial assistance departures). Although the gov-
ernment's motion is a prerequisite, a district court can depart under § 5K1.1 if the
government refused to file a motion "based on an unconstitutional motive" such as
racial discrimination. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992).
350 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000). "In determining whether a circumstance was
adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sentencing
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however, has warned that this should be a "rare" situation because of
the breadth of its consideration. 5 ' Appellate courts have agreed, be-
lieving that "the Sentencing Commission has already considered, and
the Sentencing Guidelines have already factored in, many if not all
circumstances that are arguably relevant to criminal sentencing.
'3
52
Thus, "departures are not authorized where, at bottom, the sentenc-
ing court simply disagrees with the Commission's assessment of the
relative seriousness of the crime committed. ' ' For example, the Sev-
enth Circuit "held that the district court had no authority to reduce a
51 month prison sentence for a defendant who was acknowledged to
be mentally ill, who had suffered a history of abuse by her father, and
who everyone agreed was a danger to no one.' 4 While the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged the result was "harsh," it believed departure was
not permissible. " The Fourth Circuit has similarly asserted that the
trial court "may not depart from an otherwise applicable guideline
range simply because its own sense ofjustice would call for it.''
56
guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commis-
sion." Id.
351 Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that
Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 21, 47-48 (2000).
352 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 102. Indeed, this reasoning might explain
the fact that the government lost only twenty-nine percent of its appeals of downward
departures between 1996 and 2001. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 109 tbl.58 (2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/2001/table58.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 109 tbl.58 (2000), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/2000/table58.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 109 tbl.58 (1999), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/1999/table58.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 107 tbl.56 (1998), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/1998/table56.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 107 tbl.56 (1997), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/1997/table56.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FED-
ERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 79 tbl.51 (1996), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/1996/tab-51.pdf; see also FISHER, supra note 286, at 217 (using this statistic to
demonstrate that federal prosecutors rarely challenge judges' decisions to depart, but
when they do, they generally prevail).
353 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 100.
354 Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of
Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1441, 1469 n.98 (1997) (citing United
States v. Poff 926 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
355 Poff 926 F.2d at 593.
356 United States v. Barber, 93 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Kate Stith,
The Hegemony of the Sentencing Commission, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 14, 14 (1996)
("[T]he question whether the applicable guidelines produce justice in the case at hand
is not open for consideration either by sentencing courts or appellate courts.").
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Congress recently amended the Sentencing Guidelines to restrict
the already-limited discretion of trial judges even further."7 Congress
provided for de novo review of district court decisions applying the
Guidelines to the facts.358 Thus, Congress increased appellate scrutiny
of district court decisions to depart downward, effectively overruling
the Supreme Court's decision in Koon v. United States,3511 which held
that these determinations should be reviewed under the relatively
more deferential abuse of discretion standard.360 Congress further or-
dered the Sentencing Commission to review existing downward de-
parture grounds and promulgate "appropriate amendments to the
sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary to
ensure that the incidence of downward departures are substantially
reduced.",3 ' For defendants convicted of certain offenses-namely
certain crimes against children and sexual offenses-Congress for-
bade downward departures on any ground not "affirmatively and spe-
cifically identified" in Part K of the Guidelines' Chapter Five. 32 In ad-
dition, the Attorney General is now obligated to report to the
Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate any instance where the
district court grants a downward departure.
363
In stark contrast to this scrutiny of downward departures, appel-
late courts have held that a district court's discretionary decision not to
depart downward is unreviewable on appeal.364 Thus, the Guidelines
and appellate courts have created a regime that gives the prosecutor
enormous power to hold the districtjudge in check.
It is not surprising that the appellate courts have taken this ap-
proach to the Guidelines and that Congress recently increased their
authority. In many ways, an appellate judge approaches the question
in the same distant manner that a voter considers a criminal law. The
357 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children
TodayAct of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) ("PROTECT Act").
Id. § 401(d)(2).
359 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
360 Id. at 99-100.
361 PROTECT Act § 401 (m) (2) (A).
362 Id. § 401 (b) (1) (B).
363 Id. § 401 () (2) (A).
364 Berman, supra note 351, at 52 & n.116 (citing cases that affirm this principle).
Courts have been more receptive to appeals where a judge decides not to depart on
the basis of a legal misunderstanding about her authority to do so, rather than where a
judge acknowledges her authority but exercises the discretion not to depart. Id.; see
also United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 102 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing be-




appellate judge is removed from the individual circumstances. Her
function is to focus on the legal question before her.36 But, as dis-
cussed above, the purpose of the jury is to bring an equitable element
to criminal proceedings-the community's sense of justice-even if
the letter of the law would otherwise apply. Judges cannot replicate
this function if they face the threat of appellate review at the urging of
367the government.
Thus, as Kate Stith and Jos6 Cabranes have concluded in their
thoughtful analysis of the Guidelines:
The two phenomena (mandatory statutory minimums and mandatory
Guidelines ranges) are different manifestations of the same "counter-
reformation" against discretionary sentences. Mandatory sentences and
mandatory sentencing guidelines are both attempts to replace discre-
tionary sentencing with determinate sentencing 
....38
Michael Tonry has similarly observed that, although the Guide-
lines "were intended to be presumptive, not mandatory," they have
turned out in practice to be "more and more like mandatory sentenc-
ing laws." 36' Under the Sentencing Guidelines, judges possess nothing
akin to the jury's nullification power. Judges cannot simply opt to
365 As Daniel Freed put it:
Appeals court judges are reviewers, opinion writers, and rulemakers. They no
longer look defendants in the eye, study presentence reports, or struggle with
assessing whether an offender is beginning or ending a criminal career, ap-
pears to be dangerous or harmless, is a minnow in a sea of big fish, or has
gone astray under unusually stressful circumstances and will not offend again.
Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1728 (1992).
366 As Cynthia Lee notes, an appellate court is concerned more with future simi-
larly situated defendants than with the individual defendant in the case before it,
whereas the district judge is focused on the most appropriate sentence for the individ-
ual offender before the court and not so much on the implication of her decision for
future cases. Cynthia K.Y. Lee, A New "Sliding Scale of Deference" Approach to Abuse of Dis-
cretion: Appellate Review of District Court Departures under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 33-34 (1997).
367 This is especially true given the number of factors the Sentencing Guidelines
declare off-limits for sentencing purposes. The Sentencing Commission has consid-
ered some factors not relevant as grounds for departure in any case. See U.S. SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (2002) (discussing drug or alcohol depend-
ency); id. § 5H1.10 (covering race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and
socioeconomic status). And the Commission has determined that it is ordinarily inap-
propriate for judges to consider a defendant's education and vocational skills, age,
mental and emotional condition, employment record, family ties and responsibilities,
and community ties. Id. §§ 5Hl.l,.2,.3,.5,.6.
36 STIT1H & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 123.
369 Tonry, supra note 6, at 129.
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ignore the law-in a particular case or as a general matter-to further
their view of what a just outcome would be. Indeed, judges cannot
disagree with the Guidelines in any respect as long as the Sentencing
Commission made an ex ante judgment on the treatment of a factor.
Trial judges have thus come "to view their role under the Guidelines
as 'judicial accountants.' 370 As a result, "the awesome power of the
state to inflict suffering is wielded as an exercise in bureaucratic regu-
larity, for which no one, ultimately, bears responsibility.,
371
The Constitution provides a mechanism for checking this kind of
administrative regime: the people. Judges are not the only judicial
actors. Juries-the other judicial branch-have tools to check the
administration of criminal laws. The criminal jury's very function is to
check the government when it implements a scheme of general laws
that dictate criminal punishment. Because the Guidelines fall into
that category, they should be treated like all other criminal laws, and
they should be applied by thejury.
It is important to recognize, however, that this analysis would not
apply to all sentencing guideline schemes. For example, states such as
Utah, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, Arkansas, and Missouri have vol-
untary guidelines that are not subject to appeal.3 72 Because judges in
these states have unlimited authority to ignore the guidelines ifjustice
so requires in an individual case, these regimes do not suffer from the
same fatal defect as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 73 Thus, it is
possible to create a guideline regime that is consistent with the jury
guarantee and the constitutional commitment to individualized jus-
tice in criminal cases. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are just not
such an example.
370 Berman, supra note 351, at 72 (quotingJack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second
Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 357, 364 (1992)).
371 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 103.
372 Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing Guide-
lines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425, 428 (2000).
373 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court appears to have interpreted its state's guide-
lines as advisory, too. See Reitz, supra note 354, at 1478-79 (describing Pennsylvania
court decisions regarding review of state guidelines). A tougher question is whether a
state like Minnesota, where "mitigated departures have almost never been reversed on
appeal," provides enough of a judicial check. Id. at 1486. Although this Article pro-
vides a framework for analyzing such state sentencing guideline systems-i.e., those
that fall between the extremely limited discretion allowed under the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines and the broad discretion permitted in voluntary regimes-the actual
analysis of these state systems is beyond the scope of this Article.
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B. Confronting the Objections
The test identified in this Article for identifying laws that must be
applied by juries is subject to at least two major objections. One pos-
sible objection to this analysis is that it could lead to a return to the
pre-Guidelines world of unpredictable and disparate punishments.74
Thus, some might argue that the Constitution should not be inter-
preted to yield such an undesirable result.
There is, however, reason to doubt that the pre-Guidelines level of
disparity will reemerge under this interpretation. After all, nothing in
this analysis precludes a legislature from specifying how a fact will af-
fect punishment. Rather, it simply requires the jury to find the rele-
vant fact when that fact has been linked with a specified amount of
punishment and the discretion ofjudges is sharply curtailed in depart-
ing from such a law. The legislature may conclude that the benefits of
mandating the punishment associated with particular facts justify the
costs of giving the factfinding responsibility to the jury. In particular,
by specifying the consequences of a particular fact, the legislature may
increase the deterrent effect of the law. Sentences imposed byjudges
before the Guidelines tended to be more lenient than the sentences
prescribed in the Guidelines, especially for drug offenders andS • 37:i
white-collar criminals. Thus, by specifying the punishment, the leg-
islature can prevent judges from imposing a weaker punishment than
it would prefer in some cases. All else being equal, the greater the
punishment, the greater the deterrence. And, too, by specifying the
punishment associated with a particular fact, the legislature can
achieve greater uniformity and predictability in sentencing. Political
pressures may also motivate legislatures to specify punishment.
The benefits of specifying the punitive effects of a particular fact,
therefore, will be weighed against the costs of vesting those factual
374 SeeJEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICANJUSTICE
132 (1949) (arguing that 'jury-made law" is capricious and tends to produce arbitrary
results); FRANKEL, supra note 238, at 5-49 (criticizing unbounded judicial discretion);
Saltzburg, supra note 48, at 250-51 (worrying that Apprendi could lead to a return to the
"original broad sentencing ranges of the old days"); see also Dale W. Broeder, The Func-
tions of theJury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 386, 413 (1954) (noting that 'juries
are permitted to deal differently with persons who are similarly situated"); Katyal, supra
note 207, at 2420 (arguing that a uniform system like the Sentencing Guidelines can
create more deterrence by accounting for "substitution" and "complementarity" ef-
fects). But see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 106 (disagreeing that the level of
disparity before the Guidelines was "shameful").
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 60-61 (citing the Commission's effort to
raise penalties for drug offenders and white-collar criminals from past practice).
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findings with thejury. Those costs are, admittedly, not slight. Increas-
ing the number of facts ajury must find at trial could make an already
cumbersome trial process even more unwieldy. Moreover, the prose-
cutor must prove the facts under the rules of evidence and with the
burden of the reasonable doubt standard, which, in addition to the
jury's power to nullify, decreases the chances that the prosecutor will
be successful. 6 Thus, for each type of factual determination, the leg-
islature must determine whether the value of specifying its effect on
punishment in advance outweighs the increased procedural costs of
having it decided at trial. For many facts, it will be worth keeping the
prescribed punishment, even if the fact must be decided by ajury.
There is even less cause for concern about disparity if a de mini-
mis exception is recognized for relatively small sentencing enhance-
ments. That is, it is possible to construct a constitutional rule that
would require proof to ajury of only those facts that have a significant
effect on a defendant's sentence by a particular percentage increase
over the base sentence or by an absolute number of months, for ex-
ample.37 A panel of judges from the Sixth Circuit, for instance, has
argued that a fact must be tried by a jury if the risk of error in
determining the issue is more than slight and the factor would "sub-
stantially affect[]" the sentence.3 78 To avoid confusion in the lower
courts with such a vague standard, the Supreme Court could adopt a
376 This Article does not address the related, but separate, questions of when a leg-
islature can alter the burden of proof or create affirmative defenses. Such questions
raise issues of due process, rather than of the jury's power, because the jury decides
whether the fact has been proven no matter which party bears the burden or what
standard of proof applies. Similarly, when a legislature can use a civil penalty regime
to dodge the criminal jury requirement and other criminal trial procedures is beyond
the scope of this Article. For a good overview of this topic, see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done
About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1878 (1992); Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil
Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 679, 690 (1999); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process,
and the Civil-CriminalLine, 7J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 7-15 (1996).
377 See Richard Singer & Mark D. Knoll, Elements and Sentencing Factors: A Reassess-
ment of the Alleged Distinction, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 203, 205 (2000) (describing a
bright-line test which would allow the consideration of facts only if they increase the
defendant's sentence by a particular percentage); Singer, supra note 341, at 169-70
(discussing the possibility of utilizing a significant percentage increase in a sentence or
an increase greater than six months as triggers for when facts need to be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt to ajury); see also Sundby, supra note 316, at 508 (arguing that
requiring facts that make a "substantial difference" in punishment to be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt is a "quasi-procedural" rule "because a fact's importance is
still derived from the legislature's decision to use the fact as a significant factor for
measuring criminal responsibility").
378 United States v. Rigsby, 943 F.2d 631, 64243 (6th Cir. 1991).
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bright-line rule implementing the Constitution. It could state that
only facts that increase imprisonment (as opposed to facts that in-
crease fines) need go to the jury, and only if the increase is greater
than six months. Although a six-month line may seem somewhat arbi-
trary, this is the same limit the Court uses to determine whether an of-
fense is serious enough to warrant ajury trial or whether it is "petty"
and can be tried without ajuryY
Even without such a'de minimis exception, there is nothing to
stop the legislature from proposing voluntary, not mandatory, guide-
lines for how facts not specified in the code should affect a sentence.
The Sentencing Guidelines could become real guidelines-for the
judge to use at her discretion-instead of a mandatory code. Al-
though judges will undoubtedly depart, these guidelines will serve as
benchmarks that should also make the variation far less pronounced
than it was when judges had no idea what other judges were doing
with similar cases. Indeed, there is some evidence that states with vol-
untary sentencing guidelines have experienced disparity reduction .
For all these reasons, the disparity that existed before the Guide-
lines need not reemerge to the same degree. Nevertheless, because
the constitutional analysis presented here vests a judicial actor with
more discretion, there would inevitably be greater disparity and un-
predictability than that which exists currently under the Guidelines.
First, as a result of this inevitable tradeoff, some facts will not be
deemed worth the additional trial costs because they are not as impor-
tant or because they would be difficult for the government to prove to
a jury under trial rules. The effect of those facts on a sentence will
therefore be left to the discretion of the trial judge, who will operate
presumably within a wider sentencing range. Second, even for those
facts that must be found by a jury, there may be more disparity than
when those facts rested with judges because of greater variation
among juries in applying the law than among judges. This disparity
will arise because trial judges face an appellate check and juries do
not.
379 Singer & Knoll, supra note 377, at 205; Singer, supra note 341, at 170. Another
possibility is a one-year line, a standard that Stephen Saltzburg notes is consistent with
most definitions of a felony. Saltzburg, supra note 48, at 252. Stephanos Bibas notes
that, even before Apprendi, some courts treated as elements those facts that elevated
misdemeanor penalties to felony levels. Bibas, supra note 7, at 1182 n.473.
See Frase, supra note 372, at 436 (noting that five guideline states have reported
data showing disparity reductions and that two of the five states are appropriately char-
acterized as having "voluntary" guidelines).
2003]
120 UNIVERSITY OF PENNS YL VA NIA LAW REVIEW
Thus, while it is likely that the sentencing disparity will not be as
great as it was pre-Guidelines, the results may not be as uniform and
predictable as they are under the Guidelines' administrative regime.
This is, of course, the tension that arises whenever an institutional ac-
tor is given unreviewable discretion. The discretion allows the actor
flexibility to do justice and treat cases differently when necessary, but
it also provides an opportunity for discrimination and disparate
treatment. The Constitution's commitment to the jury reflects the
judgment that, in the criminal context, the loss of certainty is out-
weighed by the benefits of individualized determinations. In return
for the cost of some disparity, we receive one more check on the gov-
ernment's awesome power to declare behavior criminal and deprive
an individual of her liberty. Just as the reasonable doubt standard is
designed to protect the innocent, so, too, is the jury's power under
the Constitution designed to protect the legally and morally inno-
cent.
The potential increase in disparity that results fromjudicial discre-
tion is the tradeoff for individualizing justice and respecting individ-
ual liberty. Under a truly mechanical application of the law, it may
appear that disparity is eradicated. But the uniformity that results is
not without costs. Indeed, as Stephen Schulhofer has noted, manda-
tory sentencing laws result in several troubling consequences8 3  Be-
cause "Congress can never foresee the full range of circumstances to
which a mandatory might apply or the full scope of interconnections
to other pertinent federal and state criminal statutes," drafting mis-
takes will inevitably occur. 4 Even if such mistakes could be elimi-
nated, mandatory sentences result in too much uniformity, treating
unlike offenders similarly when their conduct is not equally blame-
worthy.3s 5 "Important differences among offenders are by nature diffi-
cult to anticipate and categorize. Hence, uniform treatment through
381 This tension between uniformity and discretion is seen in the death penalty
context where the jury's discretion must be bounded, but where the jury must also be
permitted the discretion to take into account mitigating factors.
382 This same rationale explains executive pardons and prosecutorial discretion
not to bring charges.
383 See Schulhofer, supra note 337, at 208-13 (discussing potential adverse conse-
quences of implementing a mandatory sentencing regime).
384 Id. at 210.
385 See Schulhofer, supra note 192, at 835-36 (delineating three forms of inequality
that can result from sentencing: the imposition of different sentences on similar of-
fenders, the imposition of similar sentences on different offenders, and the imposition
of different sentences as determined by insufficiently relevant differences).
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mandatories invariably produces unfairness and generates systematic
pressure for evasion., 3 6 The judiciary is designed to protect and rec-
ognize these individual differences. If judges lack the freedom to
make such distinctions, at the very least, the jury must be given the
opportunity. The cost is additional disparity, but the gain is a respect
for individual circumstances. Allowing a judicial check, in other
words, errs on the side of liberty.
There is, however, still a second objection to the test advanced
here. Criminal trials are about more than subjecting a defendant to
loss of her property or liberty. After all, individuals face loss of prop-
erty or liberty in civil commitment proceedings as well. A criminal
trial also has a powerful expressive component. A conviction brands
the defendant a criminal and thereby reflects a community judgment
that an individual has violated the standards of the community. 7
Unlike tort law, in which the victim proceeds against a defendant,
criminal law is about more than a private wrong. It is about an offense
against the community and its values. Thus, a conviction carries with
it the message that the defendant's actions are morally blameworthy
in the eyes of the community.38 "[I] t conveys a symbolism of censure,
condemnation, and reprobation."8 9 The criminal proceeding conveys
"the Law, the authoritative voice of society, using force and authority
publicly to enact its basic terms and relationships and to impress
them, like a template, upon the conduct of social life."390 Thus, the
defendant and the public at large learn what is blameworthy from
what is labeled criminal.
386 Schulhofer, supra note 337, at 211.
387 See Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales ofJustice: Burdens of Persua-
sion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1339 (1977) ("The special character of a
criminal conviction lies in its substantial stigmatizing effect, the possibility of impris-
onment, and the fact that it serves not merely to impose costs on the defendant but
also to express the condemnation of the community.").
388 See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Crimi-
nal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 807 (1997) (describing the relationship be-
tween criminal punishment and societal judgments of blame); see also Dan M. Kahan,
What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean , 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 598 (1996) (observing that,
"[u]nder the expressive view, the signification of punishment is moral condemna-
tion").
489 DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 265 (1990).
390 Id.
,See id. at 260-65 (describing the audience of penality); see alsoJohn C. Coffee,
Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinc-
tion in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 200-01, 223-25 (1991) (discussing the social-
izing effects of labeling an activity as "criminal").
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The Constitution recognizes the powerful message carried by the
criminal law and imposes special procedural checks so that it is not
abused by the state.9 The chief among these is the jury. Judge Baze-
lon believed that "[t]he very essence of the jury's function is its role as
spokesman for the community conscience in determining whether or
not blame can be imposed."393  For example, Northern juries sent
powerful messages when they refused to hold defendants criminally
responsible for aiding fugitive slaves in escaping from their owners.
Southern juries also sent a strong, if disturbing, message when they
acquitted whites who committed crimes against African Americans
and civil rights workers. The acquittal in the celebrated murder trial
of O.J. Simpson also served a valuable communicative function. It re-
flected the distrust many African Americans in Los Angeles felt toward
the police as a result of racist and brutal police practices.394 Whether
or not we agree with the jury's message, the communicative function
of ajury verdict and its link with community notions of blameworthi-
ness cannot be denied. The Supreme Court has thus recognized that
"one of the most important functions any jury can perform. .. is to
maintain a link between contemporary community values and the pe-
nal system."
3 95
The standard advocated in this Article for identifying offense ele-
ments that must go to the jury is not, however, directly tied to this ex-
pressive component of a conviction, for the standard would apply to
sentencing guidelines that merely increase sentences but do not result
in additional "convictions. ' 396 Nor do I attempt to identify facts that,
392 See Steiker, supra note 388, at 809 ("[T]he definition of punishment as blaming
implies the need for a special procedural regime within which punishment should be
imposed, both to limit the state's ability to harness the power of blame and to preserve
blaming as a social practice.").
3 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
394 See Craig Haney, Commonsense Justice and Capital Punishment: Problematizing the
"Will of the People", 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoI.'Y & L. 303, 314-15 (1997) (noting that the
Simpson verdict was "based in part on a very messy empirical reality with which people
of color in Los Angeles had been grappling for some years-a hostile, often racist and
untrustworthy, and at times even brutal police force ... .
3% Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.15 (1968); see also Scheflin, supra
note 144, at 192 ("If crime is unacceptable deviance from community values and stan-
dards, then a communityjudgment on that deviance must be made.").
396 See O'Sullivan, supra note 245, at 1376 (explaining that the resolution of Seri-
tencing Guidelines questions "does not impose upon the defendant the stigma of a
criminal conviction" because "[t]he defendant has no criminal judgment lodged
against him, bears no notation on his rap sheet regarding such conduct, and suffers no
continuing civil disabilities by virtue of it").
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by their nature, connote blame and therefore must be decided by a
jury, whether or not they are enacted into positive law. Thus, like the
Court's analysis in Mullaney v. Wilbur 97 and Apprendi, '8 the test I advo-
cate relies on punishment established by criminal laws as a proxy for
blameworthiness and stigma.
To be sure, attaching punishment to a fact in a general law is "an
index of the community's moral judgment upon it."'9 9 Indeed, Kyron
Huigens recently argued that "[a] ny aspect of wrongdoing that is sin-
gled out for purposes of determining the relative severity of the
wrongdoing is by definition a matter of fault., 40 0 From that premise,
he concludes that all positive laws mandating punishment must be de-
cided by juries because juries are the institutional actors charged with
assigning blame and making determinations of wrongdoing and fault.
40'
In short, Huigens approaches what he calls the Apprendi puzzle by at-
tempting to forge a theory of punishment based on the jury's role as
the determiner of criminal fault and the judge's role as the deter-
miner of what is a proportional sentence, as opposed to approaching
the problem as a question of institutional separation of powers. Thus,
although Huigens approaches the issue from a vastly different per-
spective than does this Article, he ends up advocating a similar test for
identifying offense elements. In other words, Huigens believes the
3q7 421 U.S. 684 (1975); see also Ronald Jay Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme
Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law-An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Inter-
vention, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 269, 281 (1977) (agreeing with Mark Tushnet that the Court
in Mullaney used the defendant's liberty interest as a proxy for stigmatization and that
stigmatization itself did not play an independent role); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional
Limitation of Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 55 B.U. L. REV. 775, 799 (1975) ("[R]elying on statutory penalties to measure
stigma means that the interest in minimizing stigmatization is swallowed by the interest
in avoiding a harsher sentence."). The link between stigma and punishment may,
however, help explain the differential treatment of recidivism in Almendarez-Torres, 523
U.S. 224 (1998). The defendant already suffers from the stigma of the prior offense,
so using it to increase a sentence does not impose additional stigma. Rather, only the
defendant's liberty interest is at stake.
3908 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
199 Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 52, at 980. "Broadly speaking, acts [at the
common law] were dealt with summarily which did not offend too deeply the moral
purposes of the community, which were not too close to society's danger, and were
stigmatized by punishment relatively light." Id. at 980-81; see also Andrew von Hirsch,
Censure and Proportionality, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 235, at 115, 118
("[I]f punishment conveys blame, it would seem logical that the quantum of punish-
ment should bear a reasonable relation to the degree of blameworthiness of the crimi-
nal conduct.").
400 Huigens, supra note 7, at 455.
101 Id. at 432-34.
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test suggested here is the right test even if one approaches the prob-
lem by focusing on the jury's role in expressing blame.42
Although Huigens makes a persuasive case, there is a limit to how
far this argument can go because the enactment of positive law is an
imperfect index of blameworthiness. Not all sentencing laws are en-
acted on the basis of a retributive or just-deserts sentencing philoso-
phy. For example, in the federal system, the Guidelines are not based
on any particular philosophy of punishment. Instead, they are based
largely on averages of past practice. While some sentences might have
been set based on a rehabilitative rationale, others may have been
based on deterrence or retributive concerns. Thus, using the sen-
tence as a moral compass is somewhat misleading. What is necessary
to achieve optimal deterrence does not necessarily correspond to a
sense of moral blame.
To identify accurately those elements of a crime that make the of-
fense a blameworthy one, we would need to define elements not by
procedure or consequence (i.e., defining "crime" in terms of whether
it is part of a positive law that imposes criminal punishment), but by a
substantive standard that reflects moral blameworthiness.
This is a road many eminent scholars have traveled. Henry Hart,
for example, argued that it makes little sense "to insist upon proce-
dural safeguards in criminal prosecutions if anything whatever can be
made a crime in the first place[.]" 40 3 Rather, he contended, a crime
must reflect the judgment of community condemnation. ° 4 Herbert
402 Huigens distinguishes between what he calls positive fault considerations and
interstitial fault considerations. Id. at 433. "Positive fault considerations are those
that... have been stated in positive law," id., and Huigens argues that they must,
therefore, go to the jury, id. at 434. Interstitial fault considerations, in contrast, are not
enacted into positive laws but instead arise "ex post, in the course of adjudication." Id.
at 433. Huigens allows those determinations to be made by judges as well as juries;
thus, his test would also draw a distinction between mandatory and discretionary sen-
tencing guidelines. Id. at 434. As he puts it:
If fault considerations are enacted into positive law at all, then this is evidence
that they pertain to wrongdoing and to the jury's determination of whether
punishment is justified in the case. In contrast, the fault determinations that
the sentencing court makes involve considerations that are not positively en-
acted into rules, because they are relevant to a broader inquiry into character
that bears on the determination of a proportionate punishment.
Id. at 450.
403 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401,431 (1958).
404 See id. at 404-05 ("'What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction ... is the




Packer and others have argued that a "crime" must include a mens rea
element because "moral blameworthiness should be the indispensableS405
condition precedent" to the imposition of a criminal sanction. At
the very least, argues Joel Feinberg, we should not permit imprison-
ment on the basis of strict liability because "imprisonment in modern
times has taken on the symbolism of public reprobation.
The Supreme Court briefly toyed with the notion of a substantive
limit in Robinson v. California4 0 7 and Lambert v. California,4 0 ' but those
cases have proven to be anomalies. "[F] ew who have worn the judicial
robes have sensed in themselves an individual capacity to trump forth-
right legislative decisions to attach the criminal stigma to X or to any
other act or omission that is not privileged by virtue of a recognized
constitutional right. 4 09  The judiciary has been reluctant to second-
guess the legislature on what constitutes a "crime" because of the nec-
essary policy judgments that underlie such a determination. To be
sure,judges have attempted to maintain the moral component of the
criminal law either by interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions to
require mens rea4 1 or by recognizing a mistake of law defense when
405 Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107, 148;
see alsoJeffries & Stephan, supra note 316, at 1374 ("At least when the offense carries
serious sanctions and the stigma of official condemnation, liability should be reserved
for persons whose blameworthiness has been established."); cf Stuntz, supra note 376,
at 7 (arguing that criminal procedural rules are "worthless" and may be "perverse"
without substantive limits on criminal law); Ann Hopkins, Comment, Mens Rea and the
Right to Trial by Jury, 76 CAL. L. REv. 391, 416 (1988) (arguing that, because mens rea
was a jury question and a prerequisite for finding criminal guilt when the Constitution
was written, the Sixth Amendment requires ajury finding of blameworthiness). Packer
further argued that substantive limits should be placed on victimless crimes. See Her-
bert L. Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at "Sub-
stantive Due Process, "44 S. CAL. L. REv. 490, 493 (1971) (questioning whether there is a
"rational basis" for "victimless crimes").
406 Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in A READER ON PUN-
ISHMENT, supra note 235, at 73, 84.
407 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that it is cruel and unusual punishment to
imprison someone on the basis of his status as a drug addict).
408 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957) (concluding that conviction under a registration law
requires "actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such
knowledge and subsequent failure to comply" because "'[a] law which punished con-
duct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would
be too severe for that community to bear"' (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
THE COMMON LAW 50 (Boston, Little, Brown 1881))).
4W. Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 1269, 1277 (1998).
410 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (stating that statutes
not explicitly requiring mens rea must be construed "in light of the background rules
of the common law ... in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly
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the underlying conduct of the defendant "violates no moral norms
independent of the law that prohibits it., 41' But they have not gone so
far as to insist that legislative pronouncements include specific ele-
ments as a constitutional matter. The Supreme Court has therefore•412
approved even those crimes that lack a mens rea requirement.
The judiciary's reluctance is understandable. Moral blamewor-
thiness is a moving target. It varies over time as well as across geogra-
phy. While environmental polluting might not have been deemed
morally reprehensible fifty years ago, it is today-at least in some
413communities. How can one anchor a constitutional standard in a
concept of blame that is so inherently malleable?
414
Although it is imprecise, using a mandated punishment barome-
ter to define the laws to be applied by juries allows the courts to track
changing conceptions of moral blameworthiness, albeit imperfectly,
while still placing a limit on the legislature's ability to avoid the Con-
stitution's procedural guarantees.4 This limit therefore seems to
strike the best balance among the responsibilities and abilities of the
legislature and the judiciary.
embedded"); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (holding that Con-
gress's "mere omission from § 641 of any mention of intent will not be construed as
eliminating that element from the crimes denounced").
Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 127, 149 (1997); cf Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L.
REv. 828, 834 (1999) (arguing that the Court will reject strict liability crimes, "if the
other elements of the crime, with the strict liability element excluded, could not them-
selves be made a crime").
412 See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975) (recognizing that an act
of Congress need not "make criminal liability turn on" consciousness of wrongdoing);
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (stating that a person can be
guilty of violating section 301 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act "'without
any conscious fraud at all"' (quoting United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 497
(1911))); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) (holding that whether sci-
enter is a necessary element of a statutory crime "is a question of legislative intent").
413 For that reason, it is no solution to define "blame" according to a common law
benchmark. See Bibas, supra note 7, at 1181 (arguing that, if legislatures want to "tap
into common-law stigma," ajury must decide "the classic elements of classic common-
law crimes, particularly mens rea requirements"). Why should only those offenses that
were stigmatized 200 years ago be protected today? After all, carjacking, toxic dump-
ing, and a host of other statutory offenses are considered by many to be quite morally
blameworthy, even without a direct common law analogue.
414 Tushnet, supra note 397, at 800 ("The criteria upon which a constitutional doc-
trine rests should not be tied to factors as changeable as the current social view of the
inherent opprobrium of given conduct.").
415 "The Framers chose to protect defendants, not primarily by regulating the sub-
stance of the criminal law, but by establishing certain trial procedures to be followed in




Under the mandatory sentencing regime that now exists at the
federal level-and in some states-prosecutors possess the bulk of the
discretion to ensure that individual laws should be applied to particu-
lar defendants. Unsurprisingly, this regime has sparked a great deal
of commentary on why judges should have more discretion in check-
ing prosecutorial abuse and ensuring that justice is served in each
case.
What has been forgotten, however, is that there is another judicial
actor in criminal cases and that it has the power to bring discretion to
bear even on mandatory laws. The jury's power to issue an unreview-
able general verdict of acquittal gives juries wide latitude to make de-
cisions in individual cases on the basis of the jury's sense ofjustice, not
the mechanical application of law to facts. This is critical in the
criminal context, in which society is passing moral judgment on and
imposing punishment for the behavior of the defendant.
But the jury can exercise this function only if it has the power to
pass judgment on all general laws mandating criminal punishment.
In that situation, where the trial judge cannot bring discretion to bear
on an individual case, the jury is the last check on government abuse
and overbroad criminal laws.
Although this Article advocates a constitutional test that gives ju-
ries the power to apply laws that link facts with specific levels of pun-
ishment, it does not advocate a mandatory punishment scheme over a
discretionary one. Rather, the focus here addresses what should be
done when a legislature makes the decision to switch from a discre-
tionary sentencing regime to a mandatory sentencing regime. While
the legislature is free to make such a decision, the constitutional de-
sign contemplates ajudicial check in either case. In the discretionary
scheme, trial judges are able to ensure individualized justice. In a
mandatory regime, only the jury can supply a meaningful judicial
check.
This check is not, of course, a perfect one. Many criticisms of ju-
ries are well taken. But, when judges lack the discretion to ensure jus-
tice in an individual case, juries are a fair price for "free nations...
[to] pay for their liberty.
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